MAADBench: The Refreshable Paradigm for Anomaly Detection in Multi-Agent Systems

The rapid integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) has significantly enhanced their collaborative problem-solving capabilities, but it has also expanded their attack surfaces, exposing them to vulnerabilities such as prompt infection and compromised inter-agent communication. While emerging graph-based anomaly detection methods show promise in protecting these networks, the field currently lacks a standardized, reproducible environment to train these models and evaluate their efficacy. To address this gap, we introduce Gammaf (Graph-based Anomaly Monitoring for LLM Multi-Agent systems Framework), an open-source benchmarking platform. Gammaf is not a novel defense mechanism itself, but rather a comprehensive evaluation architecture designed to generate synthetic multi-agent interaction datasets and benchmark the performance of existing and future defense models. The proposed framework operates through two interdependent pipelines: a Training Data Generation stage, which simulates debates across varied network topologies to capture interactions as robust attributed graphs, and a Defense System Benchmarking stage, which actively evaluates defense models by dynamically isolating flagged adversarial nodes during live inference rounds. Through rigorous evaluation using established defense baselines (XG-Guard and BlindGuard) across multiple knowledge tasks (such as MMLU-Pro and GSM8K), we demonstrate Gammaf's high utility, topological scalability, and execution efficiency. Furthermore, our experimental results reveal that equipping an LLM-MAS with effective attack remediation not only recovers system integrity but also substantially reduces overall operational costs by facilitating early consensus and cutting off the extensive token generation typical of adversarial agents.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) built on Large Language Models (LLMs) are proliferating rapidly, but their heterogeneous execution traces provide no common basis for evaluation across methods. Outcome-only benchmarks discard collaborations, whereas LLM-as-Judge evaluation requires additional, model-dependent inference and can vary with the LLM and rubric. We introduce a generalizable evaluation framework that maps native MAS traces into a shared space of unified collaboration graphs, enabling different methods to be evaluated under the same representation, reference set, and metric panel. Candidate graphs are compared with a query-specific reference forest. Each forest is a benchmark-provided collection of verified-success graphs: it records diverse ways in which representative MAS methods can complete the task, rather than prescribing a unique optimal process. Instantiating the framework as ForestBench, we filter $844$ collaboration-necessary queries from seven public datasets, precompute ten successful target-conditioned reference graphs per query, and evaluate six representative MAS frameworks. Controlled backbone, reference-construction, and perturbation studies test the stability and scope of evaluation. Once the benchmark forests are built, ForestBench scores a trace in milliseconds without further LLM inference, providing a reusable structural basis for comparing diverse MAS collaboration traces.

While enabling effective collaboration on complex tasks, LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) face critical security challenges due to vulnerabilities at the agent and interaction levels. Most existing MAS security defenses are built upon two core assumptions: semantically-explicit malicious attacks and explicit graph-based modeling of the MAS topology and agent-level interactions. In practice, real-world attacks are becoming more semantically stealthy, while MAS execution is typically asynchronous without the temporal alignment assumed by graph-based propagation models. To address these limitations, we propose AcMAS, an activation-based framework for malicious-behavior detection in MAS. By analyzing internal reasoning states in the activation space of local agents, AcMAS detects even stealthy attacks in a synchronization-robust fashion, without relying on explicit interaction graphs. Moreover, our activation analysis provides critical signals to guide AcMAS in restoring the functionality of compromised agents, rather than the disruptive agent isolation commonly used by the state-of-the-art methods. Comprehensive evaluation demonstrates that AcMAS significantly outperforms graph-based baselines against stealthy attacks, by +0.22 F1 in synchronous settings (0.94 vs. 0.72) and by +0.55 F1 in asynchronous settings (0.93 vs. 0.38), with generalization across diverse open-source LLM backbones, attack intensity, and MAS scale.