Diagnosing and Improving Probabilistic Reasoning in Large Language Models

We investigate the probabilistic reasoning capabilities of large language models through a controlled benchmarking study on discrete probability problems. We constructed two datasets, respectively a set of standard exercises and a set of counterintuitive exercises, designed to trigger heuristic reasoning, and evaluated 8 state-of-the-art models, each tested with and without Chain-of-Thought prompting. Models achieve an average accuracy of 0.96 on standard problems but only 0.59 on counterintuitive ones. We further provide empirical evidence of token bias: performance drops by over 20% when canonical formulations are replaced by disguised variants. Embedding misleading suggestions in the prompt reduces performance by up to 34%, with no model proving immune. Taken together, the reported findings suggest that current LLMs are not yet genuine probabilistic reasoners, despite their success in advanced mathematical problems.

Reinforcement learning has become the standard for improving reasoning in large language models, yet evidence increasingly suggests that RL does not teach new strategies; it redistributes probability mass over solutions the base model already contains. In this work, we ask: if RL merely steers the model toward paths it already knows, is the RL optimization loop itself necessary? Through token-level analysis across multiple model families and RL algorithms, we find that RL's beneficial footprint is a sparse, predictable correction concentrated at high-entropy decision points where the model is uncertain which branch to take. Only 1--3% of token positions are affected, the promoted token always lies within the base model's top-5 alternatives, and targeted corrections at those few positions causally recover a large fraction of RL's accuracy gain, while random corrections fail. The base model's own entropy identifies these positions without any RL-trained model, and the entire correction is low-dimensional, representable in a tiny fraction of model parameters. These findings reframe reasoning improvement as sparse policy selection, not capability acquisition. We translate this insight into ReasonMaxxer, a minimal RL-free method that applies contrastive loss only at entropy-gated decision points, using a few hundred base-model rollouts and no online generation. Across three model families, six scales, and six math reasoning benchmarks, ReasonMaxxer matches or exceeds full RL performance while requiring only tens of problems and minutes of single-GPU training, a reduction in training cost of roughly three orders of magnitude.

Modern AI systems are being deployed in complex domains such as medicine, science, and law, where it is important that they not only produce correct answers, but also represent and update uncertain beliefs about the world as new evidence arrives. We introduce the novel technique of studying LLMs as information processing rules and utilize the information processing gap to study the internal (in)consistencies of how LLMs update their probabilistic beliefs from evidence. Our extensive experiments evaluate multiple approaches in which LLMs can incorporate evidence into their beliefs. Some of these approaches produce (nearly) Bayesian updates; others seem to use a learned heuristic. Surprisingly, the non-Bayesian heuristic updates often outperform exact Bayesian computation in terms of downstream task performance -- indicating the LLMs' probabilistic models of the world are misspecified. Lastly, we show how our measure can provide diagnostics to identify issues with LLM-powered inferential systems.