Evidence and Intervention: A Coupled Active-Inference Extension of Rational Speech Act Models

Who we communicate with influences both our interpretation of their utterances and the design of our own. Such adjustment to the conversational partner is studied as speaker modeling in comprehension and as audience design in production, with the two literatures having developed largely separately. We argue that both adjustments express one rational computation and propose the rational interlocutor (RI) model, a computational account unifying comprehension and production. An interlocutor maintains a model of their partner, defined by three parameters: an identity parameter Π sets the messages and forms expected from the partner; a fidelity parameter Φ sets how reliably messages and utterances map onto each other for them; a knowledge parameter Λ sets how knowledgeable the partner is believed to be. Comprehension and production are thus mirror-image modes of one computation over the partner model. Comprehension chooses the message the partner most likely intends to convey, weighing how well each candidate fits the utterance against how likely this partner is to mean it. Production chooses the utterance from which the partner will best recover the message, weighed against the effort of saying it. This explains why comprehenders appear to rely less on the forms produced by a linguistically less competent speaker, while producers tend to invest more effort in designing forms for them. We conjecture that perceived linguistic competence decomposes into two of these quantities: fidelity and knowledge. Their contrasting profiles across second-language (L2) adults, children, and artificial partners produce distinct and testable predictions.

Dialogue with a large language model can lead a person to insight: a sudden change in how they understand a problem. This perspective asks how model activity relates to insight as a dialogue unfolds. I propose that part of the intelligence expressed in dialogue arises from two interacting recurrences: each generated token becomes context for the next, and each response returns through the person, whose interpretation and new observations reshape what the model receives. Within this loop, the model's contribution shifts between modes, from echoing familiar formulations to offering a framing that opens a new direction for the person to develop. These modes may correspond to distinguishable patterns of model activity. A memory "spine" that selects which context is carried forward could elicit productive patterns again while the ideas themselves change. Public records of human-model dialogue, activity recorded from open-weight models and tools from computational neuroscience make these proposals testable.

When a person shares something with a language model, the model often answers the surface of the message rather than what the sender was doing by sending it: share a finished project and it critiques the code; share a raw late-night line and it runs a wellness check. We treat the sender's communicative intent, the Gricean what-was-meant, as a first-class interpretability object, and show the failure is one of readout on top of a robust representation. A linear probe decodes the sender's intent, whether they want a thing recognized or evaluated, from a model's default-pass hidden states, cleanly and surface-independently, across six models and four families and in the base checkpoints. The representation generalizes further, to intent that is only pragmatically inferred, and to a second, lexically clean intent (support versus help). The behavioral half of the story, and every causal test, is established on the recognize/evaluate contrast, where what varies is whether the default output acts on the intent. The readout lags the representation in depth within a model (the intent is decodable several layers before it drives the output); across models, which ones act on it by default is model-specific, an observed stratification (three of six show the failure) that we do not read as a scaling law. Where the gap is open, a direction closely tied to the representation, the discriminative direction at a searched-for layer, is a causal handle: steering it recovers the intended behavior, as well as an explicit instruction does and with no prompt at all. This direction is near-orthogonal to the feedback-offering axis, so it routes a represented intent rather than a generic feedback knob, though at the recovery dose the routed intent can override an explicit request. We support each link with controls against obvious deflations and report the nulls as plainly as the confirmations.