cs.AIOct 5, 2026

Nash Equilibrium Text: A Game-Theoretic Decoding Framework for Text Generation

Authors: Alireza Jafari, Arman Adibi, Mohammad Ghavamzadeh, Hadi Daneshmand

Organizations: Department of Computer Science University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA, USA · School of Computer and Cyber Sciences Augusta University Augusta, GA, USA · Qualcomm AI Research San Diego, CA, USA

Abstract

Text revision has become an integral component of large language models. This paper formulates revision such that it admits a Nash equilibrium: Token positions are players, vocabulary items are actions, and each player's utility is the language model's log conditional probability. We motivate the revision by showing that Nash equilibria can have exponentially higher likelihood than autoregressive outputs as the sequence length grows. We further propose Nash decoding, an algorithm that reaches an ε\varepsilon-Nash equilibrium in O(1/ε)O(1/\varepsilon) time given access to the joint probability of tokens conditioned on a prompt. In practice, we run Nash decoding using conditional probability estimates from large language models and evaluate the resulting equilibria on question-answering benchmarks. On CLAPNQ, PubMedQA, and CoQA, Nash equilibria obtained from masked language models achieve higher F1 and ROUGE scores than autoregressive models up to 18×18\times larger, without any fine-tuning or retraining, at the cost of additional test-time computation.

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