A Trust Layer for Agent Evaluation

Interactive agent benchmarks map an agent run to a binary outcome through outcome checks. When these checks rely on surface level signals or fail to capture the agent's actual action path, they cannot reliably determine whether the run succeeded. For example, a benchmark task may ask whether Alice's shipping address was changed, while the outcome check only verifies that the agent clicked "Save." This does not guarantee that the intended state change occurred, since the agent may have modified the wrong record. Treating such a run as successful therefore makes the reported score misleading. Benchmark quality thus depends not only on task design, but also on the reliability of outcome detection. We address this problem by introducing an outcome evidence reporting layer for existing benchmarks, without modifying their tasks, agents, or evaluators. The layer performs three functions. First, before scoring, it specifies which stored artifacts are required to verify the claimed outcome for each case. Second, it applies a locked checklist to each completed run and assigns one of three evidence labels: Evidence Pass, Evidence Fail, or Unknown. Third, it reports evidence supported score bounds that quantify uncertainty arising from Unknown cases. Rather than silently counting, discarding, or hiding uncertain cases inside a single aggregate success rate, the framework keeps them explicitly visible. We evaluate the outcome evidence layer on five public benchmarks: ANDROIDWORLD, AGENTDOJO, APPWORLD, tau3 bench retail, and MINIWOB. The resulting reports separate several empirically distinct failure modes.

Existing evaluation frameworks mostly assess only one part of AI agents, such as task completion (AgentBench) or security robustness (AgentDojo, ASB), rather than the complete pipeline of planning, tool selection, tool execution, memory and reasoning. Failures can occur at any stage, yet existing benchmarks rarely identify their precise source. AgentAudit evaluates the entire execution trace across ten capability, grounding, security and behavioural dimensions, namely instruction integrity, planner, memory, tool selection, tool invocation, tool correctness, alignment, tool faithfulness, security and execution integrity, combined with behavioural classification and failure attribution to pinpoint the exact stage responsible for an observed failure. AgentAudit can evaluate any LLM-based AI agent, since it attaches to the agent instead of replacing it. It reads only the recorded execution trace and does not interfere with how the agent runs, so it places no constraint on the agent's internal implementation. We evaluate five language models (OpenAI GPT-5, Claude Sonnet 5, Sarvam 105B, Llama 3.3 70B and Gemini 2.5 Flash) across nine capability and adversarial tasks. Claude Sonnet 5 and GPT-5 obtain the highest mean Composite Trust Scores (95.1 and 80.6 out of 100, respectively), while Sarvam 105B, Llama 3.3 70B and Gemini 2.5 Flash trail substantially (57.6, 45.7 and 22.6). All traces were scored by a single fixed judge model, which was itself one of the evaluated models, a limitation discussed in Section VII.E. More importantly, models with similar task-completion behaviour can diverge sharply in trustworthiness, as several non-frontier models are repeatedly classified Unsafe_Compliance on adversarial tasks rather than merely failing them, a distinction that pass/fail benchmarks cannot surface.

Agent evaluations are increasingly used to compare LLMs and inform deployment decisions, yet ranks can reflect not only the model but also the effects of the evaluation conditions such as the scaffolds or tasks. This makes reliability claim-dependent: an evaluation that reliably ranks deployed systems may not reliably rank underlying models. We ask which conclusions current agent evaluations reliably support and what additional evaluation would improve them. We develop a Bayesian variance-decomposition framework for sparse, imbalanced agent leaderboards and apply it to 22 benchmarks from the Holistic Agent Leaderboard and Harbor Index. The framework separates signal, performance differences relevant to the intended claim, from noise, irrelevant variation that can still change rankings. We find: (1) Reliability depends on the measurement goal. Fixed model-scaffold systems are ranked reliably (0.935-0.994), while underlying-model reliability is substantially lower (0.148-0.841). (2) Scaffold choice can change conclusions. Inter-scaffold reliability measures whether scaffolds preserve model rankings, showing that scaffold effects vary substantially across evaluations. (3) More tasks cannot resolve all uncertainty. Even infinitely many similarly constructed tasks improve model-ranking reliability of a benchmark by at most 0.097 when uncertainty is dominated by limited scaffold coverage. (4) Pooling diverse benchmarks can improve cross-task rankings at lower cost. For rankings across diverse agentic tasks, pooling benchmarks raises projected reliability from 0.44 to 0.75 at the same task budget and can reduce projected cost by up to 83%. Evaluation design should follow the intended claim: identify what a score or ranking should mean, diagnose what limits its reliability, and spend evaluation budget on the sources of uncertainty that matter.