Pseudowords as probes: Large Language Models show little of the sublexical sensitivity that governs human pseudoword processing

The asymmetry between language production and perception has been well-documented in psycholinguistics. Whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit a functionally analogous distinction remains an open question, particularly given that LLMs rely on the same underlying mechanism (next-token prediction) for both input and output processing. In this exploratory study, we operationalize the production-perception distinction through direct token probability measurements rather than metalinguistic prompting. Using the base Llama-3.1-8B model, we generated poems under a production prompt and re-scored the same tokens under both rephrased production prompts and perception-oriented prompts. Across an extended experiment with four production and three perception prompts, production-perception distances consistently and substantially exceeded production-production distances, with non-overlapping ranges across conditions and an overall average ratio of approximately 1.8. Near-ceiling correlations in the production-production control confirm that the effect is specific to communicative framing rather than prompt surface variation, and we show the effect replicates across five open-weight models (Llama-3.1-8B, EuroLLM-9B, gemma-2-9b-it, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3, and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct), spanning both base and instruction-tuned variants. Temporal analysis revealed that the perception prompt exerts its strongest influence at the beginning of the sequence, with divergence decaying as generated context accumulates, though the specific shape of this decay varies across prompt pairs. These findings suggest that prompt framing alone induces a production-perception distinction in LLM probability distributions, even within a decoder-only architecture.

Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.

A recent study (Kuribayashi et al., 2025) has shown that human sentence processing behavior, typically measured on syntactically unchallenging constructions, can be effectively modeled using surprisal from early layers of large language models (LLMs). This raises the question of whether such advantages of internal layers extend to more syntactically challenging constructions, where surprisal has been reported to underestimate human cognitive effort. In this paper, we begin by exploring internal layers that better estimate human cognitive effort observed in syntactic ambiguity processing in English. Our experiments show that, in contrast to naturalistic reading, later layers better estimate such a cognitive effort, but still underestimate the human data. This dual alignment sheds light on different modes of sentence processing in humans and LMs: naturalistic reading employs a somewhat weak prediction akin to earlier layers of LMs, while syntactically challenging processing requires more fully-contextualized representations, better modeled by later layers of LMs. Motivated by these findings, we also explore several probability-update measures using shallow and deep layers of LMs, showing a complementary advantage to single-layer's surprisal in reading time modeling.