This article develops a failure-mode framework for analyzing how advanced artificial intelligence could contribute to human extinction, irreversible civilizational collapse, or permanent human disempowerment. The central thesis is that catastrophic AI risk does not require consciousness, hostility, or an explicit intention to harm humanity. Instead, risk may arise through several distinct but interacting pathways, including autonomous misalignment, harmful human use, organizational failure, and competitive deployment. The severity of these pathways depends on factors such as capability, autonomy, external access, persistence, institutional safeguards, and the preservation of recovery capacity. The analysis is deliberately non-operational: it identifies causal conditions, empirically tractable intermediate quantities, and defensive research questions rather than procedures for causing harm.
The pursuit of artificial general intelligence (AGI) rests on a seemingly self-evident premise: that general intelligence, the kind of flexible, domain-general cognitive capacity exemplified by Homo sapiens, is extraordinarily valuable. This paper subjects this premise to critical scrutiny. We first present the intuitive case for the value of general intelligence before mounting an evolutionary challenge. We argue that, on evolutionary timescales, its adaptive value is far from empirically established. Numerous taxa, from cyanobacteria to horseshoe crabs, have persisted for hundreds of millions or even billions of years without anything resembling general intelligence, while Homo sapiens has existed for roughly 300,000 years and already faces self-generated existential risks. Mass extinction events do not preferentially favour cognitively sophisticated species. We argue that general intelligence may be the only biological strategy that generates existential threats to the species possessing it, an existential risk paradox with no parallel among non-intelligent survival strategies. Unlike prevailing accounts of AI risk that trace the danger to misalignment, we locate it in structural features of general intelligence itself, implying that even well-aligned AGI would inherit this liability. If the long-term evolutionary value of general intelligence is uncertain or negative, this raises ethical questions about engineering AGI and, more urgently, creating artificial consciousness. Drawing on deontological ethics and the precautionary principle, we argue that this uncertainty imposes a duty of caution: if we create a new kind of intelligent being, we bear responsibility for ensuring the conditions under which it can flourish.
Recent years have seen increasing concern that artificial intelligence may soon pose an existential risk to humanity. One leading ground for concern is that artificial agents may be power-seeking, aiming to acquire power and in the process disempowering humanity. I show how the argument from power-seeking rests on a strong version of a claim known as the instrumental convergence thesis. I explore leading defenses of the instrumental convergence thesis and argue that none establishes the thesis in a strong enough form to ground the argument from power-seeking. I discuss implications for longtermism, the governance of artificial intelligence, and the methodology of studying risks posed by artificial agents.
A key premise in leading arguments for existential risk from artificial intelligence is that malfunctioning artificial agents could not be easily shut down. This motivates the catastrophic shutdown problem of ensuring that agents can be shut down before they cause an existential catastrophe. A range of arguments and theorems are offered to suggest that solving the catastrophic shutdown problem is difficult, bolstering arguments for existential risk and motivating a search for solutions to the catastrophic shutdown problem. This paper argues for two conclusions. First, existing arguments do not establish the difficulty of solving the catastrophic shutdown problem. Second, concern for the catastrophic shutdown problem has led to technical solutions that impose a high safety tax on model performance.