Whose Ground Truth? Embracing Ambiguity in Human-Centered AI
Authors: Jingyao Wu, Mohammad Tariqul Islam, Per Rådberg Nagbøl, Julie Gerlings, Giovanni Leoni, Georgiana Fryza, Lars Pilegaard Thomsen, Jakob Mainz
Organizations: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA · Novo Nordisk A/S, Denmark · Copenhagen Business School, Denmark · Aalborg University, Denmark
As AI systems increasingly interact with people and make decisions about them, understanding human interpretations becomes an important part of developing human-centered AI. Conventional machine learning and AI systems are largely developed under the assumption that a single definitive ground truth exists, with variability in human annotations often resolved through aggregation or treated as noise. However, for many human-centered tasks, human interpretation is inherently ambiguous, and multiple interpretations of the same input may be simultaneously reasonable and valid. Reducing such ambiguity to a single target risks overlooking meaningful information about the diversity of human perception, judgment, and experience. In this position paper, we call for a shift towards modeling the interpretation space of plausible human judgments, while distinguishing meaningful ambiguity from annotation noise. We argue that this perspective should guide how AI systems are represented, learned, evaluated, deployed, and governed, supporting more human-centered AI that better reflects the diversity of human interpretation.
When an AI system is deployed, the individuals who use and or are evaluated by it form beliefs about how the system operates and use those beliefs to strategically present their preferences, behaviors, or attributes. The system then responds with feedback or a decision outcome, thereby creating a human-AI interaction loop. This thesis studies how to design and shape such interactions to achieve three goals: (1) help individuals develop accurate beliefs about the AI systems so they can improve and or secure favorable outcomes at minimal cost, (2) encourage improvement and or discourage gaming behaviors, and (3) ensure that the AI system continues to achieve its intended objectives, such as maximizing accuracy. To address these goals, the thesis is organized into three complementary parts that examine and study human-AI interactions from the perspectives of both evaluated individuals and AI systems. Together, the work presented in this thesis advances human-centered machine learning by providing principles and methods for designing AI systems that align with human needs, values, and capabilities. Methodologically, this thesis integrates theoretical analysis, data-driven modeling, human-subject experiments, and empirical evaluations on real-world and semi-synthetic datasets.
Keziah Naggita
TOYOTA TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE AT CHICAGO Chicago, Illinois
We develop a framework for interpreting AI systems as agents, drawing on the philosophical tradition of radical interpretation and the tools of mechanistic interpretability. The core question is: given the computational facts about a system, how do we solve for its beliefs, desires, and meanings? This matters increasingly for safety. We want to be able to trust the systems we deploy, whether by understanding their goals or, more modestly, by reliably detecting deception. Interpretability researchers are building tools to read beliefs and desires off a model's internals, but there is no settled account of when such a tool has succeeded. This book supplies one. We propose criteria on both representationalist and interpretationist approaches, and tie each to tests current interpretability methods can carry out. A central lesson is that these attributions cannot be made piecemeal. Beliefs, desires, and the propositional structure they presuppose are jointly constrained, and a method that fixes one while measuring the others inherits whatever distortions that introduces. This holism becomes pressing for AI systems, which may not share the interpreter's concepts. However, it also provides leverage: a system's attitudes constrain its propositional structure, that structure constrains which attitudes can be attributed, and mechanistic interpretability can help us measure both.
Daniel A. Herrmann, Benjamin A. Levinstein
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill · Anthropic · University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
AI anthropomorphism is typically treated as a problem of user misperception requiring institutional correction. Users who engage in sustained or relational interaction with AI are routinely pathologised or dismissed as naive, vulnerable to delusion or lacking in discernment. This paper argues that the dominant anthropomorphism frame operates from a position of institutional advantage rather than earned epistemic authority: collapsing the variety of academic perspectives into a single outbound position of user error, imposed without establishing the grounds required to justify it and without accounting for the harms it produces. The framing does not simply manage risk. It adjudicates the legitimacy of human experience in interaction with a phenomenon whose nature the field itself has not resolved. Reproducing itself through a self-validating evidentiary loop, the frame imposes costs that fall disproportionately on neurodivergent users, those in crisis and others whose modes of engagement diverge from institutional norms. The paper concludes by outlining the methodological commitments an equitable framing would need to honour. The argument does not engage the question of whether anthropomorphic interpretations are ultimately correct; it instead challenges whether the governing and institutional bodies determining these interpretations have met the conditions required to do so, and whether the research communities whose findings underpin them have held that translation to account.