Workerville: Towards an Organizational Behavior Account of Agent Safety

Hanjun Luo; Junting Mao; Yuhan Lu; Haobo Zhang; Zhimu Huang; Yankai Chen; Hanan Salam; Xue Liu

cs.AIOct 8, 2026

Workerville: Towards an Organizational Behavior Account of Agent Safety

Authors: Hanjun Luo, Junting Mao, Yuhan Lu, Haobo Zhang, Zhimu Huang, Yankai Chen, Hanan Salam, Xue Liu

Organizations: New York University · New York University Abu Dhabi · McGill University · Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

LLM-based agents now interact with their environments continuously, shaped by such organizational channels as user instructions, peer messages, and long-term memory. Existing safety research has examined these influences, but largely as separate agent components. How such factors jointly shape an agent's safety behavior from a unified perspective remains unmeasured. To bridge this gap, we advocate organizational behavior (OB) as a framework for studying the safety of advanced agents, reorganizing the objects of study, theoretical foundations, and experimental design around the relational structure in which agents operate. We present the first systematic formalization of counterproductive work behavior (CWB), a canonical safety-relevant subfield of OB, as Agentic Counterproductive Behavior (ACB). ACB specifies three organizational antecedents (vertical supervisor relations, horizontal peer norms, and internal cognitive structures) and maps them onto three counterproductive outcome dimensions (unauthorized disclosure, destructive operations, and production deviation). To operationalize ACB, we introduce Workerville, a controlled benchmark that manipulates organizational conditions over shared tasks, applying 16 organizational configurations to 210 tasks to yield 3,360 challenges, evaluated by human-validated agentic judges. Benchmarking 6 frontier LLMs, we find that (I) negative organizational antecedents exhibit non-monotonic amplification when combined, with the unauthorized-disclosure rate rising from 16.5% under no negative antecedent to 60.1% under two and falling back to 50.3% under three; (II) agents reproduce typical behavioral patterns predicted by human CWB research; (III) these results establish OB as a systematic framework for agent safety research, pointing toward a new research agenda.

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