SafeDiSTL: Decomposing Joint Constraints for Safe Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Multi-agent systems are widely used in safety-critical applications that require coordinated behavior under strict safety constraints. Existing approaches face a fundamental trade-off: learning-based methods achieve strong empirical performance but lack theoretical safety guarantees, while control-theoretic methods enforce safety but often lead to overly conservative and inefficient behaviors. We propose a hierarchical multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that enforces hard safety constraints under mild assumptions at low level via a constraint manifold, while enabling effective coordination through high-level policy learning. Our approach provides theoretical safety guarantees in the multi-agent setting and yields stationary learning dynamics, thereby enabling stable and efficient training. Empirically, our method achieves competitive performance while maintaining nearly perfect safety rates, and generalizes effectively to varying numbers of agents and obstacles.

Safe coordination problems surface in multi-agent reinforcement learning when global safety cannot be enforced by any agent unilaterally: the admissibility of one agent's action may depend on the dynamics of other agents. Decentralised shields can enforce safety at runtime, but purely factorised permissions often exclude optimal team behaviour that is safe only through coordination. We study deterministic safety guarantees for agents trained and deployed under decentralised execution, recovering team-optimal safe behaviour without centralised runtime control. Agents have a shared global specification $φ$ in the safety fragment of Linear Temporal Logic ($\mathsf{LTL}_{\mathsf{safe}}$ ), and select among tuples of local $\mathsf{LTL}_{\mathsf{safe}}$ obligations whose conjunction implies the global specification $φ$. Each agent may rely on the other agents' local obligations as assumptions because the whole contract tuple is certified simultaneously and allows projection into local action masks. At learning time, a non-stationary multi-armed bandit chooses among a library of local $\mathsf{LTL}_{\mathsf{safe}}$ obligations to select the tuple that optimises team reward, all without forgoing end-to-end safety. We evaluate the approach across 6 environments and 15 algorithmic variants.

When multiple agents share a cost budget, a common Lagrange multiplier can enforce the aggregate constraint but does not determine how its penalty should be allocated across agents. Uniform penalties ignore heterogeneity in the rewards agents sacrifice, while agent-specific multipliers may still rely on the same aggregate cost signal. We introduce Lagrangian Responsibility Allocation (LiRA), which learns each agent's share of a common multiplier by optimizing social welfare over a finite training horizon. The multiplier enforces the aggregate budget, while responsibility shares redistribute its influence without modifying the original rewards or constraints. For convex games under standard regularity conditions, varying these shares induces a smooth family of normalized generalized Nash equilibria in which active constraints remain at their budgets while welfare varies. To optimize responsibility before convergence, we derive a welfare gradient that accounts for both learning updates and the induced change in data distribution. Across CityLearn, MABIM, Harvest, and MetaDrive, spanning 3 to 400 agents, LiRA improves average social welfare by up to 29% over uniform and agent-specific multiplier baselines. Grid and driving costs remain within budget, inventory violations decrease, and Harvest makes more effective use of available budget.