agent-risk: Risk Assessment for Changes to AI Agents

Agents are LLM-driven components that can mutate environments in powerful, arbitrary ways. Extracting guarantees for the execution of agents in production environments can be challenging due to asynchrony and failures. In this paper, we propose a new abstraction called LogAct, where each agent is a deconstructed state machine playing a shared log. In LogAct, agentic actions are visible in the shared log before they are executed; can be stopped prior to execution by pluggable, decoupled voters; and recovered consistently in the case of agent or environment failure. LogAct enables agentic introspection, allowing the agent to analyze its own execution history using LLM inference, which in turn enables semantic variants of recovery, health check, and optimization. In our evaluation, LogAct agents recover efficiently and correctly from failures; debug their own performance; optimize token usage in swarms; and stop all unwanted actions for a target model on a representative benchmark with just a 3% drop in benign utility.

When an agent reuses logged experience, a changed decision may reflect the recorded score, the action's name, or the record's position in storage. Standard memory evaluations do not reveal which relationship drives that change. We introduce ReplayLens, a black-box audit that changes one relationship in the stored history at a time, holds the remaining interface fixed, and measures the resulting decision. Four interventions target four relationships. Outcome reassignment swaps which scores belong to which actions. Pair transport moves intact action-score pairs to new record slots. Consistent renaming relabels actions in both history and menu. Key-slot reassignment changes both score attachment and position. A constructive separation shows why the audit is needed: two memory writers with identical endpoint accuracy respond differently to the same replay, so conventional evaluation cannot resolve the underlying dependence. On black-box LLM interfaces, swapping scores changes decisions while moving intact pairs does not, separating score attachment from record order. A bounded-memory study exposes ingestion-order sensitivity that endpoint comparison misses. In sequential experiment planning, altered historical scores redirect exploration and reduce final utility despite fresh measurements. A code-debugging agent with sealed hidden tests shows the same pattern outside model selection. ReplayLens provides a relationship-level audit for deciding whether logged experience can be merged, reordered, or reindexed safely.

AI agents built on large language models (LLMs) run shell commands, read and write files, and reach the network, typically with their user's privileges. However, what an agent does during an execution is difficult to understand: tests assert on the result, and the agent's trajectory records only what the agent reports about itself, which may omit behavior executed by its subprocesses. We present AgentSpy, an approach that observes an agent from outside the agent. AgentSpy runs the agent in an isolated environment, configured by a declarative specification, and records the system calls and network traffic of the agent and of every process it executes. Based on this monitoring, AgentSpy supports two families of analyses: conformance analyses, which measure obligations, i.e., what an agent execution should do, and safety analyses, which check prohibitions, i.e., what an agent execution must never do. We instantiate one analysis of each family. The reliability analysis uses rules to summarize each run by the environment resources the agent uses: the commands it executed, the files it accessed, and the hosts it contacted. The security analysis applies deterministic rules to the system calls of an execution. For reliability, we evaluated AgentSpy on 77 tasks with the codex harness and three recent LLMs, executing each task three times. Sets of repeated runs of the same task are more similar than sets that include runs of another task in 92.2% of the comparisons. Among tasks for which all three runs pass outcome-based tests, the agent performs task-unrelated activities in 18% of the cases, reads the grading files in 7%, and does not use the developers' guidance in 17%. For security, the generic rules of AgentSpy detect four of five attack categories we considered, with no false positives across 50 runs.