CryptoFlowBench: Benchmarking Multi-Hop Reasoning on Blockchains for Cryptocurrency Fund Tracing
Authors: Runang He, Tongya Zheng, Jing Cao, Yucheng Ying, Shunyu Liu, Bingde Hu, Yang Gao, Zeyuan Hu, +2 more
Organizations: State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University · Hangzhou City University · Hangzhou High-Tech Zone (Binjiang) Institute of Blockchain and Data Security · China Mobile Group Zhejiang Co., Ltd · China Unicom Digital Technology Co., Ltd
Pseudonymous accounts and complex smart-contract ecosystems substantially hinder the tracing of illicit cryptocurrency fund flows. Existing Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved promising performance in blockchain fraud detection, yet their static node- or edge-level predictions do not naturally generalize to multi-hop fund tracing. Meanwhile, existing tracing methods mainly rely on predefined heuristics to capture multi-hop relationships, limiting their adaptive reasoning capabilities. To bridge this gap, we introduce CryptoFlowBench, a benchmark constructed from authoritative reports on cryptocurrency-related illicit incidents, with four tasks spanning local to multi-hop fund tracing. These tasks pose substantial challenges to existing learning- and heuristic-based methods, particularly in complex multi-hop scenarios. We therefore propose ChainSleuth, a graph-tool-augmented agent that iteratively reasons, invokes graph tools, and updates its tracing trajectory, enabling adaptive information acquisition and recovery from erroneous paths. Experiments show that no baseline consistently dominates all four tasks, revealing substantial gaps between local fraud detection and multi-hop fund tracing. ChainSleuth achieves notable improvements on multi-hop tasks, demonstrating the potential of agentic graph reasoning for cryptocurrency fund investigation.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Comparison of fund-tracing behaviors on a case-centered transaction graph. Red edges in (a) show the verified suspicious flow. The machine-learning/GNN-based method in (b) cannot recover after selecting an irrelevant branch, shown as gray edges, while the rule-based method in (c) over-expands under a fixed propagation policy. ChainSleuth in (d) retrieves on-chain evidence, revises earlier decisions, and suppresses unsupported expansions.
Case
Primary source
Type
01 Ronin
U.S. Treasury
Credential/ UI compromise
02 Harmony
Harmony
03 CoinEx
CoinEx
04 HTX HECO Bridge
HTX
05 Stake.com
Stake.com
06 WazirX
WazirX
Table 1: Incident types and primary sources of the benchmark cases.
Figure 2: Overview of the benchmark construction pipeline. Public incident reports are consolidated into structured case summaries, aligned with indexed on-chain transactions, and converted into grounded question-answering tasks with task-specific verification. Where “Trans.” indicates “Transaction”.
Case
Trans
Action
Path
Subgraph
Total
01 Ronin
658
11
7
13
689
02 Harmony
1,720
4
1
25
1,750
03 CoinEx
1,216
4
0
21
1,241
04 HTX HECO Bridge
220
14
5
13
252
05 Stake.com
148
10
2
13
173
06 WazirX
706
5
1
25
737
Table 2: Task distribution by incident.
Method
Comp. ↑
Path F1 ↑
TF Acc. ↑
Over-exp. ↓
Poison
0.330
0.345
0.396
0.644
Haircut
0.330
0.311
0.396
0.674
FIFO
0.422
0.340
0.560
0.628
LIFO
0.301
0.328
0.476
0.651
TIHO
0.313
0.307
0.604
0.646
TRacer
0.087
0.186
0.643
0.158
Table 3: Path results on 51 tasks from 16 cases. ∗ indicates ChainSleuth and + indicates detector tool enabled.
Method
Pred F1 ↑
Oracle F1 ↑
Path P ↑
Path R ↑
Poison
0.199
0.167
0.295
0.180
Haircut
0.199
0.167
0.295
0.180
FIFO
0.219
0.228
0.318
0.190
LIFO
0.217
0.136
0.379
0.164
TIHO
0.237
0.228
0.386
0.202
TRacer
0.109
0.137
0.220
0.075
Table 4: Subgraph results on the valid-seed, positive-path subset of 22 tasks from 22 cases. ∗ indicates ChainSleuth and + indicates detector tool enabled.
Method
Structure-valid rate ↑
Tool-protocol pass rate ↑
DS-V4-Flash
0.318
0.099
DS-V4-Pro
0.780
0.292
Qwen3.6-27B +
0.802
0.766
Qwen3.6-27B
1.000
0.979
Table 5: Execution reliability of ChainSleuth on path completion. All the methods are ChainSleuth and + indicates detector tool enabled.
Train rate
Method
AP ↑
Hit@1 ↑
Hit@5 ↑
MRR ↑
1%
LR
0.651
0.546
0.955
0.746
RF
0.881
0.955
1.000
0.970
XGB
0.883
0.955
1.000
0.970
5%
LR
0.659
0.546
0.955
0.735
RF
0.862
0.909
1.000
0.947
XGB
0.877
0.864
1.000
0.921
Table 6: Case-disjoint comparison of candidate seed detectors under different illicit-node ratios in the training set.
Faculty of Informatics, Universit`a della Svizzera italiana, Lugano, Switzerland · School of Management and Law, Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Zurich, Switzerland · Forensics and Financial Crime, Deloitte AG, Switzerland
School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China · Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Clayton, VIC 3800, Australia · CSIRO’s Data61, Eveleigh, NSW 2015, Australia +2