cs.CLOct 12, 2026

Communication, Vocalisation, and Language

Authors: Peter Wallis

Abstract

The contention is that the current batch of Large Language Models don't understand language, but they do it. Rather than LLMs forming some kind of distributed representation'' of symbols, the claim is that LLMs are capturing Cultural Intelligence'' and grounding symbols in what the sociologists call practices.

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