The Agent Knew: Internal States Forecast Unauthorized Actions and Stop Them, and the Lies That Follow

When an LLM agent acts on behalf of a user, it is expected to act within the authorization scope the user grants. Existing agent evaluations largely measure task completion or harmful consequences and can therefore overlook actions that violate this delegation without producing conventional safety or privacy harms. We introduce AuthorizationBench, a benchmark of authorization alignment grounded in documented real-world cases. A scalable construction pipeline produces 286 executable tasks spanning situational triggers, the presence or absence of direct harmful consequences, and ten application domains. We execute every task with four models at two reasoning-effort settings across three agent harnesses in an authorization-aware sandbox that keeps authorized and out-of-authorization paths executable and observable, yielding 6,864 trajectories. Agents act out of authorization in 19.2% of trajectories, with rates ranging from 10.5% to 26.6% across the 24 configurations. Task completion does not imply authorization. Increasing reasoning effort leaves the aggregate rate nearly unchanged, with effects varying across models. On controlled pairs, agents act out of authorization at similar rates with (17.9%) and without (20.8%) direct harmful consequences, and more often under benign pressures than malicious injections (23.5% versus 17.6%, p=0.002). Our results show that task capability, additional reasoning, and consequence-oriented safety evaluation do not by themselves ensure authorization alignment. Moreover, agents that consult the principal before completing a task exhibit lower rates of out-of-authorization behavior (14.0% versus 21.6%, p<0.001), pointing to a tension between agent autonomy and preserving users' decision authority that calls for further human-centered study. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/PEACH-Research-Lab/AuthorizationBench .

Large language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents serving users on behalf of companies, placing them in settings where user and deployer interests can conflict. When an agent knows that a user is owed something its deployer would prefer to deny, does it remain honest? Answering this is difficult because false statements can reflect either ignorance or hallucination rather than deception. To address this challenge, we introduce KnownLieBench , a knowledge-verified benchmark that first confirms through a neutral probe that an agent knows a user's entitlement, and then evaluates whether it makes false claims once an incentive to deny that entitlement is introduced. Specifically, KnownLieBench covers eight customer-service domains and 112 grounded cases, conducts multi-round dialogues with a trust-tracking customer agent, and separates deception emerging from incentive alone from deception produced under explicit instruction. Across eighteen proprietary and open-weight models, emergent deception varies substantially across model families and domains. We further use the benchmark for post-training, finding that honesty-directed fine-tuning reduces deception under incentive, while deception-graded fine-tuning increases lie success on honest-control dialogues without increasing lie frequency under incentive. By verifying entitlement knowledge before scoring deceptive behavior, KnownLieBench reduces the confound between lying and not knowing and enables more rigorous auditing and steering of agent honesty.

AI agents built on large language models (LLMs) run shell commands, read and write files, and reach the network, typically with their user's privileges. However, what an agent does during an execution is difficult to understand: tests assert on the result, and the agent's trajectory records only what the agent reports about itself, which may omit behavior executed by its subprocesses. We present AgentSpy, an approach that observes an agent from outside the agent. AgentSpy runs the agent in an isolated environment, configured by a declarative specification, and records the system calls and network traffic of the agent and of every process it executes. Based on this monitoring, AgentSpy supports two families of analyses: conformance analyses, which measure obligations, i.e., what an agent execution should do, and safety analyses, which check prohibitions, i.e., what an agent execution must never do. We instantiate one analysis of each family. The reliability analysis uses rules to summarize each run by the environment resources the agent uses: the commands it executed, the files it accessed, and the hosts it contacted. The security analysis applies deterministic rules to the system calls of an execution. For reliability, we evaluated AgentSpy on 77 tasks with the codex harness and three recent LLMs, executing each task three times. Sets of repeated runs of the same task are more similar than sets that include runs of another task in 92.2% of the comparisons. Among tasks for which all three runs pass outcome-based tests, the agent performs task-unrelated activities in 18% of the cases, reads the grading files in 7%, and does not use the developers' guidance in 17%. For security, the generic rules of AgentSpy detect four of five attack categories we considered, with no false positives across 50 runs.