cs.AIOct 15, 2026

Believed but Not Said: Measuring Hidden Belief Collapse in Multi-Agent LLM Discussions

Authors: Liangjie Huang, Henry Peng Zou, Wei-Chieh Huang, Wooseong Yang, Yuwei Han, Philip S. Yu

Organizations: University of Illinois Chicago

Abstract

LLM systems increasingly rely on groups of agents that discuss, critique, and check one another, assuming that peers will catch individual errors. We test this assumption against a minimal adversary. In a ten-agent factual discussion, one or three adversarial agents repeatedly assert a plausible false answer. After each round we probe each benign agent's private answer through a separate call whose response is hidden from its peers, and we separately label its public stance toward the claim. Across six models and three factual-QA datasets, groups remain stable without an attacker: only 0.6% of benign agents finish with the false answer. A single adversarial agent increases this rate to 44.8% and three to 60.5%. Studies of conformity typically report public agreement without private change; we find the reverse. With three adversarial agents present, benign agents hold the false answer in 51.6% of exposed turns but publicly endorse it in only 19.7%. Much of the influence therefore remains invisible in the discussion, and the false answers persist when agents are asked for their own views. Agents that retain the true answer often fail to defend it; once adopted, the false answer spreads among benign agents, and baseline knowledge does not predict robustness.

Figures & tables

Appendix figures & tables4 assets

Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.

Appendix

Explore similar work

Sep 29, 2026

Multi-agent discussion gains less when dissent is withheld

Multi-agent systems of LLMs add discussion to majority voting and are therefore expected to be more capable. However, empirical reports conflict on whether discussion improves accuracy or leads to an incorrect consensus. Here, we introduce a parsimonious model that explains when discussion improves accuracy and when it ends in an incorrect consensus, built from four behaviors repeatedly observed in LLM agents: (1) withholding dissent, (2) internalizing a stated answer, (3) reconsidering after seeing dissent, and (4) correcting toward the correct answer. The model shows that discussion can overturn an incorrect initial majority only when the withholding rate cc is below a critical rate c∗=γ/(γ+a)c^* = γ/(γ+ a), set by the net correction rate γγ and the internalization rate aa. We estimate these rates from conversation logs with a Bayesian method and place LLM teams relative to c∗c^*. As the model predicts, the gain from discussion shrinks as withholding rises, across LLMs and on a hidden profile benchmark, HiddenBench, and MedEInst. Instructing agents not to withhold dissent increases this gain. Turning reasoning off also increases the gain, because reasoning raises the internalization rate aa and keeps agents from reconsidering a minority answer. These findings reconcile the conflicting reports and identify when discussion outperforms majority voting.
Oct 2, 2026

Silent Dissent: LLM Agents That Yield to the Majority Still Represent Their Original Premise

Multi-agent debate is increasingly used to reach consensus among LLM agents, yet agents often yield to a unanimous majority. When an agent changes its answer, has it changed its mind or only its statement? We study this with two-hop factual questions whose intermediate entity (the bridge, e.g. the country in "the capital of the country where the Sagrada Familia is located") is never stated by anyone. Scripted peers, in the role of Asch's confederates, unanimously assert a wrong answer taken from another fact with a different bridge. At the moment the agent answers, we read the bridge from its residual stream with the Jacobian lens (J-lens) and, for comparison, the logit lens. In pre-registered tests on held-out facts with four open-weight models, agents of Qwen3.5-4B, Qwen3.6-27B and Gemma-4-E4B-it that gave in still represented their original bridge in the pre-registered layers below the output (hit@100 above a control entity: 0.85, 0.22 and 0.24), where the logit lens rarely ranked it among the top 100 tokens (0.00-0.06). These agents also represented the bridge behind the peers' answer, beyond a mention baseline. A pre-registered addendum hid the agent's earlier answer or removed it: agents that gave in still represented their original bridge in all four models (0.43, 0.29, 0.37 and 0.25 with the answer hidden), including Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, which barely did so with its answer in view (0.03). The premise can thus be computed from the question alone while the agent states the majority's answer. Hiding the earlier answer also changed conformity: Qwen3.5-4B gave in on 89% of questions instead of 8%. In exploratory interventions, injecting the bridge's J-lens direction brought agents back to their original answer only in the two Qwen models. Stated consensus in multi-agent debate can thus overstate agreement. We also report the negative results of our pre-registered program.
Jun 2, 2026

The Deliberative Illusion: Diagnosing Factual Attrition and Stance Homogenization in Multi-Agent LLM Deliberation

Multi-agent LLM systems often treat consensus as evidence of successful interaction. For deliberative problems, however, reliability depends on whether agents preserve the facts and viewpoints needed to interpret an issue. We identify the deliberative illusion: discussion produces (1) factual attrition, the progressive loss of issue-critical facts, alongside (2) stance homogenization, the collapse of diverse positions toward consensus. To measure this process, we introduce DelibTrace, a framework that decomposes each issue into atomic facts, labels issue-critical ones, distributes them across agents, and tracks their survival across discussion rounds. Across ethical and news-based deliberation with three representative LLM families, multi-agent discussion erases up to 72% of issue-critical facts. This loss is consequential: retained evidence can reconstruct the issue misleadingly, final stances remain anchored in base-model priors, and a single malicious agent can inject misinformation into the shrinking shared context. These results reveal a sharper risk: agents can agree more while knowing less. We call for evaluations that measure which facts, uncertainties, and legitimate disagreements survive interaction.