Radio frequency fingerprinting (RFF) models can achieve accuracy under source domain conditions but become unreliable when the receiver, distance, collection day, or environment changes. Incorrect predictions in unseen domains may receive high softmax confidence, making confidence thresholding insufficient for trustworthy deployment. We propose TrustAgent-RFF, a prediction level reliability framework for RFF that operates with a frozen in-phase and quadrature (I/Q) classifier without target domain labels. For each device prediction, the framework acquires radio frequency evidence: counterfactual stability, prototype consistency, acquisition domain similarity, and signal quality. A source calibrated trust estimator combines these diagnostics with classifier confidence, prediction margin, and evidence availability indicators. Source derived lower tail penalties and cross module interactions reduce trust when diagnostic signals indicate weak support. A large language model (LLM) based planner adaptively selects the next diagnostic action based on evidence, trust state, action costs, and remaining budget. A deterministic source calibrated decision layer updates the prediction state as Accept, Reject, or Defer. Experiments across five RFF datasets and classifier backbones reveal an average source to target accuracy drop of 38.7% and show that many incorrect target domain predictions remain highly confident.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1 : Motivation for reliability aware RFF inference. (a) High confidence predictions can remain incorrect under unseen domain shifts. (b) Diagnostics provide complementary reliability evidence.
Fig. 2 : Overview of TrustAgent-RFF . The framework acquires complementary IQ based diagnostic evidence, updates a source calibrated trust score, and uses an LLM planner to select diagnostics when the evidence is insufficient. Deterministic decision layer outputs Accept , Reject , or Defer .
Figure 3
Dataset →
ORACLE
WiSig
LoRa
NetSTAR
Bluetooth
Method ↓
Source
Target
Source
Target
Source
Target
Source
Target
Source
Target
CNNGRU [ 35 ]
0.8575
0.0924
0.8970
0.4753
0.5290
0.2159
0.4340
0.4355
0.8417
0.4303
PatchLLM [ 36 ]
0.8717
0.2540
0.8861
0.4967
0.5360
0.0392
0.4231
0.4102
0.9714
0.6777
ResNet1D [ 37 ]
0.8638
0.1138
0.8868
0.3903
0.4225
0.1520
0.4493
0.4367
0.9858
0.6958
SimCLR [ 38 ]
0.8393
0.1081
0.9109
0.3317
0.5634
0.3197
0.5352
0.4561
0.9681
0.7066
TCN [ 39 ]
0.9053
0.0960
0.9059
0.5058
0.4570
0.1306
0.6511
0.3832
0.9717
0.6646
TABLE II : Classification accuracy under source and unseen target domains. The best result in each column is highlighted in bold. All backbones are evaluated under our unified raw IQ training and evaluation protocol.
Dataset
Retention
Softmax
TrustAgent
ΔHCER
Bluetooth
20.3%
13.7%
3.7%
10.0
LoRa
99.3%
51.9%
50.4%
1.5
NetSTAR LoRa
98.1%
3.0%
2.6%
0.4
ORACLE
51.4%
83.9%
83.2%
0.7
WiSig
28.4%
45.4%
22.2%
23.2
Overall
59.5%
39.6%
32.4%
7.2
TABLE III : Predictions with base classifier confidence ≥0.9 . Retention is the percentage of high confidence predictions accepted by TrustAgent-RFF.
Fig. 4 : Reliability evaluation of TrustAgent-RFF . (a) Retained error rate as the different classifier confidence threshold. (b) Selective risk for max softmax and the TrustAgent-RFF trust score at matched coverage. Lower values are better.
Fig. 5 : Absolute reduction in high confidence error rate across backbones and datasets. Positive values indicate improvement, while negative values indicate degradation.
Table 8
Fig. 6 : TrustAgent-RFF versus modules only: (a) correctness AUROC and (b) error detection AUPRC. Bars show backbone means and standard deviations.
Planner
Bluetooth
LoRa
NetSTAR
ORACLE
WiSig
SmolLM3-3B
0.178
0.737
0.390
0.715
0.666
Llama-3.2-3B
0.182
0.742
0.388
0.720
0.672
Qwen3-4B
0.176
0.737
0.391
0.705
0.669
TABLE VI : First action AURC of different LLM planners, averaged across six backbone models. The score after the first action is used to rank predictions. Lower is better.
Selective Error Rate (%) ↓
Variant
Bluetooth
LoRa
NetSTAR
ORACLE
WiSig
TrustAgent
9.29
74.68
42.05
82.06
18.93
w/o CF
11.23
75.26
42.18
84.03
26.01
w/o Proto
14.53
74.97
42.27
83.39
19.31
w/o Dom
9.67
74.95
42.09
83.17
22.42
w/o Qual
9.58
75.11
42.12
83.75
22.44
TABLE VII : Module ablation in selective error rate at matched coverage, averaged across backbones. CF, Proto, Dom, and Qual denote the diagnostics. Lower is better.
Radio frequency fingerprint identification (RFFI) provides a critical physical-layer security mechanism for dynamic Internet of Things (IoT) and ad hoc networks. However, the decentralized and open nature of these networks imposes two strict deployment criteria: the credential must transfer reliably across physically dispersed, heterogeneous receivers, and it must decisively reject unregistered rogue traffic. Cross-receiver hardware shifts depress the confidence of registered devices and may also place unseen rogue transmitters in high-confidence known regions under naive domain adaptation, increasing false acceptance. To address these risks, we propose CRODA-ST, a joint optimization framework that couples Discriminative Structure Anchoring (DSA) with Rejection Oriented Alignment (ROA). Within this coupled objective, DSA establishes a stable target-known semantic foundation for shifted registered devices, while ROA regularizes the open-set decision boundaries governing rejection of unseen rogue transmitters. In the canonical WiSig setting, CRODA-ST achieves an open-set classification rate (OSCR) of 0.9580 and a target-domain false positive rate of 0.0469 at a 90% true positive rate (FPR90). A controllable LoRa simulation provides a complementary diagnostic under synthesized hardware distortions. At the distinct source-calibrated deployment operating point with rho = 0.80, CRODA-ST yields a target-unknown false acceptance rate (FAR) of 0.0075 in the evaluated setting.
Fengchong Yao, Jianbing Li, Qing Liu +4
School of Information Systems Engineering, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, 450001, China
Radio frequency fingerprint identification (RFFI) exploits transmitter-specific hardware imperfections as physicallayer identity cues for Internet of Things (IoT) devices, but deep models often degrade across acquisition environments. In multi-antenna reception, antenna topology and frequencyoffset dynamics structure receiver observations, while capturedependent variation distorts target embeddings and misaligns source-trained decision boundaries. This article proposes physicsinformed structure anchoring with capture-aware prototype calibration (PISA-CAPC) to address both representation and decision mismatches. The two stages separate source representation construction from target decision correction. During source training, PISA organizes antenna tokens through a topology-guided graph, conditions propagation on CFO-derived acquisition dynamics, and applies bounded contextual residual suppression to preserve identity evidence. At deployment, unlabeled capture-aware prototype calibration (U-CAPC) estimates capture-local prototypes and recalibrates target decision scores while keeping the representation and source classifier fixed. Thus, calibration uses neither target labels nor target-domain backbone updates. On a measured WiFi benchmark with four receive antennas and ten transmitters, PISA-CAPC achieves a mean target-domain Macro-F1 of 0.9257 under a balanced transductive setting. Component ablations support complementary roles for topology-guided anchoring, CFO-conditioned modulation, reliability-aware token aggregation, contextual suppression, and capture-aware calibration. These results indicate that physically motivated representation learning can be combined with labelfree decision calibration to improve cross-environment RFFI under the evaluated protocol without changing the deployed backbone.
Fengchong Yao, Jianbing Li, Qing Liu +4
School of Information Systems Engineering, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450001, China.
Radio-frequency (RF) fingerprinting systems must operate in open-world environments where signals from unknown transmitters and temporal drift introduce distribution shift at test time. Out-of-distribution (OOD) detection provides a natural framework for this problem, yet its application to RF fingerprinting (RFF) remains limited. A key barrier to their adoption is that most OOD detectors require auxiliary OOD data for parameter tuning, an assumption that is difficult to satisfy in RF environments where representative OOD data is impractical to collect. In this work, we introduce a promising set of OOD detection methods from the machine learning literature to open-set RFF domain. We present these methods within a unified mathematical framework based on information theory, which is a natural framework for communication systems. Our framework allows for the systematic analysis of methods and development of new methods. We further demonstrate the applicability of recent work on tuning OOD detectors without given OOD tuning data for open-set RFF. We evaluate on the POWDER RF fingerprinting dataset, showing that detectors tuned without any given OOD data achieve performance comparable to baselines with access to true OOD tuning data and greatly out-perform baseline approaches without access to true OOD tuning data, showcasing the practical viability for the RFF problem.