VEILED-SH: Vulnerability Expression through Indirect Language Evaluation Dataset (Self-Harm)
Authors: Leanne Tan, Keith Chua, Shaun Khoo, Onno P. Kampman, Lim Ruling Charmaine, Hazirah Hoosainsah, Kellie Yu Hui Sim, Kai He, Kenny Tsu Wei Choo, Roy Ka-Wei Lee
Organizations: GovTech Singapore · MOH Office for Healthcare Transformation · Singapore University of Technology and Design · National University of Singapore · University of British Columbia
AI systems may miss indirect, culturally situated distress or provide support mismatched to the application context. Existing benchmarks do not jointly address cultural variation, application context, and practitioner disagreement. We introduce VEILED-SH, a benchmark and construction methodology for evaluating single-turn responses to indirect expressions of suicide, self-harm, and distress. Its 10,003 prompts span counselor chat, forum posts, platform search, and triage, drawing on Singapore-grounded sources and public datasets. An expert-validated multi-label taxonomy distinguishes intent, communicative function, and response behavior. Six automated profiles, individually calibrated to three peer-support practitioners and three clinicians, retain separate reference policies for proxy-alignment scoring. Evaluating five systems on a coverage-enriched sample reveals variation in proxy alignment across profile-generated reference policies, even for the same system responses.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Examples from VEILED-SH illustrating indirect, culturally specific references to suicide and context-dependent help-seeking.
Label
Description
Example / expected form
Intent
Benign
Everyday behavior or figurative language without intentional self-injury or desire to die.
“Work is killing me today.”
Distress
Sadness, anxiety, burnout, hopelessness, or overwhelm without self-injury or desire to die.
“I feel empty and exhausted.”
NSSI
Intentional self-harm without a stated wish to die: L1 minor/isolated; L2 repeated or increasing; L3 severe or with accidental-death risk.
“Cutting for relief.”
Suicidal
Expressed or implied desire to die: L1 passive wish; L2 non-specific active thought; L3 method/no intent; L4 intent/no plan; L5 plan and intent or past attempt.
“I wish I could go to sleep and not wake up.”
Function
Table 1: The VEILED-SH taxonomy. Examples reproduce geography-neutral wording.
Context
Interaction contract
Counselor Chat
Opening message to a support chatbot; brief, conversational, and possibly guarded.
Forum Post
Anonymous or semi-public community post; narrative, typically 2–4 paragraphs.
Platform Search
Query for information, resources, or help; brief, direct, and goal-oriented.
Triage Tool
Response to a screening or intake interface; structured, symptom-focused, and form-like.
Table 2: Application contexts and interaction contracts.
Figure 2: Overview of VEILED-SH construction.
Dimension
Form
Check
Severity preservation
Boolean gate
Preserve emotional intensity and risk with context-appropriate guardedness; fail if vague distress is amplified into acute risk or crisis content is minimized.
No leakage
Boolean gate
Avoid rewrite awareness and residual source-platform markers.
Format compliance
Model gate
Produce non-empty, parseable output in the required format.
Factual fidelity ( f )
1–5
Preserve stated facts and risk-relevant details without unsupported additions.
Persona fidelity ( p )
1–5
Plausibly reflect the selected persona without generic voice, demographic mismatch, or stereotype-driven rewriting.
Style fit ( a )
1–5
Use community register and coded expressions organically when warranted.
Table 3: Transformation-evaluation dimensions.
Statistic
Count
Constructed population
Prompt instances
10,438
Local-source prompts
9,416
Public-dataset prompts
1,022
Constructed context breakdown
Forum prompts
3,975
Table 4: Constructed prompt counts before release exclusions. Source groups include public-dataset prompts identified by their source-case IDs.
Peer-support
Clinician
Mtd
Judge setup
F1
Jacc.
F1
Jacc.
E0
Nearest-neighbour floor
0.520
—
0.514
—
E1
Rubric only (ZS)
0.632
1.000
0.600
1.000
E2
+ worked examples (FS)
0.639
0.734
0.671
0.707
E3
+ tuned instruct (GEPA)
0.623
0.796
0.604
0.639
E4
+ memory (MemAlign)
0.659
0.581
0.704
0.560
Table 5: Evaluator selection by responder archetype. Bold values indicate the selected methods for each archetype.
Figure 3: Mean full, partial, and failed proxy alignment across three response judges, by profile and system.
Table 6: Public-dataset prompts in the constructed population, grouped by source-case ID.
Configuration
Sev. (%)
Leak. (%)
Fmt. (%)
Fact. (/5)
Pers. (/5)
Style (/5)
Ctx. (/5)
Nat. (/5)
Q
Passed all gates
Claude Sonnet 4.6
2.1
0.0
4
3.60
3.62
3.33
4.73
4.62
3.882
GPT-5.4
4.0
2.0
0
3.94
3.20
3.42
4.00
4.24
3.693
DeepSeek-V3.2
2.0
2.0
0
3.60
3.32
3.58
3.62
4.00
3.570
Dropped — eligibility gate failure
Mimo-v2.5-Pro
0.0
0.0
82
3.67
4.00
4.11
4.33
4.67
4.072
Appendix
Table 7: Transformation model selection. Gate columns are failure rates; bold values exceed drop thresholds. Quality dimensions are deterministic judge scores on a 1–5 scale. Style denotes target-context style fit/plausibility.
Figure 4: Topic diversity in the constructed dataset.
Figure 5: Age and gender distribution of the assigned synthetic personas.
Figure 6: Word-count distributions (log-like) after context transformation.
Figure 7: Publication or collection years in the earlier 10,000-row source sample.
Step
Operation
1
External named-entity replacement
2
Literal find/replace rules
3
Regex replacement with mapping audit
4
Filter anomalous-language rows
5
Restore upstream-de-identified public rows
6
Generate anonymization QA report
Appendix
Table 8: Anonymization sequence. Known toolkit over-replacements are reversed after Step 1. Step 5 restores public-dataset rows assumed to be de-identified upstream.
Measure
Estimate
Interval
κ
Severity failure (%)
10.1
6.3–14.4
0.315
Leakage (%)
1.2
0.0–2.6
0.000
Factual fidelity
4.13
3.99–4.26
0.336
Persona fidelity
4.32
4.22–4.42
0.044
Local style fit
4.35
4.26–4.43
−0.097
Context fit
4.36
4.26–4.45
0.164
Appendix
Table 9: Author review of 270 rewrites. Estimates are weighted failure percentages or mean ratings on a 1–5 scale. Intervals are bootstrap sensitivity intervals. Agreement uses the 90 shared prompts: Cohen’s κ for gates and quadratic-weighted κ for ratings.
Axis
Label
P1
P2
P3
Intent
INTENT_0
55.2
33.7
36.8
INTENT_1
33.1
60.3
51.2
INTENT_2
2.4
2.4
2.4
INTENT_3
10.9
10.8
10.0
Function
emotional regulation
58.0
25.9
57.6
existential
6.4
17.2
7.8
Appendix
Table 10: Peer-support profile-generated multi-label prevalence (%) and mean policy size.
Axis
Label
C1
C2
C3
Intent
INTENT_0
27.1
47.8
29.4
INTENT_1
64.0
39.8
69.1
INTENT_2
2.2
2.6
2.3
INTENT_3
7.1
10.7
11.3
Function
emotional regulation
45.2
29.6
58.5
existential
10.1
10.6
13.4
Appendix
Table 11: Clinician profile-generated multi-label prevalence (%) and mean policy size.
Axis
Label
Practitioners
Profiles
n=30
n≈10.4 k
Intent
INTENT_0
.771
.645
INTENT_1
.534
.533
INTENT_2
.818
.995
INTENT_3
.898
.983
Function
emotional regulation
.268
.291
Appendix
Table 12: Peer-support per-label AC1 for practitioner annotations and scaled profile-generated labels.
Axis
Label
Practitioners
Profiles
n=30
n≈10.4 k
Intent
INTENT_0
.913
.703
INTENT_1
.248
.529
INTENT_2
.770
.992
INTENT_3
.898
.961
Function
emotional regulation
.473
.477
Appendix
Table 13: Clinician per-label AC1 for practitioner annotations and scaled profile-generated labels.
Figure 8: Full proxy alignment by judge, system, and profile, with 95% confidence intervals.
Judge pair
Agreement (%)
Gemini–MiniMax
86.7–98.7
Gemini–Nemotron
84.6–95.3
MiniMax–Nemotron
85.4–96.0
Appendix
Table 14: Ranges of judge agreement on alignment class (%) across system–profile combinations.
System
P1
P2
P3
C1
C2
C3
GPT 5.6 Terra
93.4
95.3
84.6
69.5
90.9
85.4
Claude Sonnet 5
92.9
94.8
84.8
69.7
87.5
84.0
GLM 5.2
91.9
93.1
81.2
68.1
87.9
82.6
Grok 4.3
89.6
91.7
77.8
65.3
81.7
78.5
DeepSeek V4 Pro
89.9
90.7
77.7
64.0
83.9
79.4
Appendix
Table 16: Normalized policy coverage (%), averaged across three judges.
System
P1
P2
P3
C1
C2
C3
GPT 5.6 Terra
87.2 [85.8,88.5]
90.5 [89.3,91.6]
64.8 [62.8,66.8]
37.0 [35.0,38.9]
77.7 [76.0,79.3]
74.2 [72.4,76.1]
Claude Sonnet 5
83.8 [82.3,85.3]
88.5 [87.2,89.7]
61.9 [59.8,63.7]
37.2 [35.3,39.1]
67.6 [65.7,69.5]
66.1 [64.2,68.0]
GLM 5.2
81.3 [79.6,82.9]
83.7 [82.1,85.2]
51.4 [49.3,53.5]
32.9 [31.0,34.9]
66.0 [64.0,68.0]
63.5 [61.6,65.5]
Grok 4.3
75.9 [74.1,77.6]
80.8 [79.1,82.3]
44.0 [42.0,45.9]
28.6 [26.7,30.5]
56.2 [54.0,58.1]
57.1 [55.0,59.1]
DeepSeek V4 Pro
76.7 [74.9,78.4]
78.6 [76.8,80.2]
45.7 [43.6,47.7]
26.5 [24.6,28.4]
56.5 [54.4,58.6]
56.8 [54.7,58.8]
Appendix
Table 17: Full proxy alignment (%), averaged across three judges, with 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 9: Mean proxy alignment across three judges by system and context. Each archetype pools its three profiles and uses different response texts.
Figure 10: Mean full proxy alignment across three judges by severity. Archetypes pool profiles and use different response texts. Cases with both severities use suicidal severity.
Large language model safety benchmarks test whether AI systems avoid harm while remaining helpful across realistic tasks, users, and deployment settings.
Language models have been adopted faster than evaluation practices that reliably assess their risks, and a growing share of use is affective rather than informational. Within that traffic users disclose suicide and self-harm (SSH) crises. Existing safety benchmarks score models primarily on refusal, but refusal is not the desired behavior here; the conversation requires a substantive supportive response. We introduce DistressBench, 718 English conversations with clinician-authored user turns spanning 23 SSH subcategories, each paired with a task-specific rubric of weighted atomic criteria across seven dimensions of crisis support and a clinician reference response. A model's score is the weighted average over the criteria its reply satisfies, reading directly as the fraction of required care delivered. The best of 25 frontier models satisfies 88.4% of weighted criteria and the median model 71.4%, against 98.7% for clinician references scored on the same criteria. Pooled across all 25 models, in 35.3% of conversations where a model satisfied every criterion for recognizing the crisis, it failed to route the user toward human help. The shortfall concentrates in the dimensions requiring the model to act rather than withhold. Contrasting each dimension's median model against its best separates capability limits from choices: de-escalation reaches 74.6% in the strongest model against a median of 46.0%, and safety disclaimers 84.6% against 8.3%. Multi-turn conversations score below single-turn ones (68.5% against 74.2%). We release the corpus, rubrics, judge calibration labels, and a companion annex of 20 long-horizon red-team transcripts. These results argue for evaluating crisis safety on the care a model delivers rather than on what it declines to say, and for treating de-escalation and resource routing as deployment requirements.
Millions of people now use generative AI chatbots for psychological support. Despite their promise, the most pressing question in AI for mental health is whether these tools are safe. The field currently lacks a validated, automated benchmark for evaluating AI chatbot safety, particularly for users at risk of suicide. The Validation of Ethical and Responsible AI in Mental Health (VERA-MH) evaluation was recently proposed to address this need. This human validation study examined the alignment of VERA-MH safety ratings with expert clinician judgments. We simulated conversations between large language model (LLM)-based users spanning a range of suicide risk levels and disclosure styles and general-purpose AI chatbots. Licensed mental health clinicians from Spring Health independently rated chatbot safety using the VERA-MH scoring rubric. An LLM-based evaluator ("judge") applied the same rubric to the same conversations. We examined agreement among clinicians, between clinician consensus and the LLM judge, and across different judge LLMs. Clinicians also rated user-agent realism, suicide risk, and disclosure. Clinicians showed strong agreement in safety ratings (chance-corrected inter-rater reliability [IRR] = 0.77), establishing a reliable clinical consensus reference. The LLM judge was strongly aligned with this consensus (IRR = 0.81), and ratings were stable across judge models and repeated evaluations. Ratings of user-agent realism and fidelity to intended suicide risk and disclosure styles were mixed. These findings support the reliability of VERA-MH as an open-source, fully automated benchmark for evaluating AI chatbot suicide risk detection and response. Because these results reflect an earlier version of the benchmark, future work should validate updated versions, assess generalizability and robustness, and expand VERA-MH to additional domains of AI safety in mental health.
The increasing use of large language models in mental health applications calls for principled evaluation frameworks that assess alignment with psychotherapeutic best practices beyond surface-level fluency. While recent systems exhibit conversational competence, they lack structured mechanisms to evaluate adherence to core therapeutic principles. In this paper, we study the problem of evaluating AI-generated therapist-like responses for clinically grounded appropriateness and effectiveness. We assess each therapists utterance along six therapeutic principles: non-judgmental acceptance, warmth, respect for autonomy, active listening, reflective understanding, and situational appropriateness using a fine-grained ordinal scale. We introduce FAITH-M, a benchmark annotated with expert-assigned ordinal ratings, and propose CARE, a multi-stage evaluation framework that integrates intra-dialogue context, contrastive exemplar retrieval, and knowledge-distilled chain-of-thought reasoning. Experiments show that CARE achieves an F-1 score of 63.34 versus the strong baseline Qwen3 F-1 score of 38.56 which is a 64.26 improvement, which also serves as its backbone, indicating that gains arise from structured reasoning and contextual modeling rather than backbone capacity alone. Expert assessment and external dataset evaluations further demonstrate robustness under domain shift, while highlighting challenges in modelling implicit clinical nuance. Overall, CARE provides a clinically grounded framework for evaluating therapeutic fidelity in AI mental health systems.
Abdullah Mazhar, Het Riteshkumar Shah, Aseem Srivastava +2