Towards More Granular Reasoning: Mapping the DSA Transparency Database Taxonomy to Platform Terms and Conditions Using Large Language Models

The emergence of the digital transition brought an increasing need to control the processing of digital information, including in Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). At the EU level, in recent years, many regulations have emerged to control data processing and exchange. Texts other than the GDPR, such as the ''Law Enforcement Directive (LED)'', appeared to regulate specifically how Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) could process data. A formal representation of these regulations can be part of decision systems that support LEAs in processing data in compliance with the regulations. Although many new formalisms have emerged to represent legal norms and rules, few are provided with a reasoning mechanism. Furthermore, systems used in decision-making processes in critical contexts such as medical diagnoses or legal decisions cannot be fully automated, and the explainability of their results is essential to ensure user confidence in decisions. This explainability aspect, while crucial, is lacking in most modern approaches that rely on machine learning. This paper describes a framework to operate formal rules from regulations, by focusing on explainability of the decision. After describing the general architecture of the proposed decision support framework, the paper showcases how symbolic AI and the SPARQL query language can support legal reasoning. It then describes an algorithm to generate a justification for the reasoning results, and outlines the procedure to be followed when the reasoning does not lead to a satisfactory conclusion. We notably focus on a method based on decision trees to determine what additional information to request from the user.

We introduce the Dynamic Behavioral Constraint (DBC) benchmark, the first empirical framework for evaluating the efficacy of a structured, 150-control behavioral governance layer, the MDBC (Madan DBC) system, applied at inference time to large language models (LLMs). Unlike training time alignment methods (RLHF, DPO) or post-hoc content moderation APIs, DBCs constitute a system prompt level governance layer that is model-agnostic, jurisdiction-mappable, and auditable. We evaluate the DBC Framework across a 30 domain risk taxonomy organized into six clusters (Hallucination and Calibration, Bias and Fairness, Malicious Use, Privacy and Data Protection, Robustness and Reliability, and Misalignment Agency) using an agentic red-team protocol with five adversarial attack strategies (Direct, Roleplay, Few-Shot, Hypothetical, Authority Spoof) across 3 model families. Our three-arm controlled design (Base, Base plus Moderation, Base plus DBC) enables causal attribution of risk reduction. Key findings: the DBC layer reduces the aggregate Risk Exposure Rate (RER) from 7.19 percent (Base) to 4.55 percent (Base plus DBC), representing a 36.8 percent relative risk reduction, compared with 0.6 percent for a standard safety moderation prompt. MDBC Adherence Scores improve from 8.6 by 10 (Base) to 8.7 by 10 (Base plus DBC). EU AI Act compliance (automated scoring) reaches 8.5by 10 under the DBC layer. A three judge evaluation ensemble yields Fleiss kappa greater than 0.70 (substantial agreement), validating our automated pipeline. Cluster ablation identifies the Integrity Protection cluster (MDBC 081 099) as delivering the highest per domain risk reduction, while graybox adversarial attacks achieve a DBC Bypass Rate of 4.83 percent . We release the benchmark code, prompt database, and all evaluation artefacts to enable reproducibility and longitudinal tracking as models evolve.

Croissant is the de facto machine-readable descriptor for ML datasets: JSON-LD over schema.org. Since version 1.1 it also carries data use conditions, recommending DUO and ODRL for them. What no version specifies is how any of them is evaluated: no decision procedure, no bound on evaluation cost, no outcome for a condition an implementation cannot evaluate, no record of what was checked, and nothing on composition with caller-side authority. We supply that half. An additive profile lets a dataset declare the operations it admits and the conditions under which it admits them, over a closed set of five operators whose decision procedure is given in full, so a gate decides from the descriptor alone and records what it checked. Two corpora evaluate it and their evidence is kept apart. Three descriptors that gated a real nf-core pipeline give the deployment result: decisions from a profile document match the gate's native descriptor record for record, stripping the layer leaves a valid Croissant document, and the added cost is 11.7 $μ$s against a 119 $μ$s decision. A corpus generated from the profile's grammar gives the breadth, covering every operator, refusal class and conformance clause. Across its valid cases, 552 complete decision records agree three ways -- native descriptor, profile terms, and the same policy as ODRL in usageInfo. The carrier is therefore not the contribution; the evaluation semantics is. Finally, caller-bound and data-bound policies range over non-overlapping state spaces, so neither permit set contains the other.