Privacy-Preserving Personalized Federated Learning (PPP-FL) for Medical Imaging
Abstract
Federated learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning paradigm that reduces transmission costs, mitigates cross-border data sharing restrictions, and enhances privacy by keeping raw data on local devices. Clients in FL systems train local models and share only updates, which are aggregated by a central server. While this setup limits direct data exposure, FL remains vulnerable to privacy attacks. Existing attack and defense strategies have largely been developed for centralized systems, and adapting them to FL introduces new challenges due to its unique architecture and training workflow. In this work, we first propose a model inversion attack on FL systems using Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Networks (DCGANs) in the context of large-scale medical imaging. Our method operates under realistic assumptions about the attacker's knowledge and capabilities. We then examine the effect of client-side differential privacy (DP) in mitigating privacy leakage and incorporate personalized FL to improve model performance under DP settings. Experiments on the Brain MRI ND-5 dataset show that DCGAN-based attacks can reconstruct semantically meaningful synthetic images, revealing significant risks to the privacy of training data. Applying DP reduces attack success but introduces an accuracy trade-off, which is further overcome by personalized FL at each client side. We also evaluate how different aggregation algorithms affect both attack vulnerability and defense effectiveness, underscoring the critical role of aggregation strategies. The proposed attack-and-defense framework is model-agnostic and applicable to a wide range of FL-based systems.
Figures & tables
| Work | Year | Methodology | Advantages | Limitations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fredrikson et al. [ 13 ] | 2015 | Exploiting output confidence scores to reconstruct private attributes. | Demonstrated first attribute inference from model outputs. | Requires access to model confidence. |
| Hitaj et al. [ 10 ] | 2017 | GAN-based collaborative learning attack using shared gradients. | First GAN-based model inversion attack. | Not directly applicable to FL settings. |
| Zhu et al. [ 6 ] | 2019 | Minimizing gradient discrepancy between dummy and shared gradients. | Works under standard FL gradient-sharing. | Requires access to the raw gradients. |
| Wang et al. [ 23 ] | 2019 | GAN-based user-level privacy leakage using multi-task discriminator. | Reconstructs user-specific samples beyond class-level leakage. | Requires adversarial server with client-identity knowledge. |
| Zhao et al. [ 24 ] | 2020 | Infers true labels from gradients before image reconstruction. | Removes label ambiguity and converges faster. | Limited to single-image recovery. |
| Geiping et al. [ 25 ] | 2020 | Gradient inversion using cosine similarity and total-variation regularization. | Produces high-fidelity images on large datasets. | Depends on the precise gradients. |
| Layer (type) | Output Shape | Param # |
|---|---|---|
| Conv2D (Conv1) | (32, H, W) | 320 |
| MaxPooling2D (Pool1) | (32, H/2, W/2) | 0 |
| Conv2D (Conv2) | (64, H/2, W/2) | 18,496 |
| MaxPooling2D (Pool2) | (64, H/4, W/4) | 0 |
| Conv2D (Conv3) | (64, H/4, W/4) | 36,928 |
| MaxPooling2D (Pool3) | (64, H/8, W/8) | 0 |
| Layer (type) | Output Shape | Activation / Norm |
|---|---|---|
| Input (latent vector ) | (1024, 4, 4) | ReLU + InstanceNorm |
| ConvTranspose2D (4×4, stride=2, pad=1) | (512, 8, 8) | ReLU + InstanceNorm |
| ConvTranspose2D (4×4, stride=2, pad=1) | (256, 16, 16) | ReLU + InstanceNorm |
| ConvTranspose2D (4×4, stride=2, pad=1) | (128, 32, 32) | ReLU + InstanceNorm |
| ConvTranspose2D (4×4, stride=2, pad=1) | (1, 64, 64) | Tanh |
| Layer (type) | Output Shape | Activation / Norm |
|---|---|---|
| Input Image | ||
| (64, 32, 32) | LeakyReLU (0.2) | |
| Conv2D | ||
| (4×4, stride=2) | (128, 16, 16) | LeakyReLU + BatchNorm |
| Conv2D | ||
| (4×4, stride=2) | (256, 8, 8) | LeakyReLU + BatchNorm |
Federated Learning
Federated learning trains shared models across data holders without requiring them to pool their raw data.
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