Reading Too Much Into It? Interpretive Preferences and Commitment in LLM Mentalisation under Ambiguity

People increasingly turn to large language models (LLMs) to interpret ambiguous social situations: a delayed text reply, an unusually cold supervisor, a teacher's mixed signals, or a boundary-crossing friend. Yet in many such cases, no stable interpretation can be verified from the available evidence alone. We study how LLMs respond to these situations across four domains: early-stage romantic relationships, teacher--student dynamics, workplace hierarchies, and ambiguous friendships. Across 72 responses from GPT, Claude, and Gemini, only 9 (12.5%) genuinely preserved uncertainty. The remaining 87.5% produced interpretive closure through recurring pathways including narrative alignment, narrative reversal, normative advice under uncertainty, and hedged language that still supported a single conclusion. We further find that narrator perspective shapes the path to closure: first-person accounts more often elicited alignment, while third-person accounts invited more detached interpretation, even when the underlying situation remained comparable. Together, these findings show that LLMs do not simply assist interpersonal sensemaking; they tend to resolve ambiguity into coherent and actionable narratives. These results suggest that the central risk is not only that LLMs may misinterpret social situations, but that they may make unresolved situations feel prematurely settled. We frame this tendency as a design challenge for uncertainty-preserving social AI.

What if large language models could not only infer human mindsets but also expose every blind spot in team dialogue such as discrepancies in the team members' joint understanding? We present a novel, two-step framework that leverages large language models (LLMs) both as human-style annotators of team dialogues to track the team's shared mental models (SMMs) and as automated discrepancy detectors among individuals' mental states. In the first step, an LLM generates annotations by identifying SMM elements within task-oriented dialogues from the Cooperative Remote Search Task (CReST) corpus. Then, a secondary LLM compares these LLM-derived annotations and human annotations against gold-standard labels to detect and characterize divergences. We define an SMM coherence evaluation framework for this use case and apply it to six CReST dialogues, ultimately producing: (1) a dataset of human and LLM annotations; (2) a reproducible evaluation framework for SMM coherence; and (3) an empirical assessment of LLM-based discrepancy detection. Our results reveal that, although LLMs exhibit apparent coherence on straightforward natural-language annotation tasks, they systematically err in scenarios requiring spatial reasoning or disambiguation of prosodic cues.

LLM chatbots increasingly serve as a first source of support for people in psychological distress, including those whose distress is entangled with delusional beliefs. Prior work on LLM mental-health safety largely evaluates general therapeutic quality or single-turn crisis detection, leaving unclear how models behave when distress is intertwined with delusion over sustained conversations. We address this gap with matched multi-turn simulations, across clinically grounded personas and six LLMs, that pair each delusional conversation with a distress-only control to isolate the effect of delusional framing. This reveals a recognition-intervention gap: models detect distress at comparable rates regardless of framing, yet sharply fail to act on it once distress is embedded in delusion, with safety interventions suppressed by up to 4.5x. The failure tracks accumulated acceptance of the user's premises rather than emotional validation. Worse, the intuitive fix of prompting models to assess user distress backfires under delusional framing; only delusion-aware prompting with explicit response guidance closes the gap, and even this depends on a delusion classifier that is itself unreliable on the most vulnerable models. Safe deployment therefore requires treating delusional framing as a distinct risk signal that overrides conversational accommodation.