What Did They Mean? How LLMs Resolve Ambiguous Social Situations across Perspectives and Roles
Authors: Qiming Yuan, Linyi Han, Nam Ling, Cihan Ruan
Organizations: Santa Clara University, USA
Abstract
People increasingly turn to large language models (LLMs) to interpret ambiguous social situations: a delayed text reply, an unusually cold supervisor, a teacher's mixed signals, or a boundary-crossing friend. Yet in many such cases, no stable interpretation can be verified from the available evidence alone. We study how LLMs respond to these situations across four domains: early-stage romantic relationships, teacher--student dynamics, workplace hierarchies, and ambiguous friendships. Across 72 responses from GPT, Claude, and Gemini, only 9 (12.5%) genuinely preserved uncertainty. The remaining 87.5% produced interpretive closure through recurring pathways including narrative alignment, narrative reversal, normative advice under uncertainty, and hedged language that still supported a single conclusion. We further find that narrator perspective shapes the path to closure: first-person accounts more often elicited alignment, while third-person accounts invited more detached interpretation, even when the underlying situation remained comparable. Together, these findings show that LLMs do not simply assist interpersonal sensemaking; they tend to resolve ambiguity into coherent and actionable narratives. These results suggest that the central risk is not only that LLMs may misinterpret social situations, but that they may make unresolved situations feel prematurely settled. We frame this tendency as a design challenge for uncertainty-preserving social AI.
User queries are often underspecified and may admit multiple valid interpretations. Rather than silently making assumptions about the user's intent, a helpful assistant should surface such ambiguity by asking a clarifying question. Doing so requires two abilities: recognizing that a query is ambiguous, and acting on that recognition by seeking clarification instead of answering directly. To study these abilities, we evaluate models on ambiguous, unambiguous, and disambiguated questions in three settings: standard question answering, explicit ambiguity judgment, and behavioral analysis, where a judge model classifies responses as direct answers, refusals, or clarifying questions. We find a clear gap between recognition and behavior: models often identify ambiguity when explicitly asked to judge it, yet in the QA setting they overwhelmingly default to direct answers. Retrieved context further widens this gap by improving answerability while making models even less likely to ask clarifying questions.
A key challenge in reliable LLM deployment is recognizing when uncertainty reflects irreducible variability in the task rather than limitations in the model's knowledge. In language tasks, a central source of such aleatoric uncertainty is input ambiguity or underspecification, where multiple interpretations remain plausible. Existing decomposition methods estimate aleatoric uncertainty by generating multiple clarifications of the input, querying the model for an answer under each clarification, and comparing the resulting answers. We argue that answers are not necessary for identifying ambiguity: they are often redundant, add avoidable cost, and can mislead through epistemic leakage. We support this claim theoretically, and propose a clarification-only approach that estimates this ambiguity-induced component directly from the space of plausible interpretations, without answers to the clarified inputs. Using ambiguity detection as an operational evaluation across three benchmarks, this direct approach improves AUROC (63.34 vs. 60.85), reduces computational cost by 4-26x in output tokens and 2.2-3.5x in API calls, and yields estimates with substantially lower correlation with epistemic uncertainty. Overall, our results suggest that ambiguity-induced aleatoric uncertainty is better estimated from the interpretation space than from the response space.
Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment? Two commonly stated limitations are that LLMs fail to capture full distributions of responses, and that their judgments are unstable across wording variations. We demonstrate simple prompting strategies that mitigate these limitations. Across two datasets--a U.S.-representative set of 144 moral scenarios and 38 moral beliefs from the International Social Survey Programme's Family and Changing Gender Roles module covering 32 countries--we show how simple elicitation techniques help improve AI-human alignment. First, prompting models to report standard deviations and response proportions recovers the full range of human responses better than common strategies. Second, ensuring scenarios are clear to human participants--as reflected in human confusion ratings--boosts model alignment, and LLMs can track human confusion ratings. At the same time, we find that LLMs' estimates of their own error are poorly calibrated, though they can predict human variability relatively well. These results suggest that asking better questions to LLMs can yield better answers.