Feedback That Backfires in Games: Do LLM Players Repeat the Move They Just Watched Fail?

Agent harnesses record a failed tool call and its error message in the transcript and ask the model to continue, on the assumption that the error is corrective information. We measure whether it is. Defining the corrective gain of a failure record as the change in log-probability of re-emitting the action that just failed, we find the gain is negative for every instruction-tuned model we tested (6 checkpoints, 135M-1.7B, 4 families) in two environments: simulated tool calling and MBPP program repair. Normalised by action length the effect is about -1.03 nats per action token, a factor of 2.8 in the odds of each token, and holds on 90%-100% of individual items, not only on average. Over a fixed candidate set the probability of repeating the failed call rises from 0.06 to 0.54, and greedy decoding reproduces it token for token on 19% of items after the failure versus 0% before. Counterfactuals pairing the same call with a failure message, a success message, or a neutral acknowledgement separate two effects: the failed call's surface form accounts for 83% of the damage, while the semantic contribution of marking it failed is small and inconsistent in sign across environments. The problem is in the harness, not the model's grasp of error messages, and that predicts which remedies work. Replacing the verbatim call with a runtime-generated description of the failure removes 76% of the inversion at no token cost, and making previously-failed strings unreachable at the decoder acts on the same term. Two plausible remedies do not: an explicit "do not repeat" instruction leaves the measured quantity where it was, and deleting the failed attempt to retry from a clean context, the standard prescription for context contamination, is the worst harness we measured for repetition, because it restores the context that produced the failure. The study runs end to end on a CPU; all artefacts are released.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly tasked with strategic decision-making under incomplete information, such as in negotiation and policymaking. While LLMs can excel at many such tasks, they also fail in ways that are poorly understood. We shed light on these failures by uncovering two fundamental gaps in the internal mechanisms underlying the decision-making of LLMs in incomplete-information games, supported by experiments with open-weight models Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt-oss. First, an observation-belief gap: LLMs encode internal beliefs about latent game states that are substantially more accurate than their own verbal reports, yet these beliefs are brittle. In particular, the belief accuracy degrades with multi-hop reasoning, exhibits primacy and recency biases, and drifts away from Bayesian coherence over extended interactions. Second, a belief-action gap: The implicit conversion of internal beliefs into actions is weaker than that of the beliefs externalized in the prompt, yet neither belief-conditioning consistently achieves higher game payoffs. These results show how analyzing LLMs' internal processes can expose systematic vulnerabilities that warrant caution before deploying LLMs in strategic domains without robust guardrails.

Evaluating how LLM agents recover from mid-task failures is central to deploying reliable agentic systems. Existing checkpoint-based benchmarks measure recovery by comparing which action is selected as best across independent runs, a quantity known as set agreement. However, set agreement is a purely ordinal measure that records which action wins without reflecting the absolute level of performance. When all actions fail, they tie at zero reward, and independent runs produce the same tied set with high probability, creating an illusion of stability that masks near-zero recovery success. We formalize this limitation through a set-path symmetry result, proving that for equal-cost Bernoulli actions the success probabilities (0.9, 0.8) and (0.2, 0.1) yield identical best-action-set distributions at every sample size. No procedure based solely on which action wins can distinguish these two regimes. We further prove that certifying exact population ties is impossible in finite time, and that the assignment of outcomes to checkpoints carries information beyond marginal outcome distributions. The pooled success probability is the missing scalar that resolves the ordinal ambiguity. Experiments on 864 frozen RecoveryBench episodes and two planning cohorts totaling 3,456 responses confirm the theoretical predictions. Agreement and held-out quality can move in opposite directions, and permuting checkpoint-to-action bindings changes 8 to 13 percent of cell-level conclusions. Based on these findings, we propose reporting four diagnostic quantities (agreement, all-zero fraction, held-out success, and pooled success) that expose this failure mode with no additional data collection.