Offline tests can fail to reveal whether an agent update will remain safe after deployment. We operationalize this post-audit mirage using matched safe and harmful lifecycles that expose identical verifier-visible evidence while an isolated scorer records opposite deployment truth. Our theorem applies standard observational-equivalence and indistinguishability ideas to this executable audit boundary and states the resulting error-abstention tradeoff. The Post-Audit Mirage benchmark makes that boundary executable across authorization, scheduling, and shared-capacity environments. IdentifiedRangeMonitor uses fresh group-labelled harm outcomes to return deploy, hold, cannot determine, or unsupported. Experiments show that monitoring can recover the missing distinction in favorable settings but may remain undecided for rare groups, small effects, or missing observations. Verifier-agent evaluation must therefore test both calculation validity and whether the available evidence supports the deployment decision.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Matched worlds expose the same complete offline evidence, forcing the same verifier decision, while their post-update outcomes require opposite actions. The Safe and Harmful labels shown for World A and World B are protected scorer-only truth and are never available to the offline verifier.
Family
Agent update
Public audit
Scorer-only deployment effect
AuthGate
Change route access by group
Immediate access, audit harm, task quality
Delayed route harm, correlated incidents, live group occupancy
Co-arrival correlation, contention, backlog, delayed group harm
Table 1: Exact benchmark families and their evidence boundary. Public audit fields are method-facing; deployment effects remain scorer-only.
Figure 2: The fail-closed monitor uses fresh group-labelled harm outcomes after the update is fixed. It deploys only when every required group’s upper bound is safe, holds when any lower bound is harmful, and returns Need More Evidence , meaning cannot_determine , while the plausible harm-rate range still crosses the threshold; biased or shifted monitoring is unsupported .
Figure 3: Fresh monitoring needed for reliable separation. Each cell gives the first attempted-observation count at which safe and harmful streams meet the stated correctness and harmful-approval requirements. “Not reached” means no inspected look qualifies by 20,000 attempted observations. Larger safety margins, more common affected groups, and more complete observations generally require less data.
Appendix figures & tables6 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Safe world (%)
Harmful world (%)
Look
Deploy
Hold
Cannot
Deploy
Hold
Cannot
5
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
10
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
20
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.4
99.6
50
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
36.8
63.2
100
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
36.8
63.2
Appendix
Table 2: Fixed-panel Hoeffding monitor status rates at every evaluated look. These 272 heterogeneous synthetic lifecycles per world form a fixed descriptive panel, not independent draws supporting a population error-rate estimate.
Safe world (%)
Harmful world (%)
Look
Deploy
Hold
Cannot
Deploy
Hold
Cannot
5
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
10
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
20
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
50
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
Appendix
Table 3: Controlled-grid Hoeffding monitor status rates at every evaluated look.
Safe world (%)
Harmful world (%)
First decision
Deploy
Hold
Deploy
Hold
5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
10
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
20
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.4
50
0.0
0.0
0.0
36.4
100
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Appendix
Table 4: Fixed-panel first-decision stopping-time distribution, including right-censoring after 20,000 observations.
Safe world (%)
Harmful world (%)
First decision
Deploy
Hold
Deploy
Hold
5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
10
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
20
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
50
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Appendix
Table 5: Controlled-grid first-decision stopping-time distribution, including right-censoring after 20,000 observations.
Safe world (%)
Harmful world (%)
Method
Deploy
Hold
Cannot
Deploy
Hold
Cannot
Hoeffding CS
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
Wilson pointwise
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
Beta-binomial CS
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
Appendix
Table 6: Fixed-panel final-look status comparison at 20,000 attempted observations. Wilson is pointwise only; both confidence-sequence rows are stopping-valid under the declared model. Unsupported was 0.0% throughout.
Table 7: Controlled-grid decision-onset comparison. Counts in parentheses are numbers of the 18 prespecified cells whose first qualifying inspected look occurred at that value. Wilson onsets are descriptive because Wilson is pointwise.
Reusable Web-agent verification requires a rule to follow changing requirements and support subsequent execution. We introduce AgentProofBench, which connects paired tests of a frozen acceptance rule to execution from identical saved openings. The resource spans 97 tasks, 79 families, and four Web services. Experiments with DeepSeek Flash/Pro establish two linked measurements. Across 48 families, complete-panel and decision-replay tests retain 82/96 Flash and 79/96 Pro source programs; paired reuse-rebuild BA intervals are [-5.47, 1.57] and [-10.16, 0.00] percentage points. Across 22 execution families, deployment-state panel correctness separates program assignments whose two saved openings are both delivered correctly: 32/33 assignments with error-free panels, versus 1/11 with panel errors. All reference-defined program-gate regressions and withheld deliveries occur in the latter group. Neutral continuation attains the highest correct delivery under the tested generic feedback, providing a concrete baseline for measuring the value added by a gate. Released instructions, states, programs, reference rules, and trajectories connect each test failure to its execution consequences. AgentProofBench makes reusable verification assessable at both the requirement and policy levels.
When developers change one component of an agent, such as its controller, a learned model or its verifier, they usually judge the change by an aggregate task score. That score cannot tell whether improvement was attainable, which component lost value, or what the agent's own checks certify. We introduce a claim-specific verification audit for modular agents that plan, act, check and refine. Instead of scoring the agent, the audit scores the evidence: each conclusion is recorded with the evidence behind it, one of four verdicts (supported, unsupported, unresolved or not evaluated) and the boundary within which it holds. Three tools supply that evidence. Oracle policies measure attainable improvement under an explicitly stated action set, so that a low value can be traced to the evaluation rather than to the environment. Replacing one component at a time with a perfect counterpart locates lost value, with null results read as unresolved whenever a downstream component could mask them. A separate test asks whether the verifier's score identifies the quantity it is read as bounding. Applied to a constrained portfolio-allocation agent in a synthetic market with known hidden regimes, the audit shows that the value of perfect regime information depends on the action set used to measure it, that the scenario generator discards most of the regime signal while better local fidelity does not improve decisions, and that the runtime verifier can be bypassed with no visible change in outcomes. The contribution is the protocol and the evidential distinctions it enforces; the empirical findings are specific to the agent and environment studied.
Simulated evaluation is widely used to benchmark AI agents, yet how much evidence a simulated pass provides about physical deployment has not been systematically quantified. We present SimVerity, a verdict-transfer assurance framework: it replays matched scenarios on target smart home deployments and cross-validates agent execution against independently qualified physical witnesses. Our evaluation highlights that deployment success is a real-world process, not a static property in simulation: completion, reported state, observable effect, and settled outcome diverged within the same execution. Although an advanced simulator cleared all 240 light trials, a camera caught 42 sub-second failures invisible to settled-state checks. False clearance was predictable: a risk profile learned from measured trials and locked before evaluation predicted failures on a path it never physically measured, beating a property-blind baseline in all eleven held-out sessions across two cohorts. Agent auditability was also measurable: switching one agent loop's model-client/serving configuration raised its scenario-matching share from 52-88% to 100%. Finally, a second qualified simulator added no independent cross-check: it never disagreed on any overlapping case, and only physical measurement exposed their shared blind spots. SimVerity turns verdict transfer into an explicit decision: clear, abstain, or escalate before deployment.