Monetizing Intelligence: Advertising and Subscription Design on LLM Platforms

Yuhang Ji; Fasheng Xu; Tianjun Feng

econ.THOct 23, 2026

Monetizing Intelligence: Advertising and Subscription Design on LLM Platforms

Authors: Yuhang Ji, Fasheng Xu, Tianjun Feng

Organizations: School of Management, Fudan University · School of Business, University of Connecticut

Abstract

Large language model (LLM) platforms introducing advertising must decide how much capability ad revenue should fund and what consumers should pay to avoid ads. We study a monopolistic platform that jointly chooses costly response quality, advertising intensity, and subscription prices when advertising reduces user value but better service raises advertising returns. Three findings follow. First, when partly ad-supported and ad-free plans coexist, advertising can finance useful service for consumers who receive none under pure subscription. Lower effective quality in middle plans weakens the alternatives available to premium users, allowing higher prices for unchanged ad-free service. Some fully ad-supported users gain utility, while partly ad-supported and ad-free users lose: broader access can coexist with utility polarization. Second, an intermediate advertising cap can maximize consumer surplus by preserving some revenue that finances service while limiting degradation. Third, cheaper compute can raise quality and reduce ad intensity, yet sufficiently large cost reductions can increase aggregate advertising revenue above its initial level because better service raises the value of the remaining advertised interactions. An extension shows how advertising-funded upgrades can bring plans to the same maximum capability and advertising exposure, eliminating the basis for different prices. These results make menu design central to evaluating LLM advertising: the consequences extend beyond users who see ads to the alternatives and prices faced by those who do not.

Figures & tables

Panel of Figure 1 — Figure 1: The Impact of Ad Degradation ( $\delta$ ) on Platform Allocations ( $\bar{r}=0.1$ , $\lambda=0.2$ )

Panel of Figure 2 — Figure 2: The Impact of Ad Profitability ( $\bar{r}$ ) on Platform Allocations and Pricing ( $\lambda=0.2$ , $\delta=0.6$ )

Panel of Figure 3 — Figure 3: Quality and Utility: Hybrid Monetization versus Pure Subscription ( $\lambda=0.2$ , $\bar{r}=0.15$ , $\delta=0.6$ )

Panel of Figure 4 — Figure 4: Advertising Caps and Consumer Surplus ( $\lambda=0.5$ , $\bar{r}=0.18$ ; Panel (a): $\delta=0.9$ )

Appendix figures & tables5 assets

Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.

Appendix

Ad Degradation ( $\delta$ )	Quality-Driven Ad Premium ( $\lambda$ )	Base Ad Rev ( $\bar{r}$ )	User Segment ( $\theta$ )	Ad Load ( $\alpha^{*}$ )	Quality ( $q^{*}$ )
$(0,\frac{1}{2}]$	$(0,\delta)$	$(0,\delta-\lambda)$	$\left[0,\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\lambda}{2(1-\delta)}\right)$	1	0
$(0,\frac{1}{2}]$	$(0,\delta)$		$\left[\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\lambda}{2(1-\delta)},\frac{1}{2}+\frac{\lambda}{2\delta}\right)$	1	$(2\theta-1)(1-\delta)+\lambda$
$(\frac{1}{2},1)$	$(0,1-\delta)$		$\left[\frac{1}{2}+\frac{\lambda}{2\delta},\theta_{2}\right)$	$\alpha^{int}$	$q^{int}$
$(\frac{1}{2},1)$	$(0,1-\delta)$		$\left[\theta_{2},1\right]$	0	$2\theta-1$
$(\frac{1}{2},1)$	$[1-\delta,\delta)$	$(0,\delta-\lambda)$	$\left[0,\frac{1}{2}+\frac{\lambda}{2\delta}\right)$	1	$(2\theta-1)(1-\delta)+\lambda$
			$\left[\frac{1}{2}+\frac{\lambda}{2\delta},\theta_{2}\right)$	$\alpha^{int}$	$q^{int}$

Appendix

Table 1: Optimal Equilibrium Structure under Market Regularity

	Zero-quality ( $\alpha^{}=1,\,q^{}=0$ )	Low ( $\alpha^{*}=1$ )	Medium ( $\alpha^{int}\in(0,1)$ )	High ( $\alpha^{*}=0$ )
Quality $q^{*}$ as $\delta\uparrow$ (Prop. 5.1 )	upgraded a	$\uparrow$ if $\theta<\tfrac{1}{2}$ $\downarrow$ if $\theta>\tfrac{1}{2}$	$\downarrow$ if $\alpha^{int}>\tfrac{1}{2}$ $\uparrow$ if $\alpha^{int}<\tfrac{1}{2}$	unchanged
Price $T^{*}$ as $\bar{r}\uparrow$ (Prop. 5.2 )	unchanged	unchanged	$\downarrow$	$\uparrow$ b
Utility vs. pure subscription (Prop. 5.3 )	unchanged	$+$ c	$-$	$-$

Appendix

Table 2: Comparative Statics across Market Segments (Propositions 5.1 – 5.3 )

Panel of Figure 5 — Figure 5: Advertising Caps: The Underlying Mechanism ( $\lambda=0.5$ , $\bar{r}=0.18$ , $\delta=0.9$ )

Number of Positive-Quality Tiers	Quality-Driven Ad Premium ( $\lambda$ Interval)	Type $L$ ( $v_{L}=-4/3$ )	Type $M$ ( $v_{M}=1/3$ )	Type $H$ ( $v_{H}=1$ )
2	$\left(0,4/15\right]$	$\alpha_{L}^{}=1$ , $q_{L}^{}=0$ (Zero-Quality)	$\alpha_{M}^{}=\alpha^{int}_{M}$ $q_{M}^{}=q^{int}_{M}$	$\alpha_{H}^{}=0$ $q_{H}^{}=v_{H}$
3	$\left(4/15,3/5\right]$	$\alpha_{L}^{}=1$ $q_{L}^{}=\tilde{q}_{L}(1)$	$\alpha_{M}^{}=1$ $q_{M}^{}=\tilde{q}_{M}(1)$	$\alpha_{H}^{}=0,\ q_{H}^{}=1$
	$\left(3/5,4/5\right)$			$\alpha_{H}^{}=\alpha_{H}^{int},\ q_{H}^{}=q_{H}^{int}$
	$\left[4/5,14/15\right)$			$\alpha_{H}^{}=1,\ q_{H}^{}=1$
2	$\left[14/15,19/15\right)$	$\alpha_{L}^{}=1$ $q_{L}^{}=\tilde{q}_{L}(1)$	$\alpha_{\mathrm{Pool}}^{}=1$ , $q_{\mathrm{Pool}}^{}=\bar{q}$ (Top Pooling)
1	$\left[19/15,+\infty\right)$	$\alpha_{\mathrm{Pool}}^{}=1$ , $q_{\mathrm{Pool}}^{}=\bar{q}$ (Universal Pooling)

Appendix

Table 3: Phase Transitions in Positive-Quality Service Tiers (

\delta=0.8

\bar{r}=0.2

\theta_{M}=2/3

\bar{q}=1

)

Ad Degradation ( $\delta$ )	Quality-Driven Ad Premium ( $\lambda$ )	Base Ad Rev ( $\bar{r}$ )	User Segment ( $\theta$ )	Ad Load ( $\alpha^{*}$ )	Quality ( $q^{*}$ )
$(0,1)$	$[0,\min\{\delta,1-\delta\})$	$[\delta-\lambda,+\infty)$	$\left[0,\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\lambda}{2(1-\delta)}\right)$	1	0
			$\left[\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\lambda}{2(1-\delta)},\frac{1}{2}+\frac{\lambda}{2\delta}\right)$	1	$(2\theta-1)(1-\delta)+\lambda$
			$\left[\frac{1}{2}+\frac{\lambda}{2\delta},1\right]$	$\alpha^{int}$	$q^{int}$
$\left(0,\frac{1}{2}\right)$	$[\delta,1-\delta)$	$[0,+\infty)$	$\left[0,\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\lambda}{2(1-\delta)}\right)$	1	0
			$\left[\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\lambda}{2(1-\delta)},\frac{1}{2}+\frac{1-\lambda}{2(1-\delta)}\right)$	1	$(2\theta-1)(1-\delta)+\lambda$
			$\left[\frac{1}{2}+\frac{1-\lambda}{2(1-\delta)},1\right]$	1	$\bar{q}=1$

Appendix

Table 4: Optimal Equilibrium Structure outside the Regular Parameter Region

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