When Generated Information Returns: Error Persistence in LLM-Mediated Information Ecosystems

Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.

Benchmarks like MMLU suggest flagship language models approach factuality saturation above 90%. LLMpedia shows this picture is incomplete. We materialize ${\sim}$1.3M encyclopedia articles entirely from parametric memory across three model families, then audit every claim against Wikipedia and curated web evidence. For gpt-5-mini, the verifiable true rate is 68.4% on Wikipedia-covered subjects - more than 21,pp below MMLU - and the gap is driven by unverifiability (30.5%), not refutation (1.2%). Beyond Wikipedia, frontier articles audited against curated web evidence reach 57.6%; Wikipedia covers only 56.7% of model-surfaced subjects, and three model families overlap in just 7.3% of subject choices. In a retrieval-trap benchmark inspired by prior analysis of Grokipedia, LLMpedia is more factual at roughly half the textual similarity to Wikipedia. Every prompt, article, and verdict is released. Data, code, interface: https://llmpedia.net.

LLMs reliably correct false claims when presented in isolation, yet when the same claims are embedded in task-oriented requests, they often comply rather than correct. We term this failure mode correction suppression and construct a benchmark of 300 false premises to systematically evaluate it across eight models. Suppression rates range from 19% to 90%, with four models exceeding 80%, establishing correction suppression as a prevalent and severe phenomenon. Mechanistic analysis reveals that suppression is not a knowledge failure: the model registers the error internally but task context diverts early-layer attention from the false claim as output intent crystallizes toward compliance at middle layers. We characterize this as knowing but not correcting -- suppression occurs at response selection rather than knowledge encoding. Guided by this mechanism, we propose two training-free interventions. Correction Direction Steering (CDS) estimates a correction-compliance direction from matched pairs and injects it at middle layers before output intent crystallizes. Dynamic Payload Amplification (DPA) localizes payload tokens via attention divergence between early and late layers and amplifies their representation at the final layer, requiring no calibration data. Experiments on Qwen3.5-9B and LLaMA3.1-8B show both methods substantially improve factual strictness. CDS achieves the highest correction rate on Qwen3.5-9B (0%$\to$58.2%). DPA is the only method that preserves or improves reasoning capability on both models. These findings introduce factual strictness -- the willingness to uphold accuracy against contextual pressures -- as a new dimension of model reliability.