Beyond Belief: Evaluating and Mitigating LLM Susceptibility to Misinformation

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly employed in various question-answering tasks. However, recent studies showcase that LLMs are susceptible to persuasion and could adopt counterfactual beliefs. We present a systematic evaluation of LLM susceptibility to persuasion under the Source--Message--Channel--Receiver (SMCR) communication framework. Across six mainstream Large Language Models (LLMs) and three domains (factual knowledge, medical QA, and social bias), we analyze how different persuasive strategies influence stated belief stability over multiple interaction turns. We further examine whether verbalized confidence prompting (i.e., eliciting self-reported confidence scores) affects resistance to persuasion. Results show that the smallest model (Llama 3.2-3B) exhibits extreme compliance, with 82.5% of belief changes occurring at the first persuasive turn (average end turn of 1.1--1.4). Contrary to expectations, verbalized confidence prompting increases vulnerability by accelerating belief erosion rather than enhancing robustness. Finally, an exploratory study of adversarial fine-tuning reveals highly model-dependent effectiveness: GPT-4o-mini achieves near-complete robustness (98.6%), and Mistral~7B improves substantially (35.7% $\rightarrow$ 79.3%), but Llama models remain highly susceptible ($<$14% RQ1) even when fine-tuned on their own failure cases. Together, these findings highlight substantial model-dependent limits of current robustness interventions and offer guidance for developing more trustworthy LLMs.

Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to be persuasive across a variety of contexts. But it remains unclear whether this persuasive power advantages accuracy, or if bad actors can just as easily use LLMs to promote misbeliefs. Here, we investigate this question across four experiments in which participants (N = 3996 Americans) discussed a conspiracy theory they were uncertain about with an LLM we instructed to either argue against ("debunking") or for ("bunking") that conspiracy. Across several frontier models (with standard guardrails but prompted to allow lying), we did not find consistent evidence of a truth advantage: the LLMs were able to both substantially increase and decrease average conspiracy belief, and participants in the bunking condition rated the LLM as more informative and collaborative, and reported greater trust in AI, than those who were in the debunking condition. More encouragingly, however, debunking induced more large changes in belief, and subsequent corrections were able to reverse the bunking effect. Furthermore, simply prompting the model to only provide accurate information dramatically reduced bunking effectiveness, and one powerful frontier model (GPT 5.2) almost entirely refused to promote conspiracies, suggesting that it is possible for the right guardrails to favor accurate beliefs. Finally, we did find a stark truth asymmetry in the context of information sharing: debunking had a large positive impact on mock social media posts composed by participants, while bunking had little effect. Overall, our findings show that people are not inherently less susceptible to AI that misleads than to AI that informs, but that potential technical solutions exist to mitigate this risk.