Quantifying and Prioritizing Stealthy Source-Manipulation Threats Against Multi-Source Anomaly Detectors

Behavioral contamination detectors can return "no evidence" either because a benchmark is clean or because the audit has little power. We formalize this distinction for a benchmark in which an unknown fraction alpha of items was seen during training. With matched clean and seen controls, the behavioral channel is the sparse mixture Q_alpha = (1 - alpha) P_0 + alpha P_1, and an exact second-moment argument shows that detectability is governed by alpha * rho * sqrt(m), where rho^2 = chi^2(P_1 || P_0) measures behavioral separability. Any scalar detector reduces to its efficacy, ef = |E_1 f - E_0 f| / sqrt(Var_0(f)) <= rho, which can be estimated from controls before the audit is run. A separate sample-split certificate lower-bounds alpha distribution-free, without requiring an orientation assumption. Our empirical finding is two-sided. Frozen calibration efficacy predicts held-out power curves, with R^2 = 0.83-0.98 across six exact-permutation channels, but the efficacy-only Gaussian budget is miscalibrated at the small sample sizes it prescribes, failing in 9/9 gate-passing channels even though efficacy itself transports. The failure is in the inversion, not the calibration. A predeclared two-stage planner that simulates the deployed test repairs the budgets, is uniformly conservative, and abstains when its probe does not transport. The certificate is valid but vacuous at audit scale, and a five-seed paired injection study recovers the mechanism ordering verbatim > paraphrase > surface, in which the apparent answer-only signal is explained by baseline drift. We report the audit contract and its failures together: a non-rejection is interpretable only alongside the efficacy, budget, and validity gates that produced it.

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are stealthy, multi-stage cyberattacks whose detection is difficult due to scarce labeled traces, severe class imbalance, and the challenge of generating realistic malicious behavior. These challenges are amplified in cross-operating-system (cross-OS) settings, where a detector trained on one source platform must be deployed on an unlabeled target platform without access to target-domain labels. We study this source-only cross-OS APT detection problem using system-level provenance traces and propose a transport-based framework for ranking anomalous target processes under zero target supervision. The framework abstracts process behavior into structured natural-language descriptions, embeds them using pretrained language models, and constructs a source-normal reference for target scoring. It combines three evidence channels: semantic deviation from source-normal prototypes, structural deviation captured by graph autoencoding, and geometric deviation measured through Optimal Transport (OT). The main contribution is an OT-based barycentric anomaly score that projects target embeddings onto the source-normal manifold and quantifies residual transport mismatch. We further introduce entropy-weighted, angle-aware, and density-aware OT variants to capture uncertainty, directional drift, and sparse-support behavior. Evaluation on DARPA Transparent Computing data spanning Linux, Windows, BSD, and Android, across two APT scenarios and twelve cross-OS transfer pairs, shows that the proposed framework improves ROC-AUC and nDCG over source-only anomaly-detection baselines. The results demonstrate that source-only provenance modeling, combined with semantic abstraction and OT-based anomaly scoring, can support practical cross-platform APT detection without target-domain supervision.

We present a unified experiment, analysis, and benchmark study of multivariate time-series (MTS) anomaly detection. Ten family-representative detectors -- spanning statistical, reconstruction, association, frequency, and generic-transformer families -- are evaluated on five datasets (SMD, MSL, SMAP, PSM, and MSDS) under effectiveness, efficiency, robustness, and cross-dataset generalisation. All methods share the same windowing, scoring, hardware, and metric protocols. Effectiveness, ablation, and robustness use three random seeds; cross-dataset transfer uses seed~0 because each extra seed requires $250$ source-target evaluations. The benchmark yields three method-independent findings: no single-bias baseline dominates; absolute perturbation VUS-ROC is more informative than retention ratios; and MSDS behaves as an event-dense deployment workload rather than a sparse point-anomaly benchmark. Under this protocol we also introduce \ours{}, an adaptive detector family combining a NOTEARS-constrained directed channel-graph view with optional patch-attention and temporal-association views. \ours{} achieves the best macro-average VUS-ROC ($0.675$, $+5.1$~pt over the second-best LSTM-AE), ranks first overall, and reaches the top-3 on all five datasets. Its wins on MSL and MSDS are narrow, while its average and robustness gains are larger: under the same three-seed robustness protocol for every method, it obtains the strongest absolute VUS-ROC across noise, channel dropout, and time-shift perturbations. We release the MSDS preprocessing protocol, configurations, scripts, and seed-level metric dumps.