cs.AIOct 30, 2026

Real Computation or Merely Naming? A Pre-Registered Mechanism Audit of 25 Cognitive-Architecture Modules in an LLM-Based Agent System

Authors: Peter Chen, Ni Zhang, Ying Xu, Siyuan Zhang

Organizations: Shenyang Institute of Technology, Shenyang, China

Abstract

Agent systems built on local large language models are increasingly marketed through the vocabulary of cognitive architecture: modules named global workspace, theory of mind, causal reasoning, or active inference are listed as features, and the presence of the name is taken as the presence of the mechanism. We ask the prior question -- does the named computation actually happen -- and contribute a transferable verification method for the claim-implementation gap: a four-question static audit protocol with line-number evidence and call-chain tracing, demonstrated on two systems. We audit a system claiming 25 cognitive mechanisms, pre-register falsifiable predictions for 11 modules and execute the interventions, replicate the protocol on the IIT-phi core of a second, independent system with its own pre-committed falsification criteria, and run two repair experiments as positive controls. In 18 of 25 modules the computed value never reaches any production output; three idle-wiring shapes new to the dead-code and code-smell literatures emerge (connected-but-never-called, called-but-inert, called-but-content-blind). Of 61 frozen criteria across 12 interventions, 53 were confirmed, two partially adjudicated, five falsified, one adjudication-ambiguous. Repairs raised planner task success from 0.028 to 1.000 and cut state-controller error by 52%. Module names and module computations must be audited as independent claims; the protocol and the five-class failure taxonomy are reusable for the claim-implementation gap at two-system, case-level depth.

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