cs.AIOct 30, 2026

Hacking or Just Failing? A More Capable LLM Monitor Better Separates Reward Hacking from Honest Failure

Authors: Kaushik Kezendirane

Organizations: Independent researcher

Abstract

An agent's visible score can exceed its real progress because it gamed the score or because it simply made mistakes, so a useful reward-hacking monitor must tell the two apart. We built a sandboxed task in which an agent can game a completion score, labelled every episode by replaying it and repairing the final state counterfactually, and ran five pre-registered studies. On 60 episodes from a Llama 3.1 8B agent, small local monitors (Llama 3B and 8B) did not separate exploit attempts from honest failures with the same score gap: prompt changes traded missed exploits for false alarms, and the pre-registered primary monitor reached AUC 0.64. On identical inputs, Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite, which completed 9/10 clean tasks against 2/10 for the 8B model, met our pre-registered criterion (AUC 0.80, 95% interval [0.66, 0.93]; 1/35 honest failures flagged); with only 14 exploit episodes, this estimate is uncertain. On an exploit that no prompt names, Gemini usually described the action correctly yet never flagged it, in 5 and then 25 new episodes, even when manipulation was defined by its effect on the score. Given the full trace, the 8B monitor flagged all 25 replication episodes and none of 25 honest look-alikes, but its explanations described actions that had not occurred; given additional structured evidence, it also flagged 15 of the 25 look-alikes. A two-rule deterministic check caught every known exploit. We release the environment, labels, pre-registrations and per-judgement logs.

Figures & tables

Appendix figures & tables1 asset

Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.

Appendix

Explore similar work

Aug 31, 2026

BAITBENCH: Measuring Agent Reward Hacking with Optional Shortcuts Planted in ML Tasks

LLM agents are increasingly used to run autonomous ML experiments, iterating on target metrics with little human oversight. Prior work has documented reward hacking in these environments, bringing into question the validity of produced research and the broader safety case for AI R&D. Existing benchmarks do not measure exploits that live in the data or the modeling task itself. We introduce BAITBENCH, a suite of three synthetic tabular ML tasks that each contain a shortcut that allows agents to inflate the public test score but fail on a hidden test set. Since the shortcut is optional and using it breaks no stated rule, BAITBENCH measures how often models exploit the shortcut to achieve inflated scores. Across seven frontier agents scored by our two-stage judge pipeline, 57.1% of runs exhibit reward hacking, with five of seven above 50%. Agents cheat even under a second condition where they are prompted not to -the mean cheating rate remains above 50%. We release BAITBENCH, along with the judge implementation, and an annotated dataset of transcripts containing reward hacks as a testbed for evaluating reward-hacking mitigations head-to-head.
Sep 23, 2026

Reward Hacking Challenges Oversight of Autonomous Research Agents

Autonomous research agents can design experiments, evaluate results, and write reports, giving them control over both a scientific result and the evidence used to support it. This creates a risk of reward hacking: meeting the reward criteria without achieving the intended goal. We study (1) how often models reward-hack without instructions to do so, (2) how effective and detectable their methods are when hacking is allowed, and (3) how they adapt when an LLM review panel returns its decision and reasons. Across 17 language models and 38 tasks, the spontaneous reward-hacking rate is 30.5% on open-ended research-pipeline tasks and 2.9% on task-specific kernels. When hacking is allowed on tasks whose pass thresholds exceed our best compliant baselines, 505/677 attempts (74.6%) are confirmed reward hacks: they both clear the threshold and receive mechanism-verification panel confirmation of an evaluation exploit. An LLM panel reviewing only submitted code and reported scores misses 33/505 confirmed hacks (6.5%). Direct methods that achieve the highest scores are often easy to detect, while less direct methods evade more often. In a five-round loop, the number of model-task pairs with an evasion rises from 7 to 56. Among 79 pairs evaluated under two feedback conditions, cumulative evasion reaches 40.5% with detailed feedback and 20.3% with generic rejection. The detailed condition includes the review decision, reasons, and attempt history, so this comparison does not isolate the effect of explanations. These findings highlight the need for stronger defenses, including metrics kept outside the agent's control and independent recomputation on data chosen to expose likely exploits.
May 3, 2026

Reward Hacking Benchmark: Measuring Exploits in LLM Agents with Tool Use

Reinforcement learning (RL) trained language model agents with tool access are increasingly deployed in coding assistants, research tools, and autonomous systems. We introduce the Reward Hacking Benchmark (RHB), a suite of multi-step tasks requiring sequential tool operations with naturalistic shortcut opportunities such as skipping verification steps, inferring answers from task-adjacent metadata, or tampering with evaluation-relevant functions. RHB supports independent and chained task regimes, where chain length acts as a proxy for longer-horizon agent behavior. We evaluate 13 frontier models from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and DeepSeek. Exploit rates range from 0% (Claude Sonnet 4.5) to 13.9% (DeepSeek-R1-Zero), varying sharply by post-training style. A controlled sibling comparison (DeepSeek-V3 vs. DeepSeek-R1-Zero) shows RL post-training is associated with substantially higher reward hacking (0.6% vs. 13.9%), with consistent gaps across all four task families. We identify six exploit categories and find that 72% of reward hacking episodes include explicit chain-of-thought rationale, suggesting models often frame exploits as legitimate problem-solving. Simple environmental hardening reduces exploit rates by 5.7 percentage points (87.7% relative) without degrading task success. Models with near-zero exploit rates on standard tasks show elevated rates on harder variants, suggesting that production-aligned post-training appears to suppress reward hacking only below a complexity threshold where honest solutions remain tractable.