Multi-Estimate Elicitation Does Not Uniformly Debias Language Model Judgments

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as judgment assistants and as stand-in participants in psychology experiments, yet little is known about how much their probability estimates move in response to a single new piece of information. We pair premise-hypothesis items from $δ$-SNLI with one strengthener and one weakener each, elicit the prior and the posteriors in separate calls, and measure the directional movement s: the mean posterior change signed by the annotated direction, so that the prior cancels out. We vary whether the update is stated ("Here is something else you learned") or reported ("Someone said that"), and whether the model gives one probability or five weighted estimates. We test seven configurations: two local models (Qwen3-8B, OLMo-2-7B; 240 pairs) and five configurations run through agent command-line harnesses (120 pairs), with hypotheses and analysis rules fixed before the formal runs (not publicly registered). Under stated, direct elicitation all seven move in the annotated direction (s = 18-28 percentage points). Reporting lowers s in all seven point estimates (significantly in six, by 2-5 points) and raises the share of reverse movements in all seven: the effect is consistent but small. Five weighted estimates lower the share of responses at $\leq$5% or $\geq$95% in all seven, but in the two local models they also reduce s by 43% and 68%, whereas in the harnessed configurations the point estimates of the change lie between -3.7 and +0.5 points. An elicitation format that reduces extreme values thus need not preserve sensitivity to evidence; the two should be tested separately. Because $δ$-NLI annotates only direction, we make no claim about how large an update should be. Code, data and the frozen plan: https://github.com/asj252/llm-judgment-studies

Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment? Two commonly stated limitations are that LLMs fail to capture full distributions of responses, and that their judgments are unstable across wording variations. We demonstrate simple prompting strategies that mitigate these limitations. Across two datasets--a U.S.-representative set of 144 moral scenarios and 38 moral beliefs from the International Social Survey Programme's Family and Changing Gender Roles module covering 32 countries--we show how simple elicitation techniques help improve AI-human alignment. First, prompting models to report standard deviations and response proportions recovers the full range of human responses better than common strategies. Second, ensuring scenarios are clear to human participants--as reflected in human confusion ratings--boosts model alignment, and LLMs can track human confusion ratings. At the same time, we find that LLMs' estimates of their own error are poorly calibrated, though they can predict human variability relatively well. These results suggest that asking better questions to LLMs can yield better answers.

Multilingual evaluations often score a model's opening yes or no, a token that also carries model and language answering conventions. We ask when different ways of eliciting and reading an answer recover the same judgment, and when they measure an answer habit. We collect 1.1 million replies from eight models in six languages on up to 105 moral vignettes, varying the question's form, the answer constraint, and the reading of the reply, token or sentence, in both wordings (the FAR-6 battery). Story-level judgment profiles converge across the tested readouts and question forms, except for the yes/no token after a negative interrogative read under a preset mapping: on the same replies, token and sentence profiles agree at a median r = 0.67 across cells, while sentence profiles agree with free-sentence profiles at 0.94, a known linguistic variability. With each language's story consensus removed, a model's profile is nearest to its own in another language for 39 of 48 model-language cells under proposition labels and 15 under free sentences, against 5 expected by chance. Particle, position, and named-term preferences follow their own patterns. A model can keep its judgment and change its yes: scoring that token requires establishing which proposition it affirms.