Same Judgment, Different Yes: Measuring Multilingual Judgment Profiles in Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed across multilingual and multicultural settings, yet it remains unclear whether changing language leads models to adopt community-specific moral reasoning or merely changes how shared learned abstractions are expressed. We conduct a controlled multilingual evaluation across six geographically, culturally, and linguistically diverse languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, Hindi, Russian, and Spanish), using parallel moral reasoning benchmarks with English-origin, Chinese-origin, and natively elicited ground-truth judgments. Across 13 open-weight LLMs spanning 2B-70B parameters, we find substantial cross-lingual divergence in moral judgments, with English generally achieving the highest performance even when ground-truth judgments originate in Chinese or are collected natively in each language. Yet the reasoning underlying these divergent judgments is considerably more convergent: Utilitarianism dominates in five of six languages, reasoning follows broadly shared stages, and language-specific moral-value associations correspond only sparsely and inconsistently to values measured in the corresponding human communities. Finally, a large-scale OLMoTrace analysis of pretraining data sources reveals little direct reproduction of training text across languages, while the corpus composition, training stage, and cultural provenance of retrieved training evidence vary substantially by response language. Thus, similar moral reasoning structures emerge even from heterogeneous and often linguistically localized training evidence. Our findings, collectively, reveal a central disconnect in multilingual moral reasoning: language changes models' moral judgments and the training evidence associated with their reasoning, but does not correspondingly localize the moral abstractions they apply.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly issue judgments read as binary verdicts, and a growing literature reports such judgments shifting under logically irrelevant changes of wording - among them an amplified yes-no bias on moral dilemmas, absent in humans. A single framing cannot say what such a shift is: in a yes/no question the word "no" is at once logical verdict, lexical token, and last-printed option. We introduce a psychometric battery that separates these: crossed symmetrization - every logically irrelevant factor flipped in balanced pairs - across a corpus of question forms. A graded rating across logically equivalent forms recovers a coherent internal moral scale: frontier models' stance $θ$ is nearly format-invariant (cross-form incoherence 0.12-0.21 on a $\pm 1$ axis); small open-weight models fail in model-specific ways. Forcing the verdict through yes/no overlays a decomposable artifact: an order bias toward the last-printed option - opposite to classic human primacy - plus a lexical pull toward the word "no"; the artifact is substantial only in the Claude models (story-averaged -0.32 to -0.86), $\approx 0$ for GPT-5.5 and Gemini, and shrinks under extended reasoning. The word and the verdict share one token; swapping the words for arbitrary labels separates them, and the verdict-attached logical bias proves $\approx 0$ for every frontier model, while model-specific label and order attachments remain: the models are not drawn toward rejecting - the pull follows the printed surface, not the verdict it carries. A minimal model, $P = σ((θ\pm m)/s)$, summarizes any such artifact by a framing susceptibility m and a moral decisiveness s, measurably distinct from sampling temperature. The battery applies unchanged to any dilemma set and binary format: measuring what a model values requires crossing the frames of the question, not asking once.

When a language model is asked whether its own answer is correct, three languages are involved: that of the question, that requested for the answer, and that of the verifier instruction asking for the judgment. Multilingual confidence evaluations seldom separate the three. We vary them independently in a six-language factorial design with ten open-weight models (3B-14B) on LSQA, MMMLU and TriviaQA, holding each answer fixed across verifier languages and measuring confidence with a first-token P(True) probe. The three languages move different parts of the evaluation: which of them governs accuracy depends on the benchmark, matching the response language to the question or verifier language sharpens discrimination but not calibration, and the verifier language alone shifts calibration error by up to 0.04 without changing accuracy. The scorer matters as well: an unvalidated judge would have shrunk the MMMLU English-Hindi accuracy gap from 0.198 to 0.038. Multilingual confidence results, model rankings included, are therefore comparable only when all three languages are reported and the scorer is validated.