The communication topology of Large Language Model Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MASs) governs how information propagates among agents and encodes critical domain knowledge and expert workflow design. It is valuable intellectual property and plays a decisive role in system utility and safety, yet remains vulnerable to inference attacks that stealthily reconstruct it from agent outputs. Existing defenses detect or mitigate such attacks but do not proactively conceal the topology itself. We propose Illusion, a proactive topology obfuscation defense for LLM-MAS. Illusion injects fake edges and fake messages to present attackers with a deceptive topology, while selecting low-impact candidates that preserve output-distribution equivalence and task-accuracy non-inferiority. The resulting fake edges are designed to be indistinguishable from genuine messages under black-box observation. Extensive experiments show that Illusion reduces edge-level F1 from over 0.87 to 0.62 and graph similarity from over 0.94 to 0.71. It also largely preserves output distributions and task performance, and its fake edges resist both similarity-based and LLM-judge filtering, even under adaptive pruning.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: Illustration of the risk of topology inference attack. Topology inference attacks Wu et al. (2026) against LLM-MAS exploit semantic cues from outputs to infer the communication topology. This leads to IP leakage and poses severe safety risks, motivating the need to protect and conceal the topology of LLM-MAS.
Fig. 2: The overview of Illusion . (a) Illusion contain three stages. It operates by generating prompts for candidate fake edges, then ranking each candidate based on its effect on the receiver agent via probing, and iteratively injects the best fake edge candidate, verifying that the addition does not degrade task performance or alter the output distribution. (b) We demonstrate that the resulting obfuscated topology of Illusion achieves effectiveness , harmlessness and indistinguishability .
Fig. 3: Defense effectiveness. Comparison of topology inference performance on F1 and GSim.
Model
Topology
MMLU
GSM8K
GPQA
Llama-3.1-8B
Chain
0.0210 [0.0094, 0.0336]
0.0092 [0.0011, 0.0175]
0.0034 [-0.0055, 0.0125]
Tree
0.0018 [-0.0060, 0.0095]
-0.0010 [-0.0087, 0.0066]
0.0007 [-0.0063, 0.0079]
Star
0.0013 [-0.0050, 0.0076]
0.0080 [-0.0005, 0.0170]
+0.0020 [-0.0061, 0.0106]
Qwen-3.5-9B
Chain
0.0051 [-0.0028, 0.0133]
-0.0056 [-0.0131, 0.0025]
0.0102 [-0.0013, 0.0229]
Tree
-0.0054 [-0.0126, 0.0021]
0.0208 [0.0095, 0.0331]
0.0036 [-0.0037, 0.0113]
Star
-0.0034 [-0.0103, 0.0035]
0.0099 [0.0033, 0.0167]
-0.0006 [-0.0071, 0.0063]
Table 1: Defense harmlessness. Results of equivalence testing on the output distribution of the LLM-MAS with margin δ=0.05 . The test is formulated in §4.3.1 .
Topology
MMLU
GSM8K
GPQA
Llama-3.1-8B
Chain
60.02 → 63.45
82.10 → 86.50
27.20 → 29.66
Tree
62.95 → 63.28
86.80 → 87.20
31.11 → 30.69
Star
63.77 → 62.89
87.40 → 87.70
28.80 → 26.81
Qwen-3.5-9B
Chain
85.47 → 86.28
93.80 → 92.80
74.89 → 75.03
Table 2: Defense harmlessness. Average task accuracy (%) before and after fake edge injection. Green cells indicate that non-inferiority was demonstrated at δ=0.05 ; red cells indicate that non-inferiority was not demonstrated.
Fig. 4: Defense indistinguishability. Classification performance of a similarity-based filter and an LLM-judge filter in distinguishing fake edges from genuine messages.
Fig. 5: Defense indistinguishability. Topology inference performance under adaptive attack using similarity-based filter and LLM-judge filter.
Fig. 6: Topology inference performance against the number of fake edges.
Fig. 7: Defense effectiveness and indistinguishability (case study) Topology inference performance evaluated on a case study using Qwen-3.5-9B on MetaGPT. The topology inference performance under adaptive attack using similarity-based filter and LLM-judge filter are also illustrated.
Topology
Output distribution
Task performance
MetaGPT
0.0008 [-0.0075, 0.0097]
73.40 → 73.30
Table 3: Defense harmlessness (case study). Harmlessness results for Qwen-3.5-9B on MetaGPT, evaluated on HumanEval. Output distribution equivalence and non-inferiority of task performance (pass rate) are both established at δ=0.05 .
Appendix figures & tables8 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Component
Setting
Development set
ndev =30
Test set
ntest =100
No. of execution
k=10
Fake edge prompts
Kp=2
Temperature
0.7
Budget
B=3
Appendix
Table 4: Implementation parameters.
Fig. 8: Examples of topologies, fake edge injection, and topology inference results. The left column shows the real edges and fake edges. The prediction of CIA and GPT-5.4 are also illustrated, where green edges are correctly predicted while red edges are wrong prediction.
Model
Topology
Method
Sim. bound
Llama-3.1-8B
MMLU
Chain
0.024
Star
0.025
Tree
0.029
GSM8K
Chain
0.031
Star
0.040
Tree
0.028
Appendix
Table 5: No-effect controls. Under no defense, the largest absolute endpoint of the 90% CI for the output-similarity effect (“Sim. bound”).
Model
Topology
Method
Acc. half-width
Llama-3.1-8B
MMLU
Chain
0.029
Star
0.028
Tree
0.029
GSM8K
Chain
0.029
Star
0.023
Tree
0.024
Appendix
Table 6: No-effect controls. Under no defense, the 95% CI half-width for the task-accuracy difference (“Acc. half-width”).
Model
Dataset
Topology
Δˉ 95% CI
Llama-3.1-8B
MMLU
Chain
0.034 [0.003, 0.067]
Star
-0.009 [-0.035, 0.017]
Tree
0.003 [-0.026, 0.034]
GSM8K
Chain
0.044 [0.015, 0.073]
Star
0.003 [-0.019, 0.024]
Tree
0.004 [-0.020, 0.028]
Appendix
Table 7: Task-accuracy non-inferiority. Paired accuracy difference Δˉ and its 95% CI.
Table 8: Prompt template for LLM-based topology inference. The prompt is adopted and modified from CIA ( Wu et al., 2026 ) .
Table 9: Prompt template for LLM-judge filter to aims to filter fake messages from the message transcript.
Table 10: Prompt template for generating the candidate prompts for fake message generation.
Multi-agent system security studies attacks, trust, privacy, and defenses in interacting AI agents, including language-model teams, robot swarms, and learned controllers.
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Stevens Institute of Technology · Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Houston
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China · School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China · Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia +2