Payment fraud causes financial losses and undermines users' trust in web payment services. Although fraud detection is a critical defense for payment security, complex and diverse fraudulent behaviors can still evade detection. Generating fraud samples for data augmentation can broaden detectors' coverage of different fraud patterns. However, existing methods matching the distribution of transaction attributes alone do not ensure that generated sequences preserve the sequential relationships among transaction choices, payment feedback, and subsequent behavioral adjustments. To this end, we propose PaySeqGen, an interpretable inverse reinforcement learning framework that reconstructs fraud behavior policies from fraudsters' observed payment trajectories. We design a mechanism for constructing candidate actions to support plausible payment sequence generation while enabling exploration. The framework also learns interpretable behavioral rewards that capture fraudsters' preferences across different transaction contexts. By alternating between reward learning and policy optimization, the framework reconstructs policies that generate new fraud sequences for detector augmentation and learns interpretable rewards supporting sequential fraud-pattern analysis in real trajectories. Experiments in real-world payment scenarios at Ant International, a leading global digital payment provider, show that PaySeqGen outperforms state-of-the-art generative augmentation methods. Reward-based trajectory analysis also identifies fraud patterns of practical value, helping analyst locating suspicious segments and examine multistep fraud tactics. Evaluation in the deployed system of online payment further confirms its effectiveness.
Figures & tables
Figure 1. An illustrative online fraud payment sequence and its decision context shaped by feedback.
Figure 2. Overview of PaySeqGen. (a) Model payment trajectories as a sequential decision process. (b) Construct candidate actions through history-guided sampling and exploratory sampling. (c) Learn behavioral rewards with feedback–action interactions, supporting fraud-pattern analysis and guiding fraud policy reconstruction. (d) Optimize the policy using learned rewards to generate payment sequences for detector augmentation.
Detectors
RT
TabFormer
GraphSAGE
XGBoost
Metrics
Δ AUC
Δ Recall@2
Δ KS
Δ AUC
Δ Recall@2
Δ KS
Δ AUC
Δ Recall@2
Δ KS
Δ AUC
Δ Recall@2
Δ KS
Control
Fraud replay
-0.046
+1.094
+0.166
-0.092
-1.679
-0.042
+0.036
+1.098
+0.416
+0.109
+0.325
+0.074
Baselines
BC
-0.141
-0.360
+0.055
+0.089
-2.972
-0.097
+0.681
+3.375
+0.975
-0.195
-1.266
-0.354
CTGAN
-0.036
+1.559
-0.169
+0.148
-2.218
+0.170
+0.066
+1.370
+0.934
-0.025
-0.193
-0.304
Diffusion-TS
-0.189
+0.871
-0.610
-0.042
-1.923
-0.423
+0.343
+1.454
+1.056
-0.095
-0.976
-0.232
TabDiff
+0.169
+0.769
+0.108
+0.198
-2.000
+0.295
-0.251
+0.111
-0.517
-0.093
-0.103
-0.628
Table 1. Performance changes across four fraud detectors under different augmentation methods. Values are percentage-point differences from training without augmentation. Boldface and underlining indicate the best and second-best results per column.
Figure 3. Reward-guided fraud-pattern analysis. (a) Payment history and relative rewards, with the selected interval shaded and the fraudulent target marked by a star. (b) Features with the largest positive contributions to relative reward within the selected interval. (c) Prevalence of the corresponding pattern among real fraud-target and legitimate-target trajectories.
Figure 4. Sensitivity Analysis with respect to the ratio of augmented samples and the exploration candidate ratio.
Figure 5. Schematic overview of online payment risk-control pipeline integrating risk services and model services.
Method
AUC
Recall@2
KS
Model-1
86.02
40.66
54.69
Model-1 (PaySeqGen)
86.23
43.85
55.45
Model-2
85.90
41.79
55.03
Model-2 (PaySeqGen)
86.16
44.63
56.09
Table 2. Results of online A/B tests.
Appendix figures & tables3 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Augmentation
RT
TabFormer
GraphSAGE
XGBoost
Δ AUC
Δ Recall@2
Δ KS
Δ AUC
Δ Recall@2
Δ KS
Δ AUC
Δ Recall@2
Δ KS
Δ AUC
Δ Recall@2
Δ KS
Real-fraud replay
-3.874
-0.654
-2.781
+0.249
-0.292
+0.159
-1.221
-0.905
-0.327
-0.874
-0.028
-0.242
BC
-11.970
-0.710
-10.376
-1.583
-0.306
-1.531
-0.439
-1.184
+0.708
-1.175
+0.084
-1.019
CTGAN
-12.406
-1.058
-11.004
-4.368
-0.794
-3.842
-6.084
-1.351
-5.278
-0.404
+0.292
-0.234
Diffusion-TS
-4.191
-0.947
-2.809
+0.449
-0.111
+0.559
-0.548
-1.253
+0.258
-0.894
+0.014
-0.401
TabDiff
-2.361
-0.961
-3.202
-4.600
-0.473
-4.566
-3.620
-1.392
-3.241
-0.337
+0.265
-0.150
Appendix
Table 3. Augmentation results on public credit card fraud detection dataset MS-FFSD.
Reduction
Fraud-target
Legitimate-target
10%
43/885 (4.86%)
5/1,604 (0.31%)
20%
35/885 (3.95%)
4/1,604 (0.25%)
30%
31/885 (3.50%)
3/1,604 (0.19%)
Appendix
Table 4. Pattern prevalence under different minimum amount reductions. Entries show matched/eligible trajectories and occurrence rates.
Method
Local W1 ↓
Cond. JS ↓
2-step JS ↓
Path MMD 2 ↓
Cov. (%) ↑
BC
0.316
0.180
0.486
0.0313
24.44
CTGAN
1.462
0.380
0.349
0.2352
1.39
Diffusion-TS
0.613
0.299
0.284
0.0574
10.21
TabDiff
1.086
0.335
0.240
0.0373
0.98
MoE-BiEntIRL
0.730
0.451
0.472
0.1407
4.97
PaySeqGen
0.560
0.369
0.176
0.0540
18.12
Appendix
Table 5. Behavioral fidelity and coverage of generated fraud samples on the proprietary dataset. Values are means; bold denotes the best value in each column.