Regret-based Characterization, Information Limits, and the Sample Complexity of Auditing Adaptive Policies

We study the problem of auditing a black-box algorithmic decision-maker from observable inputs and outputs alone. Our main result is an exact decomposition: under precisely characterized conditions, the cumulative regret of a dynamic policy equals the sum of per-period covariances between the cost vector and the policy's decision. This extends the single-period identity of Aldridge~(2026) to the full multi-period setting of stochastic dynamic programming. We prove the identity holds exactly under i.i.d. costs and mean-unbiased Markov policies, derive closed-form bias corrections for non-stationary and time-varying cases, and establish the discounted-horizon analog. A Bellman recursion for the covariance regret functional connects the result to standard reinforcement learning algorithms; for rolling-window policies, the estimation-error bias is $O(d/w)$. The decomposition has direct implications for algorithmic auditing in strategic environments: in platform mechanism design, it provides a welfare-based audit metric without access to the agent's private type; in repeated games, covariance reduction is a sufficient condition for policy improvement; in procurement and ad auctions, the bias correction quantifies welfare loss from strategic misreporting. The associated trajectory estimator is consistent, asymptotically normal with HAC variance, and computable in $O(T \cdot nd)$ time. This makes the proposed approach a tractable, model-free audit tool for platform mechanisms, algorithmic portfolio strategies, and any sequential decision system subject to external performance review.

When many reinforcement-learning policies achieve near-optimal return, a post-hoc auditor may have to distinguish among many behaviorally distinct but return-equivalent policies. We formalize this phenomenon through an occupancy-measure analogue of Rashomon capacity: the metric entropy of the near-optimal occupancy region, computed relative to an audited deployment class. Because occupancy measures identify behavior only up to occupancy equivalence, we formulate auditing at the occupancy-class level and distinguish exact local-query oracles from noisy sample-query oracles. Our main exact-query result is conditional: if the audited class contains a $2/H$-separated near-optimal packing whose local signatures are $b$-sparse, then exact local-query auditing requires $Ω(M/b)$ queries; when the packing realizes deployment-class capacity and $b=O(1)$, this becomes $Ω(2^{\Hopt^\cF(\eps)})$. We give a finite discounted hidden-branch MDP attaining this bound and show the exact Bayes success law. For noisy hidden-trigger testing, we prove a mixture lower bound of order $M/β$, where $β$ is the per-sample KL signal, yielding $Ω(2^{\Hopt^\cF(\eps)}/(ρ^2Δ^2))$ for capacity-order packings with $β=O(ρ^2Δ^2)$. We also provide a static target-recognition information lower bound, a transcript-compatible oracle-cover verification upper bound, and a canonical occupancy regularizer whose regularized audited capacity collapses when a trusted reference occupancy is available. Controlled benchmarks distinguish positive sparse-signature instances from high-capacity negative controls where exact auditing is easy, and map the noisy-trigger law to post-processed continuous-control and visual-RL auditing regimes.

Fraud can pose a challenge in many resource allocation domains, including social service delivery and credit provision. For example, agents may misreport private information in order to gain benefits or access to credit. To mitigate this, a principal can design strategic audits to verify claims and penalize misreporting. In this paper, we introduce a general model of audit policy design as a principal-agent game with multiple agents, where the principal commits to an audit policy, and agents collectively choose an equilibrium that minimizes the principal's utility. We examine both adaptive and non-adaptive settings, depending on whether the principal's policy can be responsive to the distribution of agent reports. Our work provides efficient algorithms for computing optimal audit policies in both settings and extends these results to a setting with limited audit budgets.