Decentralized federated learning (DFL) eliminates the central aggregation server but remains vulnerable to non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID) data, Byzantine attacks, and channel noise. We show that channel noise accumulates as models propagate across nodes and becomes increasingly significant as the learning rate decays. Moreover, accumulated noise enables Byzantine attackers to exploit loss-based model selection by mimicking the average of the honest models. To address these challenges, we propose FedSharp (screened, hop-aware, averaged, ranked, proximal), a robust DFL framework. In FedSharp, each node keeps the latest models received from its 2b predecessors, which guarantees at least b honest candidates when at most b nodes are Byzantine. FedSharp screens suspicious models using their deviations from the coordinate-wise median, averages the b lowest-loss candidates to reduce the fresh channel-noise variance by a factor of b, and applies hop-aware gradient-norm regularization and proximal training to mitigate accumulated noise and non-IID drift. Experiments on a 100-node ring with 33 Byzantine nodes show that FedSharp achieves 93.5 to 94.9 percent accuracy on MNIST, compared with 29.4 to 38.1 percent for a state-of-the-art single-model-selection benchmark, and 32.8 to 48.8 percent on CIFAR-10, compared with 10.0 to 30.5 percent, across Gaussian and hidden attacks under IID and non-IID data. On MNIST, FedSharp comes within 1.3 percentage points of the benchmark operating without channel noise, and exceeds it under the hidden attack.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: The DFL framework of N nodes arranged on a ring topology.
Fig. 2: FedSharp at an active honest node. Screening and ranking remove attackers that look different; averaging reduces channel noise; the hop-aware robust loss and the proximal term shape the local training.
Item
Setting
Datasets
MNIST, CIFAR-10
Clients / rounds
100 / 500 ring rounds
Partition
IID; non-IID (Dirichlet β=0.5 )
Optimizer
SGD, batch 80, ηk=0.03/(1+0.03k)
Basil
S=10 , 1 step; ACDS shares 5%
FedSharp
S=66 , q=33 , c=2.5 , h=1 , E=5 , μ=1
TABLE I: Parameter values
Fig. 3: Accuracy comparison under Gaussian and hidden Byzantine attacks and noisy channel for MNIST IID and non-IID data settings.
Fig. 4: Accuracy comparison under Gaussian and hidden Byzantine attacks and noisy channel for CIFAR-10 IID and non-IID data settings.
Federated Learning (FL) emerges as a distributed machine learning approach that addresses privacy concerns by training AI models locally on devices. Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) extends the FL paradigm by eliminating the central server, thereby enhancing scalability and robustness through the avoidance of a single point of failure. However, DFL faces significant challenges in optimizing security, as most Byzantine-robust algorithms proposed in the literature are designed for centralized scenarios. In this paper, we present a novel Byzantine-robust aggregation algorithm to enhance the security of Decentralized Federated Learning environments, coined WFAgg. This proposal handles adverse conditions and strengthens the robustness of dynamic decentralized topologies at the same time by employing multiple filters to identify and mitigate Byzantine attacks. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in maintaining model accuracy and convergence in the presence of various Byzantine attack scenarios, outperforming state-of-the-art centralized Byzantine-robust aggregation schemes (such as Multi-Krum or Clustering). These algorithms are evaluated on an IID image classification problem in both centralized and decentralized scenarios.
Diego Cajaraville-Aboy, Ana Fernández-Vilas, Rebeca P. Díaz-Redondo +1
atlanTTic Research Center – ICLAB – Universidade de Vigo, Vigo, 36310, Spain
Decentralized federated learning (DFL) is a promising paradigm for autonomous nodes to collaboratively train AI models without relying on a central server. However, existing DFL solutions do not guarantee global model consistency, a critical requirement for collaborative mission-critical scenarios where model divergence undermines decision uniformity and safety. This lack of consistency also amplifies vulnerability to Byzantine adversaries, who exploit the decentralized network topology and weak synchrony to perform equivocation and model poisoning attacks against individual victims. This paper introduces DFL-C, a novel Byzantine-resilient DFL architecture that enables decentralized nodes to perform collaborative training with global model consistency. At its core, DFL-C integrates an asynchronous common subset (ACS) consensus protocol into the DFL workflow to ensure all nodes aggregate a uniform set of model updates to establish global model consistency, despite individual Byzantine equivocation. DFL-C further implements a dual-domain trust scoring mechanism to provide resilience against data-domain Byzantine manipulations including model poisoning attacks. This mechanism complements the consensus protocol, significantly reducing the latter's runtime. Our experimental results demonstrate that DFL-C maintains model accuracy while achieving global model consistency under Byzantine behaviors with moderate consensus overhead. Notably, when compared with the state-of-the-art DFL solution BALANCE (Fang et al.) that does not provide model consistency, DFL-C achieves better model accuracy against untargeted model poisoning attacks and comparable resilience against backdoor attacks, with the advantage widened under non-IID scenarios.
Yue Li, Sudip Bhujel, Cameron Lira +2
University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA · University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA
Most existing Byzantine-robust federated learning (FL) methods suffer from slow and unstable convergence. Moreover, when handling a substantial proportion of colluded malicious clients, achieving robustness typically entails compromising model utility. To address these issues, this work introduces FedIDM, which employs distribution matching to construct trustworthy condensed data for identifying and filtering abnormal clients. FedIDM consists of two main components: (1) attack-tolerant condensed data generation, and (2) robust aggregation with negative contribution-based rejection. These components exclude local updates that (1) deviate from the update direction derived from condensed data, or (2) cause a significant loss on the condensed dataset. Comprehensive evaluations on three benchmark datasets demonstrate that FedIDM achieves fast and stable convergence while maintaining acceptable model utility, under multiple state-of-the-art Byzantine attacks involving a large number of malicious clients.