cs.NENov 3, 2026

Neural networks and games

Authors: Philip R. Neary

Organizations: Economics Department, Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract

Hopfield neural networks and noncooperative games provide seemingly different approaches to understanding how collective outcomes emerge from local interactions. In a neural network, individual units adjust their states according to local signals; in a game, players choose actions to maximise individual payoffs. I establish an exact equivalence between symmetric binary Hopfield networks and binary-action games that admit a quadratic potential. The equivalence identifies stable network configurations with pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and asynchronous neural updating with best-response dynamics. More broadly, the storage and retrieval of memories in neural networks correspond, respectively, to the design and selection of equilibria in games.

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