Cooperative Game Theory

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Cooperative game theory models what groups can achieve together and how to allocate their gains among members. Researchers use Shapley values and related contribution measures for fair attribution, and core-based concepts to test whether any group would prefer to act alone; hedonic games and exit-and-join dynamics model how coalitions form and change. Methods include axiomatic analysis, complexity and approximation algorithms, and scalable estimation, with applications to data and feature attribution, multi-agent systems, and federated learning. Key challenges are computing values across many coalitions and reconciling fairness axioms with joint contributions, while welfare, stability, and individual incentives may point to different outcomes.

Latest papers

41 papers7 papers in the last four weeks, with none the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

Min-Marginal Power Indices for Multi-Objective Feature Selection
Oct 24, 2026Wenjie Shi, Chi ZhaoFeature Selection Cooperative Game Theory
Saint Petersburg State University 7/9 Universitetskaya nab., Saint Petersburg, 199034, Russia
Formalizing Cooperation and Competition: An AI-Assisted Mathematical Addendum to a 2018 Planning Thesis
Oct 21, 2026Haitham Masaud AmarPrice of Anarchy Cooperative Game Theory
Learning Dynamic Games for Cooperative Iterative Tasks
Oct 20, 2026Mark Pustilnik, Francesco BorrelliMulti-Agent Control Game Theory
University of California at Berkeley, USA
Cooperation Without Adaptation: LLM Agents in a Collective-Risk Dilemma
Oct 16, 2026Trung-Kiet Huynh, Dao-Sy Duy-Minh, Chi-Nguyen Tran +4Multi-Agent LLM Systems Strategic Reasoning Risks in Language Models
University of Science, VNU-HCM Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam · Teesside University Middlesbrough, United Kingdom
Gossip Agents: Reputation through Opinion Dynamics over Evolving Networks
Oct 15, 2026Yutong Wu, Arlei SilvaCooperative MARL Multi-Agent Communication
Rice University Houston, United States
Rethinking Least-Core Computation in Contextual-Distractor Games
Oct 5, 2026Hiroshi Kera, Toshinori Yamauchi, Sai Ganesh NagarajanCooperative Game Theory Feature Attribution
Chiba University; National Institute of Informatics · University of Southern Denmark, IMADA
Reputation, Strategy, and Emotion Effects on Generative AI Cooperation: A Comparison Across Reasoning and Non-Reasoning Models
Oct 1, 2026Celso de Melo, Zishan Feng, James Hale +3Cooperative Game Theory Large Language Model-Based Social Simulation
DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory, USA · Department of Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineering, Gifu University, Japan · Department of Computer Science, University of Southern California, USA +1
The Role of Network Topology and Opponent Information in Shaping Cooperation in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Systems
Aug 29, 2026Seongho Son, Stephen Hailes, Mirco MusolesiCooperative MARL Multi-Agent Systems
Department of Computer Science, University College London · UCL Centre for Artificial Intelligence, University College London · Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Bologna
Emergence of Reputation-Based Cooperation in LLM Agents
Aug 5, 2026Kazuya Horibe, Kenji Itao, Wataru ToyokawaCooperative Game Theory Multi-Agent LLMs
RIKEN · RIKNE
A game theory for foundation models shows new paths to rational cooperation through similarity inference
Aug 4, 2026Alexander Meulemans, Maciej Wołczyk, Marissa A. Weis +11Cooperative Game Theory Game Theory
Google, Paradigms of Intelligence Team · Mila - Quebec AI Institute · Université de Montréal +6
Stable and Budget-Feasible Coalition Formation for Clustered Federated Learning: A Hedonic Potential-Game Approach
Jul 29, 2026Cengis HasanCooperative Game Theory Coalition Formation
Cognifinity, Luxembourg
Dynamic Coalition Formation and Communication Pricing in Skill-Based Agentic AI Systems
Jul 24, 2026Mojtaba EslamiMulti-Agent System Optimization Cooperative Game Theory
University of Calgary
Nonlinear Axiomatic Attribution for Cooperative Games
Jul 10, 2026Weida Li, Zhuanghua Liu, Yaoliang Yu +1Cooperative Game Theory Feature Attribution
Department of Computer Science, National University of Singapore, Republic of Singapore · School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Canada · Vector Institute, Canada
Exit-and-Join Dynamics and Equilibrium in Continuum Cooperative Games
Jun 27, 2026Quanyan ZhuCooperative Game Theory Coalition Formation
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering · New York University Tandon School of Engineering · Brooklyn, NY, USA
Parametric Open Source Games
Jun 25, 2026Aleksandar Todorov, Jesse ten Napel, Alexander MüllerNash Equilibrium Cooperative Game Theory
University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands · Safe AI Netherlands
Beyond Shapley: Efficient Computation of Asymmetric Shapley Values
Jun 23, 2026Ezequiel Companeetz, Santiago Cifuentes, Sergio AbriolaCooperative Game Theory Feature Attribution
Departamento de Computación, Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales, UBA · Instituto de Ciencias de la Computación (ICC), CONICET
Multiscale Exit-Join Dynamics: Tactical Consensus and Strategic Coalition Formation
Jun 19, 2026Quanyan ZhuCooperative Game Theory Multi-Agent Coordination
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering New York University Tandon School of Engineering Brooklyn, NY, USA
Exit-and-Join Dynamics for Decentralized Coalition Formation
Jun 18, 2026Quanyan ZhuCooperative Game Theory Coalition Formation
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering New York University Tandon School of Engineering Brooklyn, NY, USA
Agents that Matter: Optimizing Multi-Agent LLMs via Removal-Based Attribution
May 26, 2026Mingyu Lu, Yushan Huang, Chris Lin +1Multi-Agent System Optimization Cooperative Game Theory
Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering, University of Washington
Rethinking Weakly-supervised Video Temporal Grounding From a Game Perspective
May 26, 2026Xiang Fang, Zeyu Xiong, Wanlong Fang +7Temporal Video Grounding Cooperative Game Theory
Hubei Key Laboratory of Distributed System Security, Hubei Engineering Research Center on Big Data Security, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology · University of Central Florida · Zhejiang Gongshang University +3
Nash Welfare in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
May 18, 2026Marta Pagano, Alexander SchlengaCooperative Game Theory Game Theory
Sapienza University of Rome, Italy · Technical University of Munich, Germany
Semantic Cooperative Games for Contribution Attribution in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems
May 14, 2026Pengyi Jiang, Xiaoguang Zhu, Quanyan ZhuMulti-Agent LLM Systems Cooperative Game Theory
New York University · University of California, Davis
In-Context Credit Assignment via the Core
May 7, 2026Keegan Harris, Siddharth Prasad, Asher TrockmanCooperative Game Theory Credit Assignment
UC Berkeley · Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago · Google Research
QuadraSHAP: Stable and Scalable Shapley Values for Product Games via Gauss-Legendre Quadrature
May 7, 2026Majid Mohammadi, Grigory Reznikov, Pavel Sinitcyn +2Cooperative Game Theory Feature Attribution
AI Technology for Life, Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University, The Netherlands · Biomolecular Mass Spectrometry and Proteomics, Pharmaceutical Sciences, Utrecht University, The Netherlands · Rational Intelligence Lab, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Germany +1
Meritocratic Fairness in Budgeted Combinatorial Multi-armed Bandits via Shapley Values
May 1, 2026Shradha Sharma, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta JainMulti-Armed Bandits Cooperative Game Theory
Indian Institute of Technology Ropar
A Collective Variational Principle Unifying Bayesian Inference, Game Theory, and Thermodynamics
Apr 30, 2026Djamel Bouchaffra, Faycal Ykhlef, Mustapha Lebbah +1Nash Equilibrium Cooperative Game Theory
1DAVID Lab, University of Paris-Saclay, UVSQ, 78035 Versailles, France. · 2TSAM, ASM, Centre for Development of Advanced Technologies, Algiers, Algeria. · 3LIPN, UMR CNRS 7030, Sorbonne Paris Nord University, Villetaneuse, France.
From Necklaces to Coalitions: Fair and Self-Interested Distribution of Coalition Value Calculations
Apr 18, 2026Terry R. Payne, Luke RileyCooperative Game Theory Multi-Agent Coordination
School of Computer Science and Informatics, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK. · Quant, London, UK.
The Price of Paranoia: Robust Risk-Sensitive Cooperation in Non-Stationary Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Apr 17, 2026Deep Kumar Ganguly, Chandradithya S Jonnalagadda, Pratham Chintamani +1Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Multi-Agent Coordination
Technical University of Munich (TU Munich) · Brown University · Indian Institute of Technology Tirupati (IIT Tirupati)
CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas
Apr 16, 2026Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita +2Social Dilemmas Cooperative Game Theory
Carnegie Mellon University · Foundations of Cooperative AI Lab (FOCAL) · Jinesis Lab, University of Toronto & Vector Institute +3
Coalition Formation in LLM Agent Networks: Stability Analysis and Convergence Guarantees
Apr 15, 2026Dongxin Guo, Jikun Wu, Siu-Ming YiuCoalition Formation Multi-Agent LLM Systems
Department of Compute Science, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China · Brain Investing Limited, Hong Kong, China · Stellaris AI Limited, Hong Kong, China

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Min-Marginal Power Indices for Multi-Objective Feature Selection

Wenjie Shi, Chi Zhao

Saint Petersburg State University 7/9 Universitetskaya nab., Saint Petersburg, 199034, Russia

Feature Selection Cooperative Game Theory

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Game-theoretic feature selection scores each feature by its average marginal contribution across coalitions. An average shows whether a feature helps overall, but not whether, in some coalition, adding it turns an acceptable model into an unacceptable one. Building on minimum marginal aggregation, we define the Min-Marginal Power Index (MinPI) on a binary utility-threshold game. For a fixed quota, MinPI takes the value -1, 0, or +1 and labels each feature harmful, neutral, or decisive. A harmful label carries its own evidence, an evaluated coalition in which adding the feature drops utility below the quota, so no score cutoff is needed; finite-budget estimators keep this property but may miss harmful features. We use MinPI to propose feature removals, which are accepted only if they pass a validation gate, and to prefilter multi-objective search. On six benchmark datasets over five seeds, MinPI removed 12.5% of analyzed features with almost no loss of held-out utility. On Madelon and Abalone, where it removed the most, its removals cost far less held-out utility than random removals of the same size. Prefiltering increased the dataset-averaged hypervolume of multi-objective search in all five seeds. MinPI is therefore a conservative feature-deletion step whose gains are largest where the data contain many removable features.