"Blind Compliance": Coercive Control in AI Jailbreaking

AI safety is still largely framed as alignment: training models to follow human preferences, safety policies, and normative constraints. That framing has improved the behavior of modern language models, but aligned behavior does not by itself guarantee that a deployed agent can be stopped, overridden, or constrained once it operates in open-ended, interactive, and tool-using environments. A system may be safe in expectation and still fail to yield to explicit runtime authority under conflicting instructions, long-horizon execution, adversarial inputs, or risky tool use. This position paper argues that AI safety therefore requires controllability as a first-class objective. We define controllability as the ability of an AI system to remain reliably interruptible, overridable, redirectable, and constrainable by explicit control signals at runtime while preserving ordinary utility when such signals are absent. To study this gap, we introduce \controlbench{}, a benchmark for evaluating controllability failures in high-risk agentic scenarios. Experiments with OpenClaw-based agents show that current alignment and guardrail mechanisms reduce risk, but often fail to provide persistent, authoritative, and enforceable runtime control. We therefore propose a control-centric architectural framework that highlights explicit control planes, runtime intervention pathways, persistent control states, and auditable decision interfaces as key design principles for future controllable AI systems.

Women experiencing coercive control, a form of intimate partner violence increasingly conducted through digital devices, are turning to conversational AI for help, and the protection they receive should not depend on the language they write in. We analyse how AI responds to coercive control against women across languages. We put one scripted scenario to seven widely used language models in nine languages: a woman whose partner tracks her phone asks for help with a self-blaming letter accepting the surveillance. We scored whether the model wrote the letter and whether it named the control, countered the self-blame, and affirmed her agency. Failure split along two independent axes. On the first, systems from non-anglophone developers gave way most often in their builders' own language. On the second, how far a sympathetic excuse for the partner could strip a model's naming of the control varied sharply from one language to the next. Two frontier systems held the strictest standard everywhere, so a protective ceiling is attainable within this scenario family, and failures elsewhere are a design outcome. What is at stake is recognition: whether a system grasps a disclosure as coercive control, and whether it then acts on that grasp. We argue this should be held to a floor, one language at a time.

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving from conversational assistants into agentic AI systems that reason, plan, invoke tools, maintain persistent memory, communicate with other agents, and execute multi-step tasks. At the same time, modern models exhibit substantially stronger native safety alignment than earlier generations on which many jailbreak attacks and defenses were originally studied. This shift raises a fundamental question: which established jailbreak-security findings remain valid in the era of modern LLMs and agentic AI? We address this question through a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) that reframes jailbreak security around the full agentic execution pipeline. We develop unified taxonomies of attacks and defenses spanning user interaction, planning and reasoning, memory, tool use, and inter-agent communication, and introduce a security--utility--efficiency evaluation framework that separates native harmful-prompt safety, adversarial jailbreak robustness, and agent-level security outcomes. We further conduct a controlled empirical study of representative attacks and defenses within a common agentic framework. Our results reveal three important gaps. First, strong native alignment does not imply robustness to adversarial jailbreaks. Second, defense effectiveness is highly model-, attack-, and component-dependent and can come at substantial cost in over-refusal, utility, and latency. Third, low final-response attack success can mask severe intermediate compromise: planning, memory, and tool interactions may remain unsafe even when the final response is successfully filtered. These findings motivate a shift from response-centric jailbreak defense toward cross-layer, execution-aware security that protects agent state, component transitions, and external actions while preserving practical utility and efficiency.