cs.AINov 6, 2026

Knowing When to Intervene: Causal Evaluation of AI Agents

Authors: Ayush Sawarni, Wenqian Xing, Tijana Zrnic, Ramesh Johari, Vasilis Syrgkanis

Organizations: Stanford University

Abstract

Current evaluations of agentic AI systems primarily rely on benchmarks. However, the static nature of benchmarks makes them uninformative about the value of auditing interventions at deployment time. For reliable deployment, we often need to determine within an agent's trajectory whether or not to intervene, e.g., by verifying the agent's current output or steering it toward different behavior, using either human review or more costly models or time-consuming agentic supervision. The value of such interventions is fundamentally a causal inference question, asking whether the causal effect of such an intervention is beneficial for the final outcome. Estimating this causal effect is particularly challenging due to the dynamic nature of the problem: the impact of an intervention depends on the current context and environment, as well as the agent's future behavior. We develop the first methodologically grounded framework for evaluating the causal effects of randomized interventions within agent trajectories. By leveraging a relatively small dataset of agent trajectories collected under randomized interventions such as verification or screening, we can estimate the dynamic causal effect of a rich class of (contextual) intervention policies. The structural parameters that we estimate can also be used to construct safety leaderboards that capture the risk of various agentic actions, which can be used by practitioners for audit prioritization. Applying our methods to tau-bench Retail, ToolSandbox, and ImpossibleBench, we find that intervention effects vary substantially across agent actions and states. More broadly, our work suggests a rich research agenda at the intersection of causal inference and agentic evaluation, which we believe is essential for the reliable and safe deployment of AI agents in the real world.

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