cs.LGNov 9, 2026

Late but Valuable: Why Deadlines Change the Measured Value of LLM Reasoning

Authors: Sina Barazandeh, Benjamin E. Lundell, Jose Lugo-Martinez

Organizations: Ray and Stephanie Lane Computational Biology Department, Kenneth C. Griffin School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA · Arm, Inc.

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly plan and run experiments in automated laboratories. These experiments keep running while the model reasons and run on schedules with hard deadlines. If an LLM-generated answer arrives late, the system executes a safe fallback action instead, such as rejecting a sample. This creates a systems problem that standard serving metrics do not capture. An answer that matches the fallback adds no value, and answers that differ from the fallback may require more reasoning time. Reporting answer quality and latency separately can therefore overstate the value of reasoning. We test this on synthetic sample decisions, where the best choice is known exactly and a runtime enforces the deadline. We compare one LLM's fast mode, which answers directly, with its thinking mode, which reasons first. In a prespecified replay of 1,200 new decisions, thinking answers that missed a deadline were worth about five times as much as on-time ones. Multiplying the on-time rate by the mean answer value predicted about twice the value that thinking delivered. This prediction overstated thinking's advantage over fast mode by 0.0241 per decision, and by 0.0191 in a repeat on 300 new decisions. Both 95% confidence intervals excluded zero. In a single-GPU Qwen3-8B experiment using simultaneous request bursts, raising the number of requests from 8 to 56 reduced the share of thinking answers that met a 45 s deadline from 79.2% to 1.4%, although total output tripled. Evaluations of LLM agents for laboratories should therefore measure each answer's value and arrival time together and score the action that actually runs.

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