How Well Does AI Peer Review Work? A Benchmark Built from 100 Planted Errors

A new class of agentic review systems are emerging as a remedy to the pressure placed on peer review systems by AI-assisted research, but it is unclear how they should be evaluated. We evaluate two open-source systems (OpenAIReview and coarse), one proprietary system (Reviewer3), and a zero-shot baseline, across six LLMs spanning frontier and efficient models. First, we study whether AI reviews on ICLR/NeurIPS papers track with papers' quality as approximated by external signals such as citations and acceptance decisions. Every system performs above chance in pairwise accuracy, and the best is OpenAIReview + GPT-5.5 at 83.0%. Second, to test whether systems can catch errors with known ground truth, we construct a perturbation benchmark that injects four categories of errors into papers across eight arXiv subject classes and measure detection recall. The strongest configuration (OpenAIReview + GPT-5.5) catches 71.6% of injected errors, leaving substantial room for improvement. The union of detections across six models reaches 83.3% recall, suggesting different models detect different errors and better harness design can potentially increase performance. Beyond these benchmarks, we study a public deployment of OpenAIReview with real users. Votes on its comments skew positive at 1.44 to 1, and the most common complaints are about false positives and minor nitpicks. Together, by evaluating full review systems backed by state-of-the-art models on real research papers, we show that while AI reviews still have room for improvement, they can already track human quality judgments well, catch important errors, and earn positive feedback from real users.

Large language models (LLMs) can generate fluent peer reviews but often miss sparse, subtle, and document-level scientific errors. We introduce PaperAudit-Bench, a benchmark for evaluating paper-level error detection and error-aware automated review. It comprises (1) PaperAudit-Dataset, 220 high-quality AI/ML papers containing more than 2,200 controlled synthetic errors across eight categories, and (2) PaperAudit-Review, an evidence-aware framework that links structured error detection to review generation. Experiments across models, error categories, paper sections, and analysis depths show that sparse long-context auditing remains challenging for current LLMs. Conditioning review generation on explicit, manuscript-grounded error evidence produces more conservative and discriminative assessments that align more closely with human judgments than representative automated-review baselines. The dataset also supports post-training compact detectors through SFT and RL; Qwen3-14B achieves 55.8% F1 at Detection@1 under a fixed held-out protocol. A PubPeer transfer study and deployment in ScienceOne, a scientific foundation-model platform led by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, further illustrate practical applicability. Code and Dataset Page: https://github.com/TU2021/PaperAudit ScienceOne Manuscript Review: https://www.scienceone.cn/lit/#/assistant

As AI-generated reviews move from experimental tools into peer-review infrastructure, most robustness concerns have focused on explicit attacks such as hidden instructions and prompt injection. We study a harder and more policy-relevant failure mode: no hidden text, no prompt injection, and no changes to methods, experiments, figures, equations, proofs, or numerical results. The attacker modifies only presentation-level content, such as the abstract, contribution framing, related work, discussion, and narrative structure. We introduce adversarial repackaging: a closed-loop attack that uses AI-reviewer feedback to search for presentation-level revisions while keeping the scientific evidence fixed. Across three mainstream AI reviewers, adversarial repackaging achieves a 75.1% attack success rate and a mean score gain of +1.21/10. The effect is not explained by ordinary prose polishing. We also reveal that strategies that change how the reviewer interprets the paper, such as related-work repositioning and analytical discussion expansion, substantially outperform surface edits such as local polishing, table formatting, and algorithm boxes. Our analysis reveals two deeper structural failure modes. First, AI reviewers are easier to impress than to convince: highlighting strengths reliably increases perceived merit, while attempts to dissolve weaknesses frequently backfire. Second, AI reviewers can confuse the appearance of addressing a limitation with actually resolving it, allowing unchanged evidence to be reinterpreted as stronger scientific contribution. These results show that the deployment risk is not only malicious hidden instructions, but the emergence of paper presentation itself as an optimization surface. We release a contamination-free rolling benchmark and attack framework for testing whether AI reviewers remain anchored to scientific content under presentation-only edits.