cs.SENov 9, 2026

Code-Grounded Agentic Explanations for Static Analysis Vulnerability Findings

Authors: Oshando Johnson, Ranjith Krishnamurthy, Rohith Kumar Shanmuganathan, Goran Piskachev, Eric Bodden

Organizations: Fraunhofer IEM, Paderborn, Germany. · Heinz Nixdorf Institute, Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany. · Carl Von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg, Oldenburg, Germany. · Amazon Web Services, New York, United States.

Abstract

Static application security testing (SAST) tools surface vulnerabilities early and their verdicts are rule-based and auditable. Yet developers routinely dismiss findings they cannot interpret. Large language models can supply the missing explanation, but designs that also hand the model the detection give up the auditability that makes static analysis defensible. We keep detection with the analyser and give the model only the explaining. A preliminary user study with 20 participants and a workshop with 19 practitioners yielded five requirements. Guided by these we redesigned SAFE, an open-source IntelliJ IDEA plugin that explains findings from any analyser reporting in the Static Analysis Results Interchange Format. It tiers explanations by demand, ties them to the reported data flow, and replaces the single-prompt backend with an agent that must consult the repository and the rule that fired before answering. A within-subjects crossover experiment with 24 participants compared the redesign against its predecessor. Perceived usability rose from 77.3 to 85.0 on the System Usability Scale. Actionability gained most among the explanation-quality items, the aspect both earlier studies flagged as weakest, and the odds of a correct remediation were 2.6 times higher. Triage accuracy and time per finding were indistinguishable, which we read as uninformative rather than as equivalence. Trust was the one measure that did not move, and the closing interviews indicate that grounding made findings easier to understand rather than easier to believe. Participants also drew a boundary no requirement anticipated, wanting the tool to find and explain while they judge and apply.

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