cs.AINov 9, 2026

No finite rulebook can certify every safe program: an impossibility theorem for gatekeeping AI agents

Authors: Tomas Perez-Acle

Organizations: Bioinspired Artificial Intelligence Lab, Facultad de Ingeniería, Universidad San Sebastián, Avda. del Valle Norte 725, Huechuraba, Santiago, Chile · Centro BASAL Ciencia & Vida, Universidad San Sebastián, Avda. del Valle Norte 725, Huechuraba, Santiago, Chile

Abstract

An AI assistant writes small programs, and a gatekeeper must decide, from the code alone, whether each one may run. Suppose the rules are fixed: never perform a forbidden action, never let the output depend on a secret, always answer eventually. Can two rulebooks, one listing what is allowed and one listing what is not, both be complete, if every rule must be backed by evidence that a machine can check in finite time? We prove that they cannot. Checkable evidence can only establish what a finite record settles, and never'' and eventually'' are never settled by a finite record. For prohibitions the failure is one-sided: every violation can be caught by watching, but no safe program can be cleared for good. For confidentiality and responsiveness, neither side can be. We characterise exactly which rules about visible behaviour evidence can confirm, and we show that any sound rulebook of nn bits omits a compliant program of about nn bits. A time limit makes everything checkable, but only by running the program for essentially the whole limit, so a finite machine is not a feasible one. Finally, we show what a gatekeeper can still guarantee: not a verdict on every program, but a checkable list that contains everything it must allow and nothing it must refuse. Simulations on 2.2 million random programs and on self-referential adversaries show that the obstruction is adversarial rather than typical, and that the one error a longer test never removes is the liveness part of confidentiality.

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