Context-Predictive Low-Rank Adaptation for Face Presentation Attack Detection
Authors: Aminu Yusuf, Shakeel Muhammad Ibrahim, Sulaimon Oyeniyi Adebayo, Muhammad Sohail Ibrahim, Muhammad Shahid Jabbar, Shujaat Khan
Organizations: Department of Computer Engineering, College of Computing and Mathematics, King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals, Dhahran 31261, Saudi Arabia. · Geomexsoft Co. Ltd., Chuncheon-si, Republic of Korea. · Interdisciplinary Research Center for Intelligent Secure Systems, King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals, Dhahran 31261, Saudi Arabia. · SDAIA-KFUPM Joint Research Center for Artificial Intelligence, King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals, Dhahran 31261, Saudi Arabia.
Face presentation attack detection requires representations that distinguish physical spoofing cues across changes in acquisition devices, subjects, and attack media. Large visual encoders offer transferable representations, but conventional binary fine-tuning supervises their final decisions without explicitly constraining how local facial evidence is represented under partial observation. We present CP-JEPA, a context-predictive adaptation framework that combines low-rank tuning of a pretrained CLIP image encoder with a joint-embedding predictive objective. A student predicts complete-image teacher features at masked spatial locations, while unmasked classification, masked classification, and prediction consistency retain the connection to the live/spoof task. An exponential-moving-average teacher supplies evolving latent targets. The auxiliary components are used only during training; inference requires only the LoRA-adapted CLIP visual encoder and binary classifier. {We evaluate CP-JEPA under single-source and multi-source OCIM transfer, additional CelebA-Spoof training, transfer to CelebA-Spoof, two-source training, and unseen-attack evaluation on SiW-Mv2.} On the standard OCIM benchmark, CP-JEPA achieves 3.74% mean HTER and 98.73% mean AUC. {Single-source evaluation achieves 11.36% mean HTER across twelve source--target combinations.} With CelebA-Spoof added to the three OCIM training sources, CP-JEPA reduces mean HTER from 3.45% to 2.35% and increases mean AUC from 98.68% to 99.32%. On SiW-Mv2, it achieves 3.36% mean HTER across the held-out attack categories. Controlled loss ablations examine the contributions of latent prediction, masked classification, and prediction consistency. The results show that context-predictive adaptation can improve cross-dataset PAD performance, although the gains vary with the training sources and evaluation setting.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: Overview of CP-JEPA training and inference. The student learns from masked spatial predictions and binary classification, using an EMA teacher to provide latent targets. The teacher and predictor are used only during training; inference uses the adapted CLIP encoder and its native binary classifier.
Setting
Configuration
Architecture
Visual encoder
CLIP ViT-B/16 (frozen base)
LoRA
Q/V, all 12 blocks; r=8 , α=8
Spatial projector
Linear, 512→192 , followed by LayerNorm
Predictor
2 layers; 4 heads; hidden 192; FFN 768
Patch masking
Uniform random; 30% of 196 patches
TABLE I: Main CP-JEPA architecture and training configuration.
Method
OCI → M
OMI → C
OCM → I
ICM → O
Avg. HTER(%) ↓
Avg. AUC(%) ↑
HTER ↓
AUC ↑
HTER ↓
AUC ↑
HTER ↓
AUC ↑
HTER ↓
AUC ↑
CIFAS [ 33 ] ( 2022a )
5.95
96.32
10.66
95.30
8.50
97.24
13.17
93.44
9.57
95.58
IADG [ 4 ] ( 2023 )
5.41
98.19
8.70
96.44
10.62
94.50
8.86
97.14
8.40
96.57
DRDN [ 10 ] ( 2023 )
10.00
96.20
20.90
83.80
11.40
94.50
15.60
90.90
14.50
91.30
DiffFAS-R [ 34 ] ( 2024 )
5.90
98.10
7.32
97.40
5.66
98.69
12.38
94.33
7.82
97.13
DiffFAS-V [ 34 ] ( 2024 )
2.86
98.41
10.11
96.32
6.36
97.89
8.11
97.27
6.86
97.47
TABLE II: Cross-domain Face Presentation Attack Detection results on the OCIM benchmark. Lower HTER and higher AUC indicate better performance. The best results are shown in bold , while the second-best results are underlined .
Method
Train C
Train I
Train M
Train O
Avg.
I
M
O
C
M
O
C
I
O
C
I
M
DRDN-ii [ 10 ] ( 2023 )
27.10
17.10
24.50
39.10
23.10
37.10
27.80
13.00
21.70
20.10
19.00
19.90
24.13
CF-PAD [ 39 ] ( 2024 )
24.80
17.14
19.43
34.00
24.76
31.70
14.44
15.90
25.34
20.33
21.50
15.00
22.03
FoundPAD (ViT-B) [ 8 ] ( 2025 )
16.40
24.52
15.14
17.00
18.57
13.38
20.00
17.10
19.41
7.89
8.95
23.33
16.81
FoundPAD (ViT-L) [ 8 ] ( 2025 )
14.05
21.43
11.00
10.22
19.29
16.94
12.00
14.55
20.93
7.22
14.40
23.81
15.49
CP-JEPA (Ours)
13.13
20.00
20.10
4.63
8.33
10.76
12.96
6.88
15.07
8.15
5.00
11.25
11.36
TABLE III: Single-source cross-dataset HTER (%) on OCIM. Each method is trained on one OCIM source dataset and evaluated separately on the remaining three. Lower HTER is better. The best and second-best results are shown in bold and underlined , respectively.
Model
ICM → O
OMI → C
OCM → I
OCI → M
Average
FLIP-MCL [ 15 ] ( 2023 )
2.31 / 99.63
0.54 / 99.98
4.25/ 99.07
4.95/98.11
3.01/99.20
FSFM ViT-B [ 22 ] ( 2025 )
7.68/97.11
3.16/99.41
4.63/99.03
3.78/ 99.15
4.81/98.68
CCPE [ 37 ] ( 2026 )
3.64/ 99.67
1.30/ 99.98
4.15 / 99.31
2.86 / 99.24
2.99/ 99.55
CP-JEPA (Ours)
2.43 /99.54
0.74 / 99.73
2.88 /98.97
3.33 /99.04
2.35 / 99.32
TABLE IV: Performance on the four OCIM leave-one-domain-out protocols with CelebA-Spoof as an additional FacePAD training source. Results are reported as HTER ↓ /AUC ↑ .
Fig. 2: Cross-domain HTER, AUC, APCER, and BPCER for CE adaptation and CP-JEPA with CelebA-Spoof added to the source training data.
Model
O
C
I
M
Avg.
HTER (%) ↓
CE
3.65
3.33
4.75
4.17
3.97
Full
3.89
3.33
5.25
2.50
3.74
− Pred
3.19
5.00
5.25
2.50
3.99
− Mask
4.31
4.81
5.25
5.83
5.05
− Cons
4.31
3.52
5.38
6.67
4.97
TABLE V: Ablation study of the auxiliary objectives in CP-JEPA across the four OCIM protocols.
Attack
MD-FAS (SRENet)
DINO (ViT-B-14)
CLIP-B16
CLIP-B32
CLIP-L14
DINO-S14
DINO-L14
CP-JEPA
[ 40 ] ( 2022 )
[ 41 ] ( 2025 )
[ 41 ] ( 2025 )
[ 41 ] ( 2025 )
[ 41 ] ( 2025 )
[ 41 ] ( 2025 )
[ 41 ] ( 2025 )
(Ours)
FunE.
29.50
8.52
13.46
19.24
9.57
18.76
21.62
11.57
PEye
2.70
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.19
PMouth
1.10
0.19
0.39
3.65
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.19
PaperG.
11.90
0.19
1.62
2.47
0.19
1.04
0.19
2.30
Ob.
1.30
18.16
8.60
10.14
12.80
9.76
7.68
12.49
TABLE VI: HTER (%) on the SiW-Mv2 leave-one-out protocol. Lower values indicate better performance. The best and second-best results for each attack type are highlighted in bold and underlined , respectively.
Model
HTER ↓
AUC ↑
Panwar et al. [ 42 ] ( 2021 )
26.10
80.00
CIFAS [ 33 ] ( 2022a )
24.60
83.20
SourceOnly [ 43 ] ( 2022b )
29.70
77.50
SDA-FAS [ 43 ] ( 2022b )
18.90
90.90
SourceOnly++ [ 44 ] ( 2024a )
23.87
83.67
SDA-FAS++ [ 44 ] ( 2024a )
13.74
93.70
TABLE VII: Cross-dataset evaluation on CelebA-Spoof using O, C, and M as training sources.
Model
M+I → C
M+I → O
Average
HTER ↓
AUC ↑
HTER ↓
AUC ↑
HTER ↓
AUC ↑
SSDG-M [ 2 ] ( 2020 )
31.89
71.29
36.01
66.88
33.95
69.09
D 2 AM [ 45 ] ( 2021 )
32.65
72.04
27.70
75.36
30.18
73.70
SSAN-R [ 46 ] ( 2022 )
25.56
83.89
24.44
82.86
25.00
83.38
HFN+MP [ 47 ] ( 2022 )
30.89
72.48
20.94
86.71
25.92
79.60
MADG [ 48 ] ( 2023 )
23.33
82.32
26.29
81.50
24.81
81.91
TABLE VIII: Cross-dataset evaluation with M and I as training sources and C and O as held-out targets.
Face Presentation Attack Detection identifies spoofing attempts, such as printed, replayed, masked, or digitally altered faces, targeting face recognition systems.
Face presentation attack detection (PAD) aims to reliably detect a wide range of presentation attacks. While PAD methods achieve strong performance within individual datasets, their performance degrades under cross-dataset evaluation. Variations in sensors or lighting conditions can reduce the effectiveness of detectors from near-perfect to nearly random. Foundation models (FMs) have emerged as a promising alternative because typical PAD datasets, such as the MCIO benchmarks (MSU-MFSD, CASIA-FASD, Replay-Attack, and OULU-NPU), are small relative to the scale used for web-based pretraining. However, existing PAD systems primarily focus on CLIP-based foundation models, while overlooking other FMs with different architectures and training procedures. This study addresses this question by systematically evaluating 32 FMs. Zero-shot prompting achieves performance near chance across model families and scales. The vision encoders, when low-rankadapted (LoRA) with fewer than 1% trainable weights, achieve below 2% intra-dataset ACER in most cases, while cross-dataset ACER is substantially higher. LoRA primarily refines the decision boundary within a dataset, suggesting that pretrained representations and the adaptation dataset play a larger role in cross-dataset generalization than the evaluated lightweight adaptation strategy.
Peter Lorenz, Anjith George, Marcel Sébastien
Idiap Research Institute, Martigny, Switzerland · University of Lausanne (UNIL), Lausanne, Switzerland
Face presentation attack detection (PAD) remains challenging under cross-dataset evaluation, where domain shift degrades models trained on a single dataset. The scarcity of large-scale labeled data motivates adapting pretrained vision models rather than training task-specific architectures from scratch, raising a fundamental question: do general-purpose vision foundation models encode PAD-relevant information accessible with minimal task-specific training? To investigate, we systematically evaluate 24 frozen encoders, including self-supervised vision transformers, vision-language encoders, and supervised CNNs, using a unified linear-probing protocol on the MCIO benchmark (MSU-MFSD, CASIA-FASD, Replay-Attack, OULU-NPU). The backbone remains fixed, and only a lightweight linear head is trained to isolate the PAD information already present in the pretrained representation. Results show that frozen foundation-model representations can support strong intra-dataset PAD performance with only a linear classifier, but this performance does not reliably transfer across datasets. Model scale is beneficial within several families, although the effect is not monotonic and is strongly mediated by architecture and pretraining. InternViT-6B achieves the lowest mean intra-dataset error, whereas CLIP ViT-B/32 offers the most favorable cross-dataset transfer-compute trade-off among the evaluated probes. These findings suggest that while pretrained representations contain PAD-relevant information, explicit adaptation remains necessary to address domain shift.
Peter Lorenz, Anjith George, Sébastien Marcel
Idiap Research Institute, Martigny, Switzerland · University of Lausanne (UNIL), Lausanne, Switzerland
Face presentation attack detection (FacePAD) is critical for securing facial authentication against print, replay, and mask-based spoofing. This paper proposes CASO-PAD, an RGB-only, single-frame model that enhances MobileNetV3 with content-adaptive spatial operators (involution) to better capture localized spoof cues. Unlike spatially shared convolution kernels, the proposed operator generates location-specific, channel-shared kernels conditioned on the input, improving spatial selectivity with minimal overhead. CASO-PAD remains lightweight (3.6M parameters; 0.64 GFLOPs at 256×256) and is trained end-to-end using a standard binary cross-entropy objective. Extensive experiments on Replay-Attack, Replay-Mobile, ROSE-Youtu, and OULU-NPU demonstrate strong performance, achieving 100/100/98.9/99.7% test accuracy, AUC of 1.00/1.00/0.9995/0.9999, and HTER of 0.00/0.00/0.82/0.44%, respectively. On the large-scale SiW-Mv2 Protocol-1 benchmark, CASO-PAD further attains 95.45% accuracy with 3.11% HTER and 3.13% EER, indicating improved robustness under diverse real-world attacks. Ablation studies show that placing the adaptive operator near the network head and using moderate group sharing yields the best accuracy--efficiency balance. Overall, CASO-PAD provides a practical pathway for robust, on-device FacePAD with mobile-class compute and without auxiliary sensors or temporal stacks.
Shujaat Khan
Department of Computer Engineering, College of Computing and Mathematics, King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals, Dhahran, 31261, Saudi Arabia · SDAIA–KFUPM Joint Research Center for Artificial Intelligence, King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals, Dhahran, 31261, Saudi Arabia