Differential morphing attack detection (D-MAD) compares a trusted live capture with a document image that may contain a facial morph. We investigate whether labelled validation data can improve a frozen-parameter vision-language evaluator through prompt selection rather than model fine-tuning. Version1 generates 50 candidate prompts and selects the top-ranked instruction using a security-oriented loss that prioritises missed morph attacks (MACER) while accounting for bona fide classification errors (BSCER), response failures, parse failures, and decision inconsistency. Version2 recursively revises prompts using aggregate validation feedback. On a subject-disjoint test set of 160 pairs spanning LMA, MIPGAN-2, and PIPE, the selected Version1 prompt achieves a (19.17%) morph attack classification error rate (MACER), with (0.00%) observed bona fide sample classification error rate (BSCER), compared with (70.00%) MACER for a controlled manual prompt. The paired (50.83) percentage-point difference has a (95%) subject-bootstrap interval of ([43.33,58.33]). Recursive revision does not surpass the best Generation0 validation loss; the reported revised descendant obtains (31.67%) test MACER. All 23 attacks missed by Version~1 are landmark-based (LMA) morphs. Overall, the results show that prompt formulation can substantially influence frozen-parameter VLM-based D-MAD performance, while also highlighting the challenge of recursive prompt refinement under a compact 10-subject validation setting.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Agentic prompt generation framework for D-MAD. Version 1 and Version 2 Generation 0 follow the solid path from prompt generation to validation. Recursive Version 2 candidates follow the dashed path from the Scoring Module through the Prompt Optimizer and Prompt Critic before returning to the Candidate Pool. The selected prompt is fixed before test evaluation. Test responses are subsequently combined by deterministic decision and score fusion.
Method
HTER
MACER
BSCER
EER
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
ViT [ 5 ]
12.50
25.00
0.00
9.79
DINOv2 [ 17 ]
42.08
84.17
0.00
15.42
CLIP [ 21 ]
46.25
92.50
0.00
22.50
Manual prompt (adapted from [ 1 ] )
35.00
70.00
0.00
10.83
V1: P033
9.58
19.17
0.00
6.67
Table 1: Overall test performance on 40 bona fide and 120 attack pairs. Version 1 and Version 2 prompts are selected using labelled validation pairs; no model parameters are updated. Lower values are better.
Method
LMA
MIPGAN-2
PIPE
MACER (%)
MACER (%)
MACER (%)
Manual prompt
85.00 (34)
45.00 (18)
80.00 (32)
V1: P033
57.50 (23)
0.00 (0)
0.00 (0)
V2: G1_P014
82.50 (33)
0.00 (0)
12.50 (5)
Table 2: Test MACER by morphing method, with missed attacks among 40 pairs in parentheses. Lower is better.
MACER (%)
Reliability (%)
Method
1 resp.
2 resp.
3 resp.
FTA
PFR
Incons.
Manual prompt
72.50
71.11
70.00
0.00
0.00
3.13
V1: P033
23.33
20.00
19.17
0.00
0.63
6.88
V2: G1_P014
32.78
31.94
31.67
0.00
0.00
1.88
Table 3: Test response budget ablation. MACER averages all subsets; FTA and PFR are per response rates, and inconsistency is measured per eligible pair.
Appendix figures & tables7 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure S1 : Kernel density estimates of fused morph risk scores for bona fide and morphed comparisons. The top row corresponds to the selected Version 1 prompt P033 ; the bottom row corresponds to the selected recursive descendant G1_P014 . Greater overlap between the bona fide and attack distributions indicates weaker score separation. The scores are uncalibrated and are not probabilities; historical plot labels are mapped to the manuscript terminology in the accompanying text.
Prompt
LMA
MIPGAN-2
PIPE
Manual
85.00 (34)
45.00 (18)
80.00 (32)
P033
57.50 (23)
0.00 (0)
0.00 (0)
G1_P014
82.50 (33)
0.00 (0)
12.50 (5)
Appendix
Table S1 : MACER by morphing method on the 40 attack pairs of each type. Values in parentheses are missed attacks. Lower is better.
Figure S2 : Representative outputs for the selected Version 1 prompt P033 . The bona fide pair is accepted correctly, whereas the LMA pair is missed because the response identifies little visible blending or texture evidence.
Figure S3 : Representative outputs for the selected recursive prompt G1_P014 . The LMA pair is missed despite reported geometric differences because the response gives greater decision weight to the absence of visible surface artefacts.
MACER (%)
Reliability (%)
Prompt
1 response
2 responses
3 responses
FTA
PFR
Inconsistency
Manual
72.50
71.11
70.00
0.00
0.00
3.13
P033
23.33
20.00
19.17
0.00
0.63
6.88
G1_P014
32.78
31.94
31.67
0.00
0.00
1.88
Appendix
Table S2 : Response budget and reliability. MACER for one and two responses is averaged over all subsets of the stated size. FTA and PFR are response level rates over 480 responses per prompt; inconsistency is measured over pairs with at least two valid decisions. Lower is better.
Comparison
Difference
95% interval
Manual − P033
50.83
[43.33, 58.33]
G1_P014 − P033
12.50
[6.67, 18.33]
Appendix
Table S3 : Paired MACER comparison with P033 . Positive differences indicate higher error for the comparison prompt. Intervals resample subjects.
Generation
Prompts
Best
G0
30
1.10
G1
15
1.10
G2
15
1.20
Appendix
Table S4 : Validation security loss across recursive generations. Lower is better.