Agent-ZTA: A chain-Aware Zero Trust Model for Bidirectional Security-State Propagation and Runtime Containment in Multi-Agent Delegation
Organizations: Faculty of Computer and Information Systems, Islamic University of Madinah, Madinah, Saudi Arabia
Abstract
Multi-agent systems increasingly delegate tasks and permissions across chains of autonomous agents that invoke protected tools. Although agent identities and delegated credentials may remain valid throughout a workflow, the security condition of any agent along the chain can deteriorate during runtime execution-either through upstream compromise or downstream ingestion of untrusted inputs. Authorization models based solely on the immediate caller and its static delegated scope fail to account for these mid-execution state changes. This paper develops Agent-ZTA, a chain-aware Zero Trust authorization and containment model that links runtime security-state changes across multi-agent delegation graphs. The model distinguishes an agent's path-specific delegated authority bound from the effective permissions currently exercisable under trusted policy. It defines an architecture featuring independently enforced policy decisions, authenticated delegation provenance, a dynamic chain-state view, and explicit fail-safe handling of missing or stale authorization signals. Furthermore, Agent-ZTA defines bidirectional security state propagation, allowing downstream security events to affect relevant upstream workflow states, and specifies adaptive branch-scoped containment through restricted permissions and a sandbox ("jail") execution mode where an isolation boundary is available. The deterministic decision procedure, five stated security properties, and worked authorization traces show how accepted security-state changes constrain affected operations while preserving original delegation bounds and separating unrelated workflow branches under the defined policies. Finally, the paper states its trust assumptions and the exact scope of its security properties.
Figures & tables
| Situation | Relevant policy inputs | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| All accepted states normal ( ) | Valid path; normal | Read and write permitted |
| Upstream degraded ( ) | Accepted record; relevant to write only | Read permitted; write denied |
| Required state unavailable ( ) | Record for missing or stale for write | Write denied (fail-closed) |
| Event at (untrusted input) | Accepted event; | Write denied on branch ; other branches unchanged |
| Unrelated principal degraded | Principal not on the authenticated path | No restriction from that event |
| Write outside original scope | Write denied regardless of state |
Multi-Agent System Security
Multi-agent system security studies attacks, trust, privacy, and defenses in interacting AI agents, including language-model teams, robot swarms, and learned controllers.
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