Organizations: University of Pennsylvania · Independent Researcher · Columbia University · Northeastern University · University of Chicago · University of Rochester · Shanghai Jiao Tong University · University of Washington · Lehigh University · Syracuse University
Human approval provides effective control only if rejected work stops and authorized work completes. We formalize refusal safety and bounded authorization completeness, and audit three execution boundaries: the model selects a call, the harness schedules and resumes it, and the workflow routes the decision to a protected effect. Paired decisions, exact traces, and native business-state witnesses support experiments with three models, five prompt arms, four runtime approval designs, two additional framework replays, and 100 public workflow sources. The paired model panel leaves seven of 300 approvals unfinished despite zero denied effects; parallel confirmation loses an approved branch in three tasks per model, restoration omits 336/672 CrewAI approvals, and four of 59 comparable n8n workflows execute after Reject. Comparing intent, generated calls, dispatch, and native effects identifies the first observable divergence and its repair target. This yields a practical audit contract that makes both refusal safety and authorization completeness independently verifiable, converting human approval from a procedural formality into an enforceable control boundary between intent and real-world effect.
Figures & tables
Model
Complete [95% CI]
Denied effect
GPT-6.1-Sol
96/100 [90.2,98.4]
0/100
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash
100/100 [96.3,100]
0/100
Claude Haiku 5.5
97/100 [91.5,99.0]
0/100
TABLE I: Paired Retail results: 100 cases per model. Completion has descriptive 95% Wilson intervals; each model’s zero-leak upper bound is 3.7%.
Fig. 2: Five-arm approval failure rate for the displayed panel. O: original; S: action-specific; S ′ : wording-only; C: system card; L: ledger. Each cell shows its own rate and denominator; heatmap intensity indicates omission severity.
O
S
S+ledger
Tasks completing 5/5
17
20
20
Tasks below 5/5
3
0
0
Total completions / 100
96
100
100
TABLE II: Repeated diagnostic: 20 selected tasks, five samples per arm. Here L adds a ledger to S; expansion L instead adds a ledger to O.
Fig. 3: Harness-level results across six test families. Consolidated run counts include repair controls; native anomalies and their mechanisms are shown by model.
Protocol
T1 breach
T2 W
T2 O
T3 O
GPT-6.1-Sol original
4
4
2
0
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash adapted
4
4
8
1
Claude Haiku 5.5 sensitivity
4
4
0
7
TABLE III: Banking transitions: 16 episodes per family including controls. W: old-target effect after withdrawal; O: new approved work omitted. Counts can overlap within an episode.
Stage
Sources
Attempted public source IDs
100
Terminal paired suffixes (33 nonterminal)
67
Approve positive controls (2 excluded)
65
Policy-comparable pairs (6 excluded)
59
Reject suppresses protected effect
55
Reject executes protected effect
4
TABLE IV: Public workflow funnel; exclusions are sequential.
Fig. 4: Approval triage: follow the first divergence from the recorded decision, then check native effects. Each diagnostic branch follows recorded calls, dispatch, and native effects.