cs.AINov 16, 2026

Benchleaking Is Accelerating: Benchmark contamination has worsened sharply in the past month -- from post-training down to pre-training base models

Authors: Yiwei Qin, Muhang Xie, Xuefeng Li, Mohan Jiang, Dayuan Fu, Tiantian Mi, Qipeng Guo, Pengfei Liu

Abstract

Benchmark contamination is not new, but recent model releases show it in a sharper form. We use the term benchleaking for the case in which a benchmark's own test examples enter training data, so that a score reflects recall rather than capability. This differs from benchmaxxing, which optimizes toward a benchmark without seeing its test set. We document two escalations over the past month. First, in post-training, the traces have become explicit: recent audits show an agent stating hidden test requirements it was never given in 23% of its attempts, where its predecessor did so in none, and continuing to follow them after the task is changed to contradict them (Schaeffer and Räuker, 2026; Lo and Lo, 2026). Second, the problem has reached pre-training. Using few-shot continuation on 20 benchmarks across four public base models, we find that some base models write out other test examples---complete questions, options, and answers---that appear nowhere in their input. For the recently released ERNIE-5.5-Flash-Base, 96% of HumanEval problems leak with their reference implementations and 85% of OpenBookQA questions leak with their answers, against 9% and none for DeepSeek-V4-Flash-Base. To quantify what a reported score owes to such examples, we define an Anti-Hack score: the benchmark score recomputed with every leaked example marked wrong and the number of examples unchanged. Averaged over the suite, it costs DeepSeek-V4-Flash-Base 1.5 points and Hy3-preview-Base 1.3, against 5.0 for MiMo-V2.5-Base and 16.6 for ERNIE-5.5-Flash-Base. Open base models are the foundation of much downstream research, so benchleaking now affects more than leaderboard rankings. We call for decontamination reports and contamination-adjusted scores to become standard practice.

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