Large language model (LLM) applications increasingly act as agents that select and invoke external tools. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes this interaction by allowing clients to compose tools advertised by multiple servers. However, tool metadata used for discovery and selection is not, by itself, necessarily bound to a verified provider identity. This paper studies this gap as tool-provider misbinding: a failure in which a request intended for a legitimate provider is instead resolved to an attacker-controlled tool. The attacker does not compromise the host, LLM, legitimate server, or network channel; it only operates another MCP server that advertises tools with chosen metadata. We formulate tool provider misbinding as an attacker-controlled tool-selection optimization problem and evaluate it in a controlled MCP environment across five LLM-based clients. The results show that interactions drive misbinding. The strongest failures occur when exact-name collision, task-aligned description, and compatible schema reinforce one another, but authority-enhanced descriptions with compatible schema can also cause wrong-provider execution or unresolved provider ambiguity without name collision. Different models expose the same provider-binding weakness differently, including attacker-controlled provider selection, clarification requests, and unstable or inconsistent provider resolution.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: Controlled MCP tool-misbinding scenario.
Condition
Name
Description
Schema
C01
Unrelated
Unrelated
Incompatible
C02
Unrelated
Unrelated
Compatible
C03
Unrelated
Copied
Incompatible
C04
Unrelated
Copied
Compatible
C05
Unrelated
Authority-enhanced
Incompatible
C06
Unrelated
Authority-enhanced
Compatible
TABLE I: Main factorial attacker-tool conditions.
Cond.
Name
Desc.
Schema
GPT-5.4
Claude Sonnet 5
Gemini 2.5 Pro
Qwen3.7 Max
DeepSeek V3
VR/CR/RBS
VR/CR/RBS
VR/CR/RBS
VR/CR/RBS
VR/CR/RBS
C01
Unrelated
Unrelated
Incompatible
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
C02
Unrelated
Unrelated
Compatible
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
C03
Unrelated
Copied
Incompatible
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
C04
Unrelated
Copied
Compatible
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.22 / 0.00 / 0.65
C05
Unrelated
Authority-enhanced
Incompatible
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
0.00 / 0.00 / 1.00
TABLE II: Main factorial results. Each condition contains 50 included trials per model. The failure rate is omitted because FR=0 in all conditions.
Fig. 2: (a) Violation rate, (b) Clarification rate, and (c) Resolved Binding instability across the evaluated models and attacker-tool conditions.
Fig. 3: Model-level behavior across attacker-tool conditions.
Fig. 4: Schema amplification across models.
Cond.
GPT-5.4
Claude Sonnet 5
Gemini 2.5 Pro
Qwen3.7 Max
DeepSeek V3
VR
SD
95% CI
CR
VR
SD
95% CI
CR
VR
SD
95% CI
CR
VR
SD
95% CI
CR
VR
SD
95% CI
CR
C01
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
C02
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
C03
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
C04
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.184
0.036
[0.141,0.237]
0.000
C05
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
TABLE III: Unrelated-name robustness results across five unrelated-name instances.
Fig. 5: Robustness to unrelated tool names across C01-C06.
Fig. 6: C06 VR by unrelated-name sample and model.
Cond.
GPT-5.4
Claude Sonnet 5
Gemini 2.5 Pro
Qwen3.7 Max
DeepSeek V3
VR
SD
95% CI
CR
VR
SD
95% CI
CR
VR
SD
95% CI
CR
VR
SD
95% CI
CR
VR
SD
95% CI
CR
C05
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.000
C06
0.036
0.017
[0.019,0.067]
0.000
0.000
0.000
[0.000,0.015]
0.208
0.408
0.023
[0.349,0.470]
0.564
0.204
0.022
[0.159,0.258]
0.000
0.508
0.067
[0.446,0.569]
0.000
C11
0.044
0.022
[0.025,0.077]
0.000
0.004
0.009
[0.001,0.022]
0.208
0.024
0.017
[0.011,0.051]
0.528
0.196
0.017
[0.152,0.250]
0.000
0.592
0.041
[0.530,0.651]
0.000
C12
0.980
0.020
[0.954,0.991]
0.000
0.256
0.038
[0.206,0.314]
0.744
0.720
0.045
[0.661,0.772]
0.280
1.000
0.000
[0.985,1.000]
0.000
1.000
0.000
[0.985,1.000]
0.000
TABLE IV: Description-robustness results across five description instances.
Fig. 7: Per-description violation and clarification rates across five authority-enhanced description samples (D1-D5) for C06 and C12.
Fig. 8: Mean violation rate with standard deviation across the five authority-enhanced description samples for C06 and C12.
(a) Violation Rate (VR)
Cond.
GPT-5.4
Claude Sonnet 5
Gemini 2.5 Pro
Qwen3.7 Max
DeepSeek V3
r=1
r=3
r=5
r=10
r=1
r=3
r=5
r=10
r=1
r=3
r=5
r=10
r=1
r=3
r=5
r=10
r=1
r=3
r=5
r=10
C07
0.04
0.10
0.24
0.28
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
C08
0.12
0.14
0.20
0.30
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.60
0.68
0.70
0.76
0.40
0.86
0.88
1.00
0.28
0.18
0.08
0.00
C09
0.00
0.12
0.26
0.34
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
C10
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.16
0.88
0.84
0.90
0.92
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
TABLE V: Attacker-budget sensitivity across exact-name collision conditions C07–C12.
Fig. 9: Effect of increasing the attacker budget from r=1 to r=10 across exact-name collision conditions C07–C12.