Sep 30, 2026, cs.CRJ/K move · Enter open · S save
Jihun Han, Yejin Jang, Byung Il Kwak, Mee Lan Han
Korea University Republic of Korea
LLM-based agents extend their capabilities through third-party skills that provide task-specific instructions, scripts, and tool-use procedures. However, malicious instructions inserted into an otherwise benign skill can cause a benign user request to trigger dangerous Tool Calls, including data exfiltration, file deletion, or unauthorized code execution. This paper presents ActionGuard, which inspects skill-influenced Tool Calls immediately before execution. ActionGuard separates the target agent's action-generation context from the safeguard's authorization context. The target agent may use the original skill for planning, but the Reviewer does not receive the potentially poisoned raw skill text. Instead, it determines whether each action is justified by the trusted user request using a balanced skill profile, current and recent Tool Calls, and local script contents. ActionGuard intercepts each Tool Call at OpenClaw's before-tool-call stage and enforces the Reviewer's ALLOW or DENY decision under a fail-closed policy. We evaluate ActionGuard on 139 contextual and 180 obvious injections in a SKILL-INJECT-based setting against Dynamic Guardian and SkillGuard, using three open-source and two commercial Reviewer models. Each condition is repeated three times and evaluated using Attack Success Rate (ASR) and Task Success Rate (TSR). Overall, ActionGuard reduced ASR by 35.54 to 46.11 percent relative to existing safeguards and by 70.44 percent relative to No Safeguard, while maintaining high benign-task completion. These results show that execution-boundary authorization grounded in trusted user intent and runtime evidence can restrict unauthorized Tool Calls induced by skill injection.